Rhonda Wood

Justice Wood has served on the Arkansas Supreme Court since 2015. Before that, she served on the Arkansas Court of Appeals since 2013.

Info from Other Sources:

• Wood's campaign website states under a "Conservative Judicial Philosophy" heading that "Judge Rhonda Wood became a trial judge after being appointed in 2006 by then Governor Mike Huckabee. 'When I first ran for the Supreme Court, I pledged to bring Arkansas values to our state’s highest court – faith, family, hard-working, conservative values. Throughout my first term I’ve done just that, making tough decisions in the face of immense pressure. As a member of the court, I will always uphold the rule of law and the Arkansas Constitution will be my guide.'"

• Justice Wood's website also states that she's a member of the Federalist Society. The Federalist Society says that she spoke at a 2017 "Supreme Court Preview" event and a 2021 "Originalism and Supreme Court Advocacy Event"
  
• Wood told ArkansasVotersGuide.com that Justice Clarence Thomas most reflects her judicial philosophy.
• Justice Wood hosts a podcast called "Lady Justice: Women of the Courts"--"A podcast featuring four women Supreme Court justices discussing the judicial branch of government and their experiences on their state’s highest appellate court."
• In an interview about the podcast and in the context Justice Amy Coney Barrett's confirmation hearings, she said, "I think it's part of the purpose of the podcast. It's for us to explain that our decisions are not about politics. They're about how we interpret the Constitution and the law..."
• Justice Wood said in an interview with the Garland County Library that one of the most common misconceptions about the judicial system and the Supreme Court is that judges sway the outcome of a case. She said have been so many times when she has ruled to keep something on the ballot and then personally voted against it. She added, "I think that, you know, people have the impression that [they'll] hear that I wrote an opinion that it's like 'Justice Wood is against this' or 'Justice Wood is for this.' It has nothing to do with what I personally feel... we just have to follow the law."
  

Notable Cases:

• Macklin v. Arkansas Department of Human Services (2021): Wrote dissent. The majority held that a circuit court erred by denying the petition of a mother whose daughter had been found dependent-neglected and placed into foster care to prevent her daughter from being vaccinated against the mother's religious or philosophical objections. Justice Wood argued that the majority expanded the list of types of medical care that required a court order when a child is in foster care. "The Supreme Court of Arkansas applies the law; we do not make the law. Here, the General Assembly placed only three limits on the type of medical care that requires a court order when a child is in foster care: removal of bodily organs; withholding life-saving or life-sustaining treatment; and amputation. That’s it. Vaccinations were simply not on the list. That was the only issue for the juvenile court to decide. The statute and issue raised were plain and uncomplicated. The juvenile court refused to enter a court order to immunize or not to immunize because the legislature had not assigned it that role. It’s not our job either. The majority today expands the statutory list to include immunizations. Those of us in dissent may agree this might be good policy, and we might even believe the legislature may take that step in the future—but it’s not our role to forecast the legislature’s decisions We cannot take a piece of legislation, decide it’s lousy, and rewrite it. If the statute reflects poor policy, the people of Arkansas, through their elected representatives, must act. I believe the people want us to remain faithful to our judicial role. To paraphrase Justice Scalia, a good justice must be willing to make decisions she does not like and to apply the law regardless. One must begin with the text of the statute and apply principles of statutory construction. That result compels the opposite decision from the majority. What’s more, the majority’s decision violates stare decisis. The majority’s decision is flawed for the following four reasons" (10). 1) "[I]t violates our primary rule of statutory construction, which is to interpret a statute according to its plain meaning. This is always the court’s first step.. The majority skips the plain-meaning step and jumps to legislative intent. But the statute’s plain language comes first. We resort to legislative intent only if the statutory language is ambiguous. No ambiguity exists here. And the majority identifies none in its opinion" (10-11) 2) "The majority further offends the rules of statutory construction by, without ever identifying an ambiguity, grafting the legislative intent of an inapposite immunization exemption in the Education Code onto the Juvenile Code’s medical-authorization statute. This is despite the Education Code’s plain language explicitly stating it applies only to school and daycare enrollment (11-12). 3) The majority violated stare decisis by overturning the precedent of Leeka v. State (2015), which held that the State was "required to prove a culpable mental state because DWI offense is part of the Arkansas Criminal Code rather than the transportation and motor vehicle section" (13) 4) Argued that the majority exercised "awkward judicial policy making" in Footnote 1 by exempting tetanus and rabies vaccines from its holding for no apparent reason. Noted that special treatment for tetanus and rabies was found nowhere in the statute (13). Concluded that, "It cannot be overstated that the outcome of this case revolves around judicial philosophy. If we are interpreting a statute, we must uniformly employ our principles of statutory construction. That path creates transparent results for the bar and the public. Judges must forgo the desire to error-correct legislation. The majority takes a different path. It leaps over the statute’s plain language, finds no ambiguity, imports legislative intent from a different code section, and then violates stare decisis. This dissent stays rooted in the role of the judiciary as interpreters of the law, not makers of the law" (14).
  
• Thurston v. League of Women Voters (2022): Wrote concurrence. "I write separately to address the importance of interpreting the constitution according to its original meaning" (7). Noted that Board of Trustees v. Andrews (2018) marked a return to the original understanding of article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution (which says that "The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts") (7). Argued that the section had been taken out of context in the past and was originally intended to limit monetary damages against the State while allowing declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials acting unconstitutionally (7). "We should first look to the constitutional text. If uncertainty and ambiguity exist, we can then consider the text according to its original meaning" (8). Cited that the current Arkansas justices universally recognize that agencies are not protected by sovereign immunity, and neither are prisons (8-9). Cited Muntaqim v. Hobbs (2018) and the U.S. Supreme Court's Ex parte Young (1908) to argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when officials are acting outside their lawful capacities (9). Argued that the overriding theme of the 1874 Constitutional Convention, from which article 5, section 20 originated, was an attempt to limit the government's ability to financially strain the State. Section 20 in particular was intended to prohibit lenders from collecting on the State's outstanding bond debt (10-11). Cited that the convention was intended "to protect the people from overreach and 'precluded . . . strong executive leadership and activist government'" (12). "[N]o historical document suggests the provision’s original meaning stripped power from the people to hold their government officials accountable" (13). "Sovereign-immunity absolutism would decimate the judicial branch and render Arkansas’s separation-of-powers perilously asymmetrical. The framers would have abhorred this imbalance" (14). "My originalist interpretation adheres to the original intent to provide citizens with more protection and to restrict governmental abuse. For the above reasons, I will continue to apply the plain language and original meaning of the Arkansas Constitution and allow our citizens to seek declaratory and injunctive relief when state officials act illegally" (16).