Kelly C. Broniec

Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Knodell, 685 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2024), reh'g denied (Apr. 2, 2024). Justice Powel authored opinion in which Justices Russell, Ransom, Wilson, Broniec and Gooch, concurred. Justiced Fischer concurred in separate opinion filed. 

Holding(s): The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court because the state did not appeal the equal protection claim.  

Analysis: The Court first held that Planned Parenthood had standing finding that evidence presented at trial included a letter from the Department of Social Services (DSS) stating it would refuse to reimburse Planned Parenthood for health care services during a specified suspension period, despite having a provider agreement. The Court found the letter demonstrated that Planned Parenthood was indeed directly and adversely affected by the implementation of HB 3014, thereby granting it standing to seek the declaratory judgment issued by the circuit court. The Court held that Planned Parenthood had not waived its right to contest lack of reimbursement, finding that contract’s language did not clearly waive their right to seek relief. Next, the Court held that Planned Parenthood was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the constitutionality of HB 3014 in circuit court. The State argued that Planned Parenthood should have pursued an administrative remedy before the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) after being denied reimbursement. However, the Court found that Missouri law provides exceptions to this requirement, particularly when a party raises a constitutional challenge. Since Planned Parenthood's claims were exclusively about the constitutional validity of HB 3014—matters the AHC could not address—it was deemed unnecessary for Planned Parenthood to first pursue its claims through the AHC. Last the Court held that the State’s appeal was moot because it did not challenge the circuit court's ruling on its equal protection claim. The Court found that it must affirm the judgment since an independent legal basis for the ruling remains unappealed-- adhering to Rule 84.13(a), which prevents it from reviewing unbriefed errors. The Court concluded that the circuit court ruled on both Planned Parenthoods claims, not just one, and since both claims independently justify the circuit court's ruling, the judgment was affirmed. 

Background: Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains sought a declaratory judgment in the circuit court, claiming House Bill No. 3014 (HB 3014) was unconstitutional and requested an injunction against its enforcement. HB 3014, an appropriation bill passed by the Missouri General Assembly, aimed to eliminate Medicaid funding for abortion providers, including Planned Parenthood. The organization argued that HB 3014 violated the single subject requirement and the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of Planned Parenthood on both constitutional claims, and the State appealed. On appeal, the State argued procedural errors and maintained that HB 3014 did not violate the single subject requirement but did not contest the equal protection ruling. The appeal highlighted the circuit court's findings that the language in HB 3014 did not preclude reimbursement to Planned Parenthood for eligible services. 

Applicable provision(s):  

• “Section 14.2030 of HB 3014 states: In reference to all sections, except Section 14.277, in Part 1 and Part 2 of this act: No funds shall be expended to any clinic, physician’s office, or any other place or facility in which abortions are performed or induced other than a hospital, or any affiliate or associate of any such clinic, physician’s office, or place or facility in which abortions are performed or induced other than a hospital.” 
• “The MO HealthNet provider agreement states, in relevant part, If at any time state or federally appropriated funds available to the [Department of Social Services]/[Medicaid Audit and Compliance Unit]/[MO HealthNet Division] for payment to [me]/[the provider] for covered services under this agreement are insufficient to pay the full amount due, [I]/[the provider] agree[s] to accept payments reduced in proportion to the funding deficiency.” 

Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2024), reh'g denied (Apr. 2, 2024). Justice Powell authored opinion in which Chief Justices Russell and Justices Fischer, Ransom, Wilson and Broniec, concurred. Justice Gooch did not participate. 

Holding(s): Circuit court judgement was vacated, and the case was remanded. The Court held that the circuit court erred when sustaining motion to dismiss Appellant’s hostile work environment and aiding and abetting claims. (16) The Court found the Appellants established the required elements for a hostile work environment claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Additionally the Court found the Appellants pleaded sufficient claims for aiding and abbetting under the MHRA. 

Analysis: The Court noted that parties did not dispute that Appellants sufficiently plead facts to meet elements one and three of their hostile work environment claim. The Court affirmed the Appellants were members of a protected group and that “race was a motivating factor in the harrassment.” (10) It was disputed; however, whether Appellants plead sufficient facts to meet elements two and four. The Court concluded that Appellants sufficient plead the second element finding that the Appellants alleged a continuous pattern of racial discrimination, including incidents like swastikas and nooses, thus constituting unwelcome harassment. Harley and Syncreon; however, argued that they had not personally witnessed the incidents. Next, the Court found Appellants sufficiently plead the fourth element by alleging that the cumulative effect of the harassment was severe enough to create an abusive work environment, that damaged their dignity and work performance. The Court concluded the harassment was severe and pervasive enough both subjectively and when viewed as an objective reasonable person. Next Appellants allege that they also asserted claims for aiding and abetting under the MHRA. “This Court ha[d] not previously set forth the ultimate facts necessary to support an aiding and abetting claim under the MHRA but f[ou]nd[] the Restatement (Second) of Torts to be persuasive.” (13) 

Background: Harley operated a manufacturing facility in Kansas City with a mostly white workforce, while Syncreon, which provided workers, employed primarily Black individuals. Several employees, including the Appellants, filed a charge of racial discrimination, leading to a petition against both companies for violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act. The Appellants' claims of a hostile work environment and aiding and abetting racial discrimination were dismissed by the circuit court, which found insufficient evidence that they personally experienced harassment or that the companies aided discriminatory actions. 

 The Appellants alleged multiple racially charged incidents, such as nooses and swastikas found at the facility, racially motivated insults, and a physical division between black and white employees. They argued that these incidents created a hostile work environment and highlighted the lack of investigations or action taken by either company regarding these issues. The circuit court dismissed the Appellants’ claims for failure to state claims. On appeal, the Appellants argued that the circuit court erred by dismissing their claims for hostile work environment and aiding and abetting, contending that had adequately plead the necessary elements for both claims. The Court held that Appellants pleaded sufficient facts to show that Harley and Syncreon “aided and abbetted others in creating in creating and fostering a hostilr work enviroment as the Plant.” (14) The Court found that Appellants provided specific instances where Syncreon encouraged employees to remain silent about incidents contributing to the hostile work environment, disposed of written complaints and misled employees about investigations, suggesting a pattern of assistance in fostering this environment. Appellants also alleged that HArley contributed to the histility by controlling Syncreon’s actions at the Plant, creating physical and functional racial segregation. Additionally, after incidents of racial graffiti management allegedly told Black employees to delete evidence. " When reviewing a motion to dismiss, appellate courts liberally construe the pleadings, ‘accept all alleged facts as true[,] and construe the facts in a light most favorable to the pleading party.’” (15) The Court concluded that the Appellants sufficiently pleaded claims for aiding and abetting under the MHRA. 

Applicable Law(s):  

• “The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race . . . . ‘ Section 213.055.1(1)(a).” (7) 
•  “The elements of a hostile work environment claim under the MHRA have been defined by Missouri courts: A successful claim of a hostile work environment requires the [claimant] to show: (1) he is a member of a group protected under the MHRA; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the [claimant]’s membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, condition, or privilege of the [claimant]’s employment was affected by the harassment. Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. App. 2021); see also Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666.” (8) 
• Section 876(b) of the Restatement states: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.” “The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d (1979). 

In the Interest of: E.G. v. Juvenile Officer (2024). Justice Broniec authored opinion joined by Chief Justice Russell and Justices Fischer, Ransom, Wilson, and Gooch. Justice Powell concurred in a separate opinion joined by Justice Ransom.  

Holding: The Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgement terminating a father’s parental rights.    

Analysis: The Court first held that Father's first point had not been preserved for review and was thus denied. The Court found that Father had not argued that section 211.447.2(4) wa an invalid statutory grounds for terminating parental rights at the trial level. The Court concluded that there could not be error where a claim wasn’t presented.

Next, the Court held that Father's constitutional argument was also not preserved, noting that “Father’s motion to dismiss vaguely alluded to constitutional issues that could have arisen under various constitutional provisions, such as the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments.” (8) Father argued that the fundamental right to parent is not explicitly stated in a specific constitutional provision, suggesting that simply referencing the general right to parent should be sufficient to preserve his constitutional argument. The Court stated, “Whether a parent has a fundamental right to parent their child, however, is not at issue in this case. It is undisputed that parents have a fundamental, constitutional right to parent their children, but this right is not absolute.” (8) 

Lastly, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence presented to terminate Father’s parental rights, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Father argued that the constitution required a specific finding of parental unfitness. However, the Court found that Father's felony convictions were sufficient grounds to satisfy the first prong of their analysis. Additionally, the Court noted that the circuit court performed a thorough analysis regarding the child’s best interest. 

Concurrence: Justice Powell agreed with the principal opinion that Father failed to preserve his first two points in the appeal regarding the termination of his parental rights, and he acknowledged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that termination. He noted that even if Father had preserved these claims, the circuit court’s judgment would still be upheld due to Father’s prior felony convictions for child molestation and sexual misconduct, which constituted statutory grounds for termination under section 211.447.2(4).  Powell argued that these convictions demonstrated Father’s unfitness as a parent, as they involved offenses against children. Additionally, Powell addressed Father's constitutional arguments, asserting that section 211.447 was constitutional both facially and as applied in this case, since the evidence of Father’s criminal history justified the termination of his parental rights without violating due process. He concluded that the principal opinion was correct, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.   

Background: This case arose after, Juvenile Officer filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Father and K.N. (“Mother”) to their Child. Mother voluntarily consented to the termination, while the petition cited Father's guilty plea to two felony violations related to child victims and argued that terminating his rights was in the Child’s best interest.  

In response, Father claimed that terminating his rights was not in the Child’s best interest, noting that the juvenile victims in his prior convictions were not the Child and that he pleaded guilty to avoid worse outcomes for himself and the victims. He expressed his love for his daughter, regret for his past actions, and a desire to bond with the Child post-incarceration, highlighting his efforts to improve as a parent. Before the trial, Father sought to dismiss the action, arguing that section 211.447.2(4) was unconstitutional, but the circuit court denied this motion. The circuit court later terminated Father’s parental rights based on his felony violations and determining that such termination was in the best interest of the Child.  

Father subsequently appealed the court's decision. B.G. (“Father”) appealed the circuit court's decision to terminate his parental rights to E.G. (“Child”), raising three main points. In Point I, he argued that the court erred by basing the termination on his prior guilty plea to felony violations involving a child, arguing this was not a valid statutory ground under section 211.447.1. In Point II, he argued that if such a plea were deemed a valid ground, it should be declared unconstitutional as it does not sufficiently indicate a parent's unfitness. Finally, in Point III, Father claimed there was insufficient evidence of his unfitness as a parent. The Court found that Points I and II were unpreserved and chose not to address them.  

Applicable Law: 

• “Section 211.447 governs the termination of parental rights in Missouri.” 
• “Section 211.447.2(4) provides: ‘The parent has been found guilty of or pled guilty to a felony violation of chapter 566, 567, 568, or 573 when the child or any child was a victim.’” (10) 
• “Termination of parental rights requires a two-prong analysis. Id. First, a court must find the existence of at least one ground for termination of parental rights. Id. The grounds for termination are contained within section 211.447. Id. Second, the court must find that termination is in the child’s best interest.6 Id.” (8-9) 

Appointed by Governor Parson (R) to the Missouri Supreme Court in September 2023

Lucas v. Ashcroft, 688 S.W.3d 204 (Mo. 2024), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 4, 2024). Judge Wilson authored opinion in which Judges Russel, Powell and Bronienc concurred. Judge Gooch concurred in part and dissented in part joined by Judge Fischer. Judge Ransom dissented.

Conclusion: The Court ordered special election for Amendment 4 on the November 4, 2024 setting aside the 2022 general election would approved of Amendment 4. (42) The Court concluded, “The special election for Amendment No. 4 shall be conducted using the following ballot title: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 4[27] Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (Second Regular Session) SS2 SJR 38 Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to authorize laws, passed before December 31st, 2026, that increase minimum funding for a police force established by a state board of police commissioners to ensure such police force has additional resources to serve its communities? This would authorize a law passed in 2022 increasing required funding by the City of Kansas City for police department requests from 20% of general revenue to 25%, an increase of $38,743,646, though the City previously provided that level of funding voluntarily. No other state or local governmental entities estimate costs or savings.” (42) 

Background: “Lucas br[ought] an original action [to] the Court challenging the voters’ approval of Amendment No. 4 in the November 2022 general election. (1) Lucas argued that the fiscal note summary “materially misstated the fiscal note for the measure.” (1) “The Court asked “whether the auditor’s fiscal note summary – the very last thing each and every voter saw before voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on Amendment No. 4 – fairly and accurately summarized the auditor’s fiscal note as required by section 116.175.3.” (2) “The ballot title for Amendment No. 4, in its entirety, read: Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to authorize laws, passed before December 31, 2025, that increase minimum funding for a police force established by a state board of police commissioners to ensure such police force has additional resources to serve its communities? State and local governmental entities estimate no additional costs or savings related to this proposal.” (4) “The fiscal note explains, if Amendment No. 4 is approved, ‘it will provide authorization to the implementation of the state legislature’s recently passed SB 678 that increases the amount that Kansas City must fund its police department from 20% to 25% of the City’s general revenue.’” (30)( Full text of fiscal note on pages 27-28.) 

Analysis & Holding(s): 

1. The Court held that it had original jurisdiction to hear election contests involving proposed constitutional amendments. The Court established that it held original jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 5 of the state constitution, which mandates the general assembly to designate the court or judge for election contests. Additionally, Section 115.555(4) stipulates that all contests related to constitutional amendments must be heard and decided by the supreme court.
2.  The Court held that it was bound by the prior decisions in Dotson and Shoemyer, finding that both were correctly decided, but noting that even if they weren’t, the Court was bound by them. The Court concluded that failing to include constitutional amendment contests would create an absurd outcome, leaving no venue for such claims.
3. The Court held that the Amendment related back to Lucas’ original petition finding that the “amendment added no new parties and no new claims.” (16) The Court relied on Beatty v. Metro St. Louis Sewer Dist. which found that Rule 53.33(c) governed. The Court concluded that “Whether the amendment [wa]s viewed merely as curing a defect under Rule 55.03(a), or an amendment under Rule 55.33, Lucas’ later verification does not render his election contest petition untimely.” (17)
4. The Court held that Lucas, the mayor of the city, had standing to sue. The state argued that the proper party was the City. The majority found that “Lucas pleaded and proved he is a registered Missouri voter and, as such, [wa]s entitled to bring this suit under section 115.553.2.” (18)  
5. The Court held the Amendment 4's ballot title was inaccurate and misleading. The Court found that the summary failed to adequately reflect the significant fiscal impact on the City, misrepresenting information voters needed to understand the amendment’s full implications. The Court found there would be fiscal impact on the city; however it found the summary mislead voters to believe there would be no fiscal impact. The Court concluded the irregularities were significant to justifies a new election. 

Concurrence and dissent: Judge Gooch concurred with the principal opinion regarding the court's original jurisdiction in the election contest, asserting that precedent from Dotson v. Kander and Shoemyer v. Missouri Secretary of State were binding. She acknowledged the dissent argument was compelling but emphasized that the court’s prior rulings compelled adherence to the principle that it had original jurisdiction over such contests. 

However, Gooch dissented from the principal opinion's outcome, arguing that relief for Lucas should be denied based on her view that he failed to meet the explicit requirements of section 115.557. She pointed out that Lucas did not file a verified petition within the mandated 30 days following the official election result announcement. Gooch noted that Lucas’s late filing of a verified amended petition did not satisfy the verification requirement in the context of election contests, which she insisted must be strictly followed. The Court found that if all elections contest were required to completed within 30 days that it “would bar practically all election contest[.]” (22) “As it did in Shoemyer, the Court again reject[ed] the argument that article XII implicitly prevents the very election contests article VII and chapter 115 explicitly authorize.” (22) 

Gooch further contended that Lucas did not adequately demonstrate that the ballot title for Amendment No. 4 was insufficient or unfair. She highlighted that the City had historically funded at or above the proposed 25 percent level, which undermined Lucas’s argument regarding the fiscal implications of the amendment. Consequently, Gooch concluded that Lucas failed to establish that any irregularities could cast doubt on the election's fairness, making a new election unwarranted.  

Dissent: Judge Ransom dissented, arguing that the Missouri Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear contested elections involving constitutional amendments. She emphasized that Article VII, Section 5 of the Missouri Constitution specifically addressed election contests for public officers, such as the governor and other state officials, and did not extend to broader election contests. Judge Ransom critiqued the majority opinion for interpreting the provision too broadly, asserting that its language clearly limited the Court's jurisdiction. She noted that previous cases, including Dotson and Shoemyer, failed to provide sufficient legal reasoning to justify this expansion of jurisdiction. Ransom argued that the legislature did not possess the authority to extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond what was explicitly outlined in the constitution. Overall, Judge Ransom maintained that adherence to the explicit boundaries of constitutional interpretation was essential and that the Court should not have assumed jurisdiction over contests involving constitutional amendments. 

Coleman v. Ashcroft, 696 S.W.3d 347 (Mo. 2024) Judge Wilson authored the opinion in which with Chief Justice Russell and Judge Ransom concurred. Judge Powell concurred with a separate opinion. Judge Broniec dissented in a separate opinion. Judges Fischer and Gooch concurred with Judge Broniec’s dissent.

Holding: The Court reversed the circuit courts order removing Amendment 3 from the November 2024 ballot. The Court held that “neither Article III, Section 50 nor Section 116.050.2(2) require[d] the ‘full text of the measure’ to include all statutes that may later be declared invalid in whole or in part if the proposed constitutional amendment is approved by the people.” (15) The Court stated “Nowhere in Buchanan – or in Moore or Halliburton, for that matter – is there even a hint of a suggestion that article III, section 50 (or its predecessor constitutional provision and related statutory provisions) requires a proposed constitutional amendment to identify all statutes that later may be declared invalid in whole or in part if the voters approve the constitutional amendment.” (20) The Court found that a plain reading of Section 116.050.2(2) does not require "Amendment 3 to identify all sections of existing statutes and all constitutional provisions the measure would repeal.” (24) Instead the Court found that “the plain language reading of subdivision 2(2) of section 116.050.2 is that initiative petitions proposing a statute must include all sections of existing statutes that would be repealed by the measure, and initiative petitions proposing a constitutional amendment must include all sections of the existing constitution that would be repealed by the measure.” (24) Next the Court held that” Amendment 3 did not violate single subject requirements proposed constitutional amendments found in article III, section 50, and article XIII, section 2(b).” (33-34) The Court found the subject was “the right to reproductive freedom.” (34) 

Dissent: Justice Broniec would affirm the circuit court’s judgement. She argued that Amendment 3 did not comply with section 116.050 “when it included no statutes or constitutional provisions that would be repealed.”  (13) The principal opinion interpreted section 116.050.2(2) as requiring that a proposed constitutional amendment identify only the constitutional provisions it would repeal. Bronienc argued that this interpretation fails to honor the statute's plain language, as it incorrectly reads the word "only" into the statute and disregards the full context and intent of the statute. She contended that this approach undermines the requirement to consider every word in the statute, ultimately misrepresenting the legislative intent. Broniec argued that a constitutional provision can repeal a statute, and the principal opinion's assertion to the contrary was incorrect. She believed this interpretation disregards the General Assembly's clear intent in section 116.050.2(2), which aims to inform voters of all laws—both statutes and constitutional provisions—that would be repealed by a proposed amendment. Additionally, she asserted that the principal's view fails to uphold article III, section 49 of the Missouri Constitution, which explicitly grants the people the power to use the initiative process to reject laws and amendments independently of the General Assembly. 

Background: The proposed amendment introduces a new section, Article I, Section 36, titled “The Right to Reproductive Freedom Initiative.” The amendment stipulates that any governmental action that denies or restricts this right must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and implemented using the least restrictive means; such restrictions are presumed invalid unless they meet these criteria. Additionally, while the General Assembly may regulate abortions after fetal viability, it cannot restrict abortions deemed necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant person, as determined by a qualified health care professional.  

Applicable Law:

• "Section 116.050 states: 1. Initiative and referendum petitions filed under the provisions of this chapter shall consist of pages of a uniform size. Each page, excluding the text of the measure, shall be no larger than eight and one-half by fourteen inches. Each page of an initiative petition shall be attached to or shall contain a full and correct text of the proposed measure. Each page of a referendum petition shall be attached to or shall contain a full and correct text of the measure on which the referendum is sought. 2. The full and correct text of all initiative and referendum petition measures shall: (1) Contain all matter which is to be deleted included in its proper place enclosed in brackets and all new matter shown underlined; (2) Include all sections of existing law or of the constitution which would be repealed by the measure; and (3) Otherwise conform to the provisions of Article III, Section 28 and Article III, Section 50 of the Constitution and those of this chapter." (23)

**Full text of the Initiative can be found in footnote 4 on pages 8-9.  

***A summary can be found here