Derek Molter

Governor Holcomb "said Molter has 'profound respect' for the Indiana Constitution and the rule of law. 'He is absolutely devoted to the cause of justice, both inside and outside the courtroom,' Holcomb said."

"Molter said that he interprets the Constitution 'consistent with the understanding of that text at the time it was enacted or ratified' – an approach often called 'originalism.' 'The virtue of that philosophy is that it anchors the court to ensure that it's exercising its judicial role. Under our separation of powers, that's the only role the judges are here to perform; they're not here to perform the legislative role,' Molter said. 'And so, the virtue of that philosophy is that ... it keeps the court in that lane.'"

From Fenwick, Tyler. "IN Supreme Court Justices Talk Qualifications, Diversity with Students." News Indiana, 28 Sept. 2023:

• “I’d also say it would be really important to have diversity on the bench,” [Justice Molter] said, “people that actually do look different, people that are different genders, because it’s also important for a community to respect and perceive that the law is crafted with a bunch of different points of view in mind.”

Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957 (Ind.), reh'g denied, 214 N.E.3d 348 (Ind. 2023). Authored opinion. *Case Involved Abortion Legislation*

Holding: The Court “vacate[d] the preliminary injunction and remand[ed] [the case] for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” (41) The Court initially held that “providers ha[d] standing to contest the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1 because the statute criminalize[d] their work, and thus they face[d] the sort of imminent, direct, personal injury our standing doctrine requires.” (2) "Then, after examining Article 1, Section 1’s Indiana Supreme Court text, history, structure, and purpose, as well as [the Court's] prior case law interpreting the provision," the Court held that Article 1, Section 1 was "justiciable enforceable." (3) Lastly the Court “h[e]ld that Article 1, Section 1 protect[ed] a women’s a woman’s right to an abortion that is necessary to protect her life or to protect her from a serious health risk, but the General Assembly otherwise retain[ed] broad legislative discretion for determining whether the extent to which to prohibit abortions.” (3) Thus, the Court concluded that the record did not support the preliminary injunction because it found that there were circumstances under which Senate Bill 1 could be consistent with Article 1, Section 1; thus the providers failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success.

Background: Indiana's General Assembly passed Senate Bill 1, which broadly bans abortion but allowed exceptions in three cases: to save a woman's life or prevent serious health risks, for lethal fetal anomalies, or in cases of rape or incest. Abortion providers challenged the law, arguing that it violated a woman's fundamental right to abortion under Article 1, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction against the law. The state appealed "seek[ing] to vacate the injunction, arguing that the abortion providers lack[ed] standing; that Article 1, Section 1 [wa]s not judicially enforceable; and that even if it [wa]s, it does not protect a fundamental right to abortion." (2)

In the introductory paragraph of Members of the Medical Licensing Board v. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc., Justice Molter wrote:

"Abortion is an intractable issue because it brings two irreconcilable interests into conflict: a woman’s interest in ending a pregnancy and the State’s interest in protecting the life that abortion would end. Pregnancy is a highly personal experience that can alter a woman’s life and health in countless ways. For some, a pregnancy may be planned, supported, or generally free of any significant health complications. But for others, a pregnancy may be unplanned, lacking significant support, or induce significant health complications. Given the nuance inherent in each woman’s experience and private life, a woman’s desire to continue or terminate a pregnancy is, likewise, intensely personal. At the same time, our laws have long reflected that Hoosiers, through their elected representatives, may collectively conclude that legal protections inherent in personhood commence before birth, so the State’s broad authority to protect the public’s health, welfare, and safety extends to protecting prenatal life." (2) 

Kelly, Niki, and Casey Smith. "Indiana Supreme Court Issues 3-2 Opinion Upholding Party Affiliation Statute in Rust Case." Indiana Capital Chronicle, 6 Mar. 2024.

The article discusses the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Rust. The case addressed whether the "two-primary rule" was unconstitutional, a challenge brought by John Rust, who was removed from the GOP primary ballot for not meeting the party affiliation requirements. Rust also argued that his removal from the ballot was itself unconstitutional.

Mellowitz v. Ball State Univ., 221 N.E.3d 1214 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied (Jan. 16, 2024). Molter authored the opinion.

Holding: The Court held that “the law d[id] not violate the constitutional separation of powers because its limited scope." (2) The Court also held that, “the law d[id] not unconstitutionally take Mellowitz’s property without just compensation” (2) and that, “the law does not unconstitutionally impair Mellowitz’s contract with Ball State” (2) The Court found that "[I]n Church, 189 N.E.3d at 590, [the Court] announced a new framework for this analysis of whether a statute reflects a valid legislative enactment or the usurpation of judicial power. And under that framework, [the Court] conclude[d] Section 7 is a valid legislative enactment." (7) The Court found “everything about Section 7 and the context of its enactment conveys the General Assembly was tweaking a procedural rule to predominantly further a public policy objective.” (13). The Court found that “[s]ection 7 reflects ‘a careful legislative balancing of policy considerations.’ 189 N.E.3d at 591.” (15) The Court found the statute was not an unconstitutional taking. The Court said,“there is no support in the record for the assertion that the only way it is worthwhile for students to pursue pandemic-related claims to recover tuition and fees is through a class action” (18) The Court concluded that “the General Assembly ha[d] not ‘take[n] away immediately and completely all legal means’ for Mellowitz to pursue his contract claims” (19) Finally addressing whether the statute impairs the university’s contractual obligations, the Court said, “Section 7 does not alter the contractual relationship between Mellowitz and Ball State at all." (20)

Background: The case arose “[a]fter Ball State University switched to providing only online instruction for the 2020 spring semester due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff Keller Mellowitz sued the university for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.” (2) The Plaintiff attempted to sue in a class-action for similarly situated students. “[A]fter [Mellowitz] sued, the General Assembly passed, and Governor Holcomb signed, Public Law No. 166-2021, which, retroactive to March 1, 2020, prohibits class action lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract or unjust enrichment claims to recover losses stemming from COVID-19.” (2) 

City of Carmel v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC, 234 N.E.3d 816 (Ind. 2024). Concurred in part and dissented in part with separate opinion.

Concurrence and dissent in part: Molter argued that, “[w]hile the record support[ed] a decision to prohibit Carmel’s request to shift the costs of these two projects to Duke, the record d[id] not support the Commission’s decision to invalidate the two ordinances on their face.” Justice Molter, “therefore [would] affirm the Commission’s order to the extent it preclude[d] Carmel from enforcing its ordinances to shift the costs of these projects to Duke, reverse the order to the extent it invalidate[d] the ordinances on their face, and remand for the Commission to amend its order accordingly.” (concurrence and dissent- pp 3)

Holding: The Court first held that “the Commission was a property party on appeal[,]” stating that “…[The Court] will not disrupt the ‘long-standing custom and practice,’ … and because public policy supports the Commission’s participation[.]” (6) Additionally, the Court held that the Commission’s findings of fact [were] supported by substantial evidence.” (6) The Court found that it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude that the Ordinance was unreasonable. The Court found that, “[b]ased on Duke’s evidence that it would seek recovery of the underground project’s costs, the Commission, using its expertise and statutory authority, reasonably concluded the costs would be shifted to all Duke customers statewide because they would be included in Duke’s rates.” (10)

Background:  Indiana Code section 8-1-2-101 grants municipalities the authority to create ordinances regulating how public utilities use municipal spaced but also grants the Commission the power to declare such ordinances unreasonable and void. In 2019, the City of Carmel adopted two ordinances: the Underground Ordinance, which bans above-ground utility infrastructure unless authorized, and the Relocation Ordinance, which outlines the process and cost allocation for relocating utilities due to municipal projects. After Carmel initiated municipal projects requiring Duke Energy to move its facilities underground, a dispute arose over who should cover the relocation costs, estimated at over $500,000. Carmel filed a complaint with the Commission to enforce the ordinances and have Duke pay the relocation costs. The Commission found the ordinances unreasonable and void. Carmel appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's decision, deeming the ordinances reasonable. The Indiana Supreme Court later granted a transfer.

Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025 (Ind. 2024), reh'g denied (Apr. 22, 2024). Authored opinion.

Holding(s): The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case with an order to enter judgment in favor of Appellants on all claims. The Court "f[ou]nd the minor requirements of the Affiliation Statute reflect an elegant balancing of First Amendment interests and are thus constitutionally sound." (3) The court’s decision primarily focused "primarily on the weighing of First Amendment 'rights of association' of both Appellants and Appellee[.]" (2) The Court first held that Rust satisfied standing and found his claims ripe. Next the Court found that the Affiliation Statute did not violate the First Amendments right to association. The Court found that it "imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s First Amendment rights, which is justified by the State’s interests, it satisfies Anderson-Burdick standard." (30) 

The Court looked to the applicable portions of the First Amendment and found support for its conclusions in López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203 (citing White, 415 U.S. at 781). In  López Torres "candidates who failed to secure party nominations" due to "election law that 'required parties to select their candidates for the Supreme Court" brought suit challenging these laws. " (11) "Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned these challengers were 'in no position to rely on the right that the First Amendment confers on political parties to structure their internal party processes and to select the candidate of the party’s choosing.' Id. at 203" (12) 

Background: John Rust of Seymour sought to be a candidate on the May 7, 2024, Republican primary ballot for U.S. Senate. However, his last vote in a Republican primary was in 2016, and he had not voted in the Republican primaries for the previous years nor voted as a Democrat in several other elections. As a result, Rust could not qualify under Option A of the Affiliation Statute and needed party certification under Option B. Jackson County Republican Party Chair Amanda Lowery refused to certify his party membership due to his voting history. Rust sought preemptive relief from the Marion Superior Court to ensure he would be included on the May primary ballot. The trial court blocked the statute's enforcement, deeming it unconstitutional. The decision was appealed.

Rules:

•  The Affiliation Statute requires that "a would-be party-affiliated candidate must establish their party affiliation by one of two ways: (A) having voted for the party with which they claim affiliation in the two most recent primary elections in which they voted (“Option A”); or (B) filing a certification from their county party chair affirming their membership in the party (“Option B”). Id. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)." (4) 
• "The balancing test from Anderson requires three inquiries: First, the Court must ‘consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’ Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). Second, the Court ‘must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed [by the law].’ Id. Third, in weighing the rights burdened and the state’s interests, the Court ‘also must consider the extent to which those [state] interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ Id. (4)