Judge Renatha Francis spoke at "Perspectives on the Florida Supreme Court: A Fireside Chat with Justice Renatha Francis and Former Justice Alan Lawson" hosted by the Federalist Society on September 26, 2024, in Jacksonville, FL.

Justice Renatha Francis spoke at "Constitution Day Celebration with Justice Renatha Francis," hosted by the Federalist Society on September 15, 2023, in Miami.

The Honorable Renatha Francis spoke at the "Florida's Supremes: The Women of Florida's Supreme Court," organized by the Federalist Society Miami Student Chapter on March 28, 2024, in Miami, FL.

"Gov. DeSantis said Francis, as an immigrant to the United States, developed a strong appreciation for America’s founding principles. 'She became a very, very stalwart defender on interpreting the constitution the way it was originally understood to apply, understanding the checks and balances, understanding the separation of powers,' DeSantis said. 'So, I think her rise in the legal ranks is really a powerful story.'"

See: Killian, Mark D. "Francis Ceremonially Sworn in as a Justice of the Florida Supreme Court." The Florida Bar News, 19 Oct. 2023.

"In the end, Judge Francis wants every lawyer and litigant to leave her courtroom feeling heard and understood, even if he/she did not prevail. She is guided by respect for the rule of law, and the limited role of judges in applying the law to the facts before them."

Excerpt from" "Judge Renatha Francis." Palm Beach Bar Association, 12 Dec. 2019.

"It is worth defending, it is worth protecting, and our role as a court in this process is to make sure that we uphold the structural constraints of government action to protect liberty — confining what we do to apply what the words meant at the time when the law was passed. We don’t get to put our gloss on it, encroaching where we have no authority to do so, violating separation of powers in the process. No," said Judge Renatha Francis.

See: Moline, Michael. "Ceremony Marks Renatha Francis’ Ascension to the Florida Supreme Court. DeSantis: 'I’m Proud That We Are Honoring Today a Justice Who Arrived to This Court Taking the Road Less Traveled.'" Florida Phoenix, 18 Oct. 2023.

"Justice Renatha S. Francis." Voting for Justice. 

"[Francis] said that applying laws 'as written' are the bedrock of her judicial philosophy, and 'essential to preserving liberty.'"

See: Dixon, Matt. "DeSantis Appoints Federalist Society Member to Florida Supreme Court. First Appointment in 2020 Scuttled Because She Did Not Meet Constitutional Requirements." Politico, 5 Aug. 2022.

Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 2024). Justice Grosshans authored opinion in which Justices Muniz, Canady, Couriel and Francis concurred. Sasso concurred with an opinion. Labarga dissented. 

Conclusion: The Court held the petitioners were not entitled to a temporary injunction finding Planned Parenthood could not “demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims[.]” (50) The Court concluded there was “no basis under the Privacy Clause to invalidate the statute.” (2) Thus the Court held that the statute did not violate the state’s constitution right to privacy and “recede(d) from its prior decision in which—relying on reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected—[the Court] held that the Privacy Clause guaranteed a right to receive an abortion through the end of the second trimester.” (2)

Sasso's Concurrence: Justice Sasso concurred with the majority but added her own observations about inconsistencies in Florida Supreme Court precedents regarding standing. She pointed out that the requirements for suing differ between federal and state levels, noting that the Court has inconsistently applied both federal and Florida standards. In this case, the State initially claimed that Planned Parenthood lacked the right to sue over HB5 but later conceded this point. Both parties ended up using federal rules to argue about Planned Parenthood's standing. While Sasso accepted Planned Parenthood's ability to sue based on the State's concession, she emphasized the need for the Florida Supreme Court to clearly define standing requirements in future cases, stressing that these standards are not derived from the Federal Constitution. She encouraged litigants to present cases that address these issues for clearer guidance moving forward.

Labarga's Dissent: Justice Labarga "strongly dissented." (64) Justice Labarga argued that the  Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs, returned “the authority to regulate abortion,” but did not place Florida in uncharted territory. He highlighted that Florida had established the right to an abortion through the 1980 constitutional amendment recognizing a right to privacy and the 1989 ruling in In re T.W., which affirmed that this right included abortion. He criticized the majority for straying from these precedents and contended that there was a solid basis under Florida's privacy rights to challenge the new law restricting abortion access. Overall, he criticized the majority opinion for misinterpreting the Florida Constitution's provision on privacy, arguing that it disregarded Florida voters' understanding that the right to privacy included the right to an abortion. The dissent noted that the prominence of Roe v. Wade in public discourse made it unlikely that Florida voters in 1980 did not associate abortion with privacy rights. Thus, he argued the majority's conclusion that the public understanding of privacy did not encompass abortion would have been seen as a significant departure from established beliefs.

Background:The Court asked whether the Florida Constitution's Privacy Clause conflicted with an amended law that prohibits abortions after 15 weeks with exceptions. “Planned Parenthood alleged that the statute violated the Privacy Clause, which was added to the Florida Constitution in 1980.” (4) “Planned Parenthood filed a motion for temporary injunction, asking the trial court to block enforcement of the statute until it could rule on the merits of the constitutional challenge.” (4)

Analysis: To answer this question of public meaning, the Court considers the text, contextual clues, dictionaries, canons of construction, and historical sources, including evidence related to public discussion. The Court found in order for Planned Parenthood to prevail the Court “must find that the public would have understood the principle embodied in the operative text to encompass abortion,” finding that the “clause itself says nothing about” the right to abortion. (20)

Applicable Law(s): 

• The “amended Florida statute prohibit[ed] abortions ‘if the physician determines the gestational age of the fetus is more than 15 weeks.’ § 390.0111(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); ch. 2022-69, § 8, Laws of Fla. (providing effective date of July 1, 2022).” (3) 
• Exceptions to prohibition:  
  • “(a) Two physicians certify in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, the termination of the pregnancy is necessary to save the pregnant woman’s life or avert a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman other than a psychological condition” (3) 
  • “(b) The physician certifies in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, there is a medical necessity for legitimate emergency medical procedures for termination of the pregnancy to save the pregnant woman’s life or avert a serious risk of imminent substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman other than a psychological condition, and another physician is not available for consultation. (3-4) 
  • “(c) The fetus has not achieved viability under s. 390.01112 and two physicians certify in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, the fetus has a fatal fetal abnormality.” (4) 
• “SECTION 23. Right of privacy. —Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.” (5) 

W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. DeSantis, 382 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 2024) Justice Sasso authored opinion in which Justices Muniz, Canady, Couriel, Grosshans and Francis concurred. Justice Labarga concurred in result only.

Holding(s): The Court concluded that quo warranto was not the appropriate method to challenge the substantive constitutionality of a law. It declined to expand the writ’s application, emphasizing that it is intended to challenge the authority to exercise state power rather than evaluate the merits of an action. Thus, the Court denied the petition because the relief sought exceeded the scope of what quo warranto could provide. 

Analysis: The court explained that its authority to issue a writ of quo warranto comes from the Florida Constitution, which traditionally tests whether a person has the right to hold an office or exercise powers derived from the state. Over time, the application of quo warranto has expanded, allowing the court to examine whether state officials have improperly exercised their powers. Petitioners argued that the Governor and Legislature exceeded their authority in authorizing off-reservation sports betting, claiming this constituted an improper exercise of power. 

However, the court clarified that quo warranto is not meant to address the substantive constitutionality of enacted laws, emphasizing that such challenges should typically be made through a declaratory judgment in circuit court. The Court found that prior cases cited by the Petitioners did not support their argument, as they involved challenges to the authority of officials rather than the constitutionality of statutes themselves.  

Background: In 2021, Governor DeSantis signed a gaming compact with the Seminole Tribe, allowing mobile sports betting across Florida, even when participants were not on tribal lands. This compact was ratified by the Florida Legislature. Petitioners, including West Flagler Associates and others, filed a writ of quo warranto challenging the compact, arguing it violated article X, section 30 of the Florida Constitution, which mandates that any expansion of casino gambling must be approved by citizens. They sought a court declaration that the compact was unconstitutional and requested to stop the Seminole Tribe from operating mobile sports betting. 

Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana. Justice Grosshans authored and Justices Canady, Labarga, and Couriel concurred. Justice Muniz concurred with opinion that Canady joined. Justice Grosshans concurred with an opinion. Justice Francis dissented with an opinion. Justice Sasso dissented with an opinion 

Holding(s): The Court approved the “Adult Personal Use of Marijuana” initiative for placement on the ballot. The Court first found the proposed amendment did not violate the single-subject requirement in article XI, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Next the Court “f[ou]nd that the summary [wa]s not misleading and meet[] the statutory clarity standards.” (16) Last the Court found that amendment was not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. 

Sasso Dissented: Justice Sasso’ agreed with the majority that the initiative petition did not violate the single-subject requirement but dissented arguing that the ballot summary was misleading. She concluded that the initiative could not be placed on the ballot. Justice Sasso pointed argued that the Sponsor's use of the word "allows" misled voters about the initiative's legal effect, suggesting it grants rights to "other state licensed entities" to enter the marijuana market. Additionally Justice Sasso argued that the initiative misleads voters with its claim that it “[a]llows adults 21 years or older to possess, purchase, or use marijuana products.” (45-46) She argued this was false because a state cannot authorize actions that constitute federal crimes, as established by Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, she argued, the initiative does not “allow” anything; whether Floridians can possess marijuana for recreational use depends on federal law.

Francis Dissent: Justice Frances dissented, “agree[ing] with Justice Sasso’s dissenting opinion regarding the misleading nature of the ballot summary[.]” (26) Additionally Justice Francis argued that the proposed amendment also violated the single-subject requirement. She held that, “the proposed amendment must ‘embrace but one [“a single unit or entire being or thing and no more . . . existing alone in a specified sphere”] subject [“topic,” not the proposed amendment’s purpose or purposes] and matter [“something (as information or a topic of discussion) of a particular nature or involving a particular and often specified thing or relation”] directly [“without equivocation,” “straightforward,” “plainly and not by implication,” and “in unmistakable terms”] connected [“joined or linked”] therewith.’” (29-30)

Justice Francis argued for a narrower interpretation of the single-subject. She suggested that the plain text of article XI, section 3 demanded a strict connection between the subject of the amendment and its related matters. Justice Francis emphasized that the terms "subject" and "matter" must be directly connected without ambiguity. She reviewed relevant definitions, agreeing with a concurrence on the meanings of "subject" as "topic" and "connected" as "united." Francis defined "one" as referring to a single unit and highlighted that "directly" modifies "connected," necessitating a straightforward and unequivocal relationship between the subject and the matter. She argued that alternative interpretations, such as a causal relationship or a broader logical connection, misrepresented the text. Her holding reinforced that for an amendment to comply with the single-subject requirement, the subject and related matters must be plainly and directly connected, avoiding any inferential leaps outside the written words. 

Background: This case arose after the Attorney General requested an advisory opinion regarding the validity of the “Adult Personal Use of Marijuana” initiative, which aimed to modify Article X, Section 29 of the Florida Constitution to legalize personal use of marijuana under state law. Following the collection of sufficient signatures, a judicial review was triggered. The Court focused on whether the amendment met the constitutional single-subject requirement, whether the ballot summary was clear, and whether it was facially valid under federal law. The Court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. 

Applicable Law(s): 

• “SECTION 29. Marijuana production, possession and use.” (see pages 3-5 for text) 

Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Limit Government Interference with Abortion. Per Curiam.  Justices Canady, Labarga, Couriel concurred. Justice Muñiz concurred with an opinion in which Justices Canady and Couriel concurred. Justice Grosshans dissented with an opinion in which Sasso concurred. Justice Francis dissents with an opinion. Justice Sasso dissented with an opinion in which Justices Grosshans and Francis, J concurred 

Holding(s): The Court approved the proposed citizen initiative titled “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” for placement on the ballot—specify no rehearing would be permitted. The Court first held that the proposed amendment titled “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” did not violate single-subject requirements, applying the “oneness of purpose” test. Next, the Court held that “the ballot title and summary fairly inform voters, in clear and unambiguous language, of the chief purpose of the amendment and they [were] not misleading.” (26) The Court found that “[t]he ballot summary’s nearly verbatim recitation of the proposed amendment language [wa]s an ‘accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed amendment. “ (26) Lastly, the Court held that the proposed amendment was not facially invalid under the United States Constitution. The Court reasoned that for a law to be deemed facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that there are no circumstances under which the law could be constitutionally applied. The Court argued that since the federal prohibition on partial-birth abortion would not render the amendment invalid in all situations, the argument was insufficient to meet this standard.  

Grosshans’ Dissent: Justice Grosshans argued that the ballot summary failed to adequately inform voters about its material legal effects, particularly regarding existing rights under Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution. She argued that the summary misled voters by omitting critical implications, which could create confusion about the amendment's scope and its impact on personhood rights for the unborn. Justice Grosshans held that the summary was conclusively defective and did not satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements for clarity and transparency. In her analysis Grosshans’ relied on precedents that emphasized the need for ballot summaries to accurately convey the amendment’s ramifications, including Wadhams v. Board of County Commissioners, Armstrong v. Harris, and advisory opinions that stressed the necessity for summaries to inform voters about the legal effects of amendments. She further argued that failing to include significant information about the amendment's potential impacts undermined the voters' ability to make an informed decision. 

Francis’ Dissent: Justice Francis dissented, arguing that the Sponsor failed to provide truthful and clear information about the purpose and scope of the proposed amendment, thereby misleading voters. She argued out that the amendment's title and summary failed to provide voters with a clear understanding of its implications, violating the truth-in-packaging law as outlined in § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. Specifically, she argued that the amendment aimed not merely to limit government interference with abortion but to eliminate legislative action entirely. This misrepresentation, she concluded, would mislead voters, preventing them from making an informed decision. Justice Francis identified four significant effects of the amendment, asserting that it would: (1) abrogate existing abortion laws and restrictions; (2) inhibit future legislative involvement by prohibiting laws on pre-viability abortions and granting healthcare providers veto power over post-viability regulations; (3) vastly expand the right to abortion as a health issue; and (4) redefine abortion without acknowledging the state's interests in protecting life. She emphasized that the amendment ventured beyond restoring Roe v. Wade, entering uncharted territory for Florida, thus necessitating a more explicit explanation of its chief purpose and potential consequences.  Justice Francis reiterated that while the constitution allows for citizen initiatives, the Court has a duty to ensure that voters are not misled by vague language. 

Further Justice Francis argued that the ballot title's claim of “limiting government interference” was misleading. She argued more accurate title would reflect that it seeks to “eliminate the Legislature’s ability to regulate abortion in any meaningful way.” (60) She noted that the proposed amendment did not restrict government interference; rather, it invited significant judicial involvement due to its vague language, leading to extensive litigation, similar to the situation that arose after Roe v. Wade. 

Sasso Dissent: Justice Sasso dissented arguing that the ballot summary did not meet the requirements of section 101.161 by failing to clearly convey the proposed amendment’s purpose. She argued that “the Sponsor ha[d] submitted a proposal with no readily discernable meaning, leaving it up to courts to determine even its most essential legal effects over time.” (66) Justice Sasso argued that under section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes, sponsors of constitutional amendments have a clear obligation to prepare a ballot summary that is both clear and unambiguous. The summary must accurately inform voters of the amendment's chief purpose, which goes beyond merely replicating the text of the proposed amendment.  

Justice Sasso argued that terms in the amendment—such as "viability," "healthcare provider," and "patient's health” lacked widely accepted definitions and that their meanings could lead to confusion among voters. She argued that merely parroting the vague language of the proposed amendment in the ballot summary did not satisfy the statutory requirement to explain the amendment's material legal effects. She found that the summary failed to inform voters adequately, leaving them to rely on their personal interpretations, which could result in misconceptions about the amendment's true ramifications.  

Background: The Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Court for an advisory opinion on the validity of a proposed citizen initiative titled “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” This amendment, sponsored by Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc., aims to create a new section in the Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution that would prohibit laws restricting abortion before viability or when necessary for the patient's health, as determined by their healthcare provider.  

The petition was filed on October 9, 2023, and various parties submitted briefs both in opposition and in support of the amendment. Oral arguments were heard on February 7, 2024. The ballot summary clarifies that while the amendment limits government interference, it does not alter the Legislature’s authority to require parental notification before a minor undergoes an abortion. 

Proposed Amendment: “The full text of the proposed amendment, which would create a new section in the Declaration of Rights in article I of the Florida Constitution, states:  

SECTION __. Limiting government interference with abortion.—Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider. - 3 - The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion, ” and the ballot summary states: No law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider. This amendment does not change the Legislature’s constitutional authority to require notification to a parent or guardian before a minor has an abortion.” (2-3) 

DeSantis v. Dream Defs., 389 So. 3d 413 (Fla. 2024). Opinion authored  by Justice Couriel and joined by Justices Muñiz, C.J., and Canady, Grosshans, Francis, and Sasso. Labarga concurred only in result. 

Synopsis: The Florida Supreme Court addressed a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding Florida’s riot law (section 870.01(2), Florida Statutes). The main issue was whether the law applies to individuals present at a violent protest who neither engage in nor intend to assist violent conduct. The Court answered no.   

Holding(s): The Court held that a “violent public disturbance” under section 870.01(2) means “a tumultuous disturbance of the peace[.]” (21) It emphasized that such disturbances are conducted “in a violent and turbulent manner,” and must involve “an assembly of three or more persons, acting with a common intent to assist each other in violent and disorderly conduct.” (21) The Court found that to secure a conviction under section 870.01(2), the State must demonstrate that the defendant “willfully participate[d] in a violent public disturbance[.]” and held that “willfully” required that the defendant acted “intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.” (23) The Court concluded that “… to obtain a conviction under section 870.01(2), the State must prove a defendant acted with intent to assist others in violent and disorderly conduct.” (24) Ultimately the Court concluded a person could not be found guilty under the statute more merely attending a protest that escalated into a public disturbance unless they did “willfully participate” in the disturbance by “acting with a common intent to assist [others] in violent and disorderly conduct.” Thus “to be guilty of the crime of riot, one must ‘engage in,’ or at least ‘intend to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct.’” (24-25)  

Background: In 2021, the Legislature passed Florida House Bill 1, which defined ‘riot’ as willfully participating in a violent public disturbance involving such conduct, resulting in injury or damage. Following the enactment of HB 1, several civil rights organizations sued the state to block enforcement of the law, claiming it was vague and overbroad. A federal district court agreed and issued an injunction against the law's enforcement. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the statute's scope was central to the constitutional issues. It noted the need for clarification on the definition of "violent public disturbance" and whether intent to assist in violent conduct was necessary for a conviction. The Court was asked to determine “What meaning is to be given to the provision of Florida Stat. § 870.01(2) making it unlawful to ‘willfully participate[] in a violent public disturbance involving an assembly of three or more persons, acting with a common intent to assist each other in violent and disorderly conduct, resulting in . . . [i]njury to another person; . . . [d]amage to property; . . . or [i]mminent danger of injury to another person or damage to property’?” (5)  

Applicable Law:“Florida Statutes (2020), to define the crime of ‘riot’: A person commits a riot if he or she willfully participates in a violent public disturbance involving an assembly of three or more persons, acting with a common intent to assist each other in violent and disorderly conduct, resulting in: (a) Injury to another person; (b) Damage to property; or (c) Imminent danger of injury to another person or damage to property. § 870.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2021).” (3)