“I’ve spent my entire career fighting for equal justice under the law for every person, regardless of wealth or skin color. Prior to my appointment to the North Carolina Court of Appeals (read my opinions here) and then to the North Carolina Supreme Court, I served as the Co-Executive Director for Programs and Chief Counsel for Voting Rights at the Southern Coalition for Social Justice in Durham, North Carolina. For the 14 years I was there, I had the privilege of advocating for those who had been marginalized and disenfranchised, arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court in several landmark redistricting cases.” 

“I'm proud to approach all the cases that have and will come before me with thoughtfulness, compassion, and a commitment to the rule of law, in areas ranging from criminal law to family law to business law. As a justice, my guiding principles are integrity, transparency, consistency and empathy.” 

Matter of K.B., 900 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 2024). Authored the opinion. 

Holding: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding hat “trial courts are not necessarily required to wait on completion of a home study to rule out the placement with an out-of-state relative if the trial court concludes that an in-state relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision and the placement is in the best interest of the children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a1).” (6) The Court concluded that, "based on the facts of this case, [it] c[ouldn't] conclude that the trial court’s decision to proceed without a complete ICPC home study was an abuse of discretion.”(10) 

Background: The narrow issue of the case was “whether the North Carolina statutes or the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children require the district court to perform a home study to rule out an out-of-state relative if the trial court concludes that an in-state relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision and the placement is in the best interest of the child.” (6). The case arose after three children were placed in foster care. DSS began an out-of-state ICPC home study on the children’s grandmother. After a series of delays by DSS, the trial court ordered that the home study be expedited so that the children could receive permanent placement. The trial court later granted guardianship to the great aunt who was in-state and provided care for the children for almost three years at that time. The court found that the great aunt “met the children’s education and development needs and removing them from her custody ‘would be basically removing them from the only home they have known.’ Additionally, the court found that there were family members in the local community willing to provide financial support for the children” (5) The children's “Mother appealed the order arguing that the trial court erred in entering an order granting guardianship to Great Aunt before Georgia DSS completed the ICPC home study of Grandmother.” (5) The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded for reconsideration of the mother's visitation. The grandmother then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 

Applicable law(s): The Court reviewed the case under de novo review and abuse of discretion review. “The question of whether a trial court has followed the plain language of a statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is ultimately a question of law for the courts." (7) “Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”(7) N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a1)  states that, "In placing a juvenile in out-of-home care under this section, the court shall first consider whether a relative of the juvenile is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision of the juvenile in a safe home. If the court finds that the relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision in a safe home, then the court shall order placement of the juvenile with the relative unless the court finds that the placement is contrary to the best interests of the juvenile. In placing a juvenile in out-of-home care under this section, the court shall also consider whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest to remain in the juvenile’s community of residence. Placement of a juvenile with a relative outside of this State must be in accordance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. []"(8)

State v. Beck, 385 N.C. 435, 894 S.E.2d 729 (2023). Authored dissenting opinion.

Holding(s): The Court held that the trial court did not err, reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision and “direct[ing] the Court of Appeals to reinstate defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.” (1) The Court held that “the State presented more than a scintilla of evidence from which a rational juror court conclude the defendant conspired ...to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon....[and] that the original crime of conspiracy...was completed no later than the morning of 27 April 2017.” (7-8) The Court reasoned that “no evidence was produced that the original plan included breaking or entering the apartment.” (8) The Court further concluded that, “[w]hen viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could conclude that the original plan was to rob Beshears in the parking lot [and] could also conclude that, in those twenty-four minutes between Silva’s first and second appearances at the apartment complex, defendant and at least one other person formed an additional and separate conspiracy—a new plan.” (9)

Dissent: Riggs dissented arguing that “precedent[] [was] clear that a multifactor analysis applie[d[ to the factual question of whether multiple conspiracy existed: 'The nature of the agreement or agreements, the objectives of the conspiracies, the time interval between them, the number of participants, and the number of meetings are all factors that may be considered.' State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 577 (2004). So, too, is the time at which the purported separate conspiracies were complete.” (11) Justice Riggs concluded, “Because I believe a full consideration of these several factors shows that the agreement to break and enter was part and parcel of the conspiracy to rob Ms. Beshears, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ vacatur of the conspiracy to commit felonious breaking or entering. And, because I believe that improper conviction mat have led the trial court to impose a harsher consolidated sentence than if only one conspiracy conviction was returned, I would also remand for resentencing based on a single conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.” (11) Riggs argued the “[t]he nature and object of the agreements [w]ere] functionally indistinguishable and militate against submitting separate conspiracy counts to the jury.” (14) Further Riggs argued that “[a] few hours difference in plans amongst the same three participants, spread between a few texts mssages and a single physical meeting, does not suggest the existence of multiple conspiracies.” (15) Riggs stated , “I [] believe the majority’s narrow focus and emphasis on which crimes were contemplated when the offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery was completed misses the mark, as the evidence shows the conspiracy was continuing when the plan to break and enter was formed. Indeed, to hold otherwise renders that consideration dispositive—a result plainly not contemplated, let alone suggested, by the multifactor test enunciated in Tirado.” (15)

Background: The Court asked “[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant’s convction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.” (6) And “whether the State presented substantial evidence of multiple conspiracies, or just one conspiracy.” (6) The Defendant was convicted of “conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit felonious breaking or entering, and felonious breaking or entering.”  (4) “[T]he Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the two conspiracy charges, and vacated defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.” (4) The Court of Appeals found that only one conspiracy had been committed. 

Rule(s): “Whether the state presented substantial evidence of conspirancy to commit a robbery with a dangerous weapon is a question of law.” (5) The Court “review[ed] the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss de novo.” (5) “Substantial evidence means ‘more than a scintilla of evidence.’” (5) 

Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N. Carolina, Inc., 385 N.C. 797, 898 S.E.2d 648 (2024). Authored dissenting opinion.

Holding(s) The Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, dismissing the negligence charges finding that the plaintiff did not meet the notice requirement on any of the negligence charges. The court said, “Here, plaintiff, as the tenant and occupier of the leased property, had ‘long term prior notice,’ before the 13 April 2017 gas explosion, that there was an issue of some sort with the gas line and with the flooring above the furnace” (12). “Without a showing of notice or defendant’s knowledge, plaintiff cannot maintain an action for negligence because defendant’s duty under N.C.G.S. § 42-42 had not yet arisen” (14). Additionally the court maintained that “a landlord “may not be found negligent per se for a violation of the [applicable housing code] unless: (1) the owner knew or should have known of the [housing code] violation; (2) the owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the violation; and (3) the violation proximately caused injury or damage.” (16) 

Dissent:  Judge Riggs dissented. The majority granted summary judgment in favoring the landlord, stating that without a written request from the tenant, the landlord had no obligation to maintain potentially dangerous components in rental properties. However, Judge Riggs argued that the RRAA mandates landlords to maintain all critical systems (e.g., electrical, plumbing, heating) in good and safe working order, regardless of tenant notification.  Judge Riggs disagreed that the landlord had no duty, arguing that the statutory duty included maintaining these system not just repairing them and did not require written notice from the tenants. Riggs emphasized that the landlord’s failure to properly maintain the gas-fired furnace, which led to Mr. Terry’s severe injuries, raised genuine issues of negligence that should be decided by a jury. The dissent further criticized the majority for interpreting the RRAA in a way that neglects the plain language of the statute and found it dismissed important facts and evidence that could indicate the landlord’s failure to meet their statutory obligations. Riggs wrote, “This duty is in addition to the duty to ‘promptly repair’ the same systems and does not require written notice by the tenant. See id. Because the record demonstrates genuine issues about whether this landlord was negligent in the duty to maintain in ‘good and safe’ working order the gas-fired furnace and associated gas piping, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding as to a duty created by the RRAA”(21) Riggs argued that “[t]he word ‘maintain’ is not defined in the RRAA, but [the Court] afford words that are undefined in statutes their plain and definite meaning. ” (23) She argued that “The majority glosse[d] over the first clause of subsection (a)(4), which by its plain language create[d] a duty for landlords to maintain in good and safe working order 'all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and other facilities and appliances.' N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(4)” (24). She further found the majority erred on the side of judicial restraint, stating “I would constrain our analysis to the facts presented in this case and avoid speculation on the wide array of hypotheticals presented by the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals.” (24) 

Background: This case arose after the plaintiff’s wife leased a property from the defendant. The plaintiff noticed there was a gas smell on the leased premise but did not notify the defendant. Later when turning on a light switch an explosion occurred resulting in severe burns and extensive medical treatment. An investigation revealed that the gas pipe to the furnace was badly rusted and corroded and that the defendant had not inspected the furnace before the lease began or since ( about 7 years.)  The plaintiff sued the defendant pursuing claims for common law negligence, negligence per se, violation of the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breach of the implied warranty of habitability.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing all claims. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, remanding the case. The defendant filed then appealed  based on Judge Carpenter’s dissent.

Applicable law: The Court reviewed the case de novo. The Court said “We review a trial court’s order for summary judgment de novo . . . .” Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196 (2007). (4) Rule:  The Court states, “he must show that there was a dangerous hidden defect on the premises, of which the landlord knew or should have known, and of which the tenant was unaware or could not, through ordinary diligence, discover. ”(5) “The RRAA, enacted in 1977, codified the implied warranty of habitability. After codification of the RRAA, all common law ‘not abrogated, repealed, or . . . obsolete’ remained ‘in full force.’ Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 350 N.C. 293, 296 (1999) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 4-1 (1986)); see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 318–19 (2012)” (6). “The RRAA abrogates the common law in that it requires a landlord to comply with “current applicable building and housing codes.” N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(1). The RRAA further abrogates the common law in that it requires a landlord to make repairs.” (7).  The RRAA also implements a notice requirement in addition to the knowledge requirement. 

McKinney v. Goins, 290 N.C. App. 403, 892 S.E.2d 460 (2023), appeal dismissed, 898 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. 2024). Riggs authored the majority opinion.

Holding: The Court reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision, holding that the Revival Window in the SAFE Child act was not facially unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the Revival Window satisfied due process, even under strict scrutiny, by advancing a compelling state interest and being appropriately limited in scope.

Background:  In 2014, Gary Scott Goins was convicted of multiple sexual offenses related to his abuse of East Gaston High School wrestlers and sentenced to a minimum of 34.5 years in prison. Under the statute of limitations that was in effect when the Plaintiffs' abuse occurred, they had three years from their eighteenth birthdays to file civil suits against the Defendants. This period expired in 2008 for the latest of the Plaintiffs' claims. The SAFE Child Act, passed by the North Carolina General Assembly in 2019, revived expired civil claims between certain dates only. This change aimed to address delayed disclosures of abuse and its long-term effects. The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendants in 2020. 

In 2021, a three-judge panel reviewed the Board's motion to dismiss based on the argument that the SAFE Child Act's "Revival Window" was unconstitutional. The majority agreed with the Board, ruling that retroactively reviving time-barred claims violated due process protections under the North Carolina Constitution. They concluded that a statute of limitations defense is a constitutionally protected vested right that cannot be retroactively affected. Judge McGee dissented, arguing that even under strict scrutiny, the Revival Window was justified by compelling state interests. Plaintiffs and the State appealed the decision. This Court asked  “whether a retroactive statute resuscitating a claim previously barred by a statute of limitations runs afoul of the North Carolina Constitution regardless of the circumstances.”(12).

Analysis: The Court first addressed the Law of the Land Clause in Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, which ensures that no person can be deprived of their life, liberty, or property except through legal processes. The Court found the key question for the Court was whether the Law of the Land Clause provides protections beyond those of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically whether reviving expired claims under the SAFE Child Act's Revival Window is unconstitutional under North Carolina’s constitutional and due process standards.

The Court stated that it analyzes facial constitutional challenges by examining the text of the Constitution, the historical context of its adoption, and relevant precedents. The Court noted that it has emphasized the high burden placed on those alleging legislation violations the constitution.

The Court next analyzed the Law of the Land Clause, Ex Post Facto Laws, and retrospective laws through Reconstruction focusing on how these concepts have been historically interpreted under North Carolina’s Constitution. The Court found that the historical perspective remains relevant, and highlighted that while the Constitution does protect against certain retroactive effects, it does not inherently bar all retrospective legislation, especially when dealing with procedural rather than substantive rights.

Next, the Court looked to modern jurisprudence regarding statutes of limitation, vested rights, and due process. The Court found that modern jurisprudence emphasized the balance between legislative power and individual rights. The Court found that the prevailing view was that while legislatures can alter procedural aspects of the law, they cannot infringe upon substantive vested rights. Overall, the Court found that the Revival Window's approach fit within the bounds of modern jurisprudence, provided it does not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.

Last, the Court asked whether the Revival Window of the SAFE Child Act adheres to constitutional due process standards. It found that the Revival Window met modern substantive due process requirements. The Court found that the Revival Window served a compelling state interest by providing justice to victims given the evolving understanding of the trauma associated with abuse. The Court found the legislation aligned with public interests, such as protecting children and holding abusers accountable. The Court noted that the Window was also narrowly tailored, applying only for a limited two-year period and exclusively to civil actions for child sexual abuse, without altering substantive defenses or burdens of proof.

Rule(s): “Whether to apply strict scrutiny or rational basis review to a statute challenged under both the federal Constitution and the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution is determined by our precedents according to the following principles: Substantive due process is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained. Thus, substantive due process may be characterized as a standard of reasonableness, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. . . . . In order to determine whether a law violates substantive due process, we must first determine whether the right infringed upon is a fundamental right. If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis wherein the party seeking to apply the law must demonstrate that it serves a compelling state interest. If the right infringed upon is not fundamental in the constitutional sense, the party seeking to apply it need only meet the traditional test of establishing that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest”(41). 

Posted on Facebook, "... I’ve spent my entire career fighting for equal justice under the law for every North Carolinian. For nearly 15 years, I was a civil rights attorney, fighting discrimination on all fronts and representing underserved communities. I worked at Southern Coalition for Social Justice - check out their work! While I was there, I served as the co-executive director for programs and chief counsel for voting rights. I argued before SCOTUS twice in landmark redistricting cases and multiple times in N.C. appellate courts.I worked with communities across the South to advocate for fair elections and safe and healthy environments. I am the youngest woman to ever serve on the state Supreme Court. I also served on the N.C. Court of Appeals.The N.C. Supreme Court deals with cases ranging from criminal law to family law to business law. I approach all cases with thoughtfulness, compassion, and a commitment to the rule of law.I am proud to have Gov. Roy Cooper’s full support! As he says: 'The need for fair-minded, even-handed, honest, experienced judges is more important than ever as our society and our courts wrestle with many critical issues.' My seat is the only N.C. Supreme Court seat on your ballot this year. The court currently has a 5-2 GOP majority - Justice Anita Earls and I are the only Democrats on the bench. As your voice on the court, I will continue my work to ensure that the Supreme Court delivers justice to all North Carolinians, without fear or favor."

EMILY'S List Endorsed Justice Riggs stating, “Justice Allison Riggs has spent her entire law career fighting for people’s rights and their fundamental freedoms. As a justice on the state Supreme Court, she is intentional about treating all people in the courtroom with dignity and respect. We are proud to endorse Justice Riggs for the North Carolina state Supreme Court. We need justices on the bench to deliver fair and equal rulings for all citizens and we are thrilled to witness the good work Justice Riggs will continue to do on the state Supreme Court.”

"EMILYs List, the nation’s largest resource for women in politics, works to elect Democratic pro-choice women up and down the ballot and across the country with a goal of fighting for our rights and our communities. Our work is centered around a fundamental vision: Run. Win. Change the World. EMILYs List has raised $850 million in service to that vision and has helped Democratic women win competitive elections by recruiting and training candidates, supporting and helping build strong campaigns, researching the issues that impact women and families, running one of the largest independent expenditure operations for Democrats, and turning out women voters to the polls. Since our founding in 1985, we have helped elect the country’s first woman as vice president, 175 women to the House, 26 to the Senate, 20 governors, and over 1,500 women to state and local office. More than 40% of the candidates EMILYs List has helped elect to Congress have been women of color. Visit www.emilyslist.org for more information."

"Reproductive Freedom for All President and CEO Mini Timmarajureleased the following statement in response: 'To uphold our fundamental rights, it is essential that we elect judges who have proven they are committed to making fair and just decisions. State Supreme Courts can be a firewall against anti-abortion extremists’ relentless attacks, and Justice Riggs has proven that she is committed to safeguarding the freedom of North Carolinians. Our members are energized and ready to get to work to elect Justice Riggs and ensure her victory this November.'"