Andrew Pinson

Justice Andrew A. Pinson is running for re-election to the Georgia Supreme Court. Former Congressman John J. Barrow (D) is running against Justice Pinson.

Background:

• Justice Pinson is married to wife Sara Beth. 

Related Employment:

• Justice Andrew A. Pinson was appointed to the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2022 by Governor Kemp (R). 
• In 2021 he was appointed by Governor Kemp to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. 
• In 2018 he was appointed Solicitor General of Georgia. 
• In 2017 he joined the Office of Georgia Attorney General Chris Carr 
  
• From 2014-2017 he was an associate at Jones Day
• From 2013-2014 he clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas 
• From 2012-2013 he was an associate at Jones Day.
• From 2011-2012 he clerked for Chief Judge David B. Sentell at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Education:

• Received J.D. from University of Georgia’s Lumpkin School of Law. 

Notable Associations:

• Member of Atlanta Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society Advisory Board. 
  

Controversial Issues:

• As Solicitor General, Pinson defended Georgia's anti-abortion laws.
  

Judicial Philosophy:

•  “I believe good judges serve with one goal: uphold the rule of law. The rule of law is the simple but powerful idea that we are all bound by the laws that our elected representatives have passed. Without the rule of law, our rights and liberties would be meaningless.” 
• “How do I uphold the rule of law? 
  • First, I approach every case with an open mind and apart from personal opinion. Personal preferences of individual judges should never affect how we interpret and apply our laws. Second, I apply the law as written. The words that our elected representatives have passed is the law that governs us. However well-meaning, judges who apply what the law should be rather than what it says undermine our democratic process.” 
  • “In each of these ways, you can count on me to work tirelessly to uphold the rule of law as a Justice on our Supreme Court: for people who are hurt or mistreated, for businesses who depend on a stable legal landscape, and for a criminal justice system that protects our rights and liberties while keeping us safe.” 
• Pinson said, "The role of the court is not to weigh in on hot button issues.... If you’re looking to change the law, you have to look to the legislature[.]”

Public Statements:

• At his swearing in ceremony in 2022 Pinson stated, “Compared to our other branches of government, the judicial branch is unique, and I think special, in that it really requires a kind of public-private partnership. Boiled down, our job as judges at any level is to decide cases, to resolve disputes between parties,” he said. “On the civil side, that means that we have very little to do unless private parties bring us a case that they need help resolving. And for both civil and criminal cases, the judicial branch just cannot work unless the parties before the court, represented by counsel, do the hard work of building the record, of presenting the facts and presenting the law to us. That partnership runs so much more smoothly when we know and trust each other—when we as judges can have faith that counsel will be candid with the court and act in good faith, and when the parties know that the judge will treat each party fairly, put aside personal opinion, and apply the law as it’s written. It’s one thing to know that attorneys and judges have taken oaths to that effect, but it’s another to know that because you know them as people.”
  

Notable Cases:

• Crary v. Clautice, No. S24A0004, 2024 WL 922863 (Ga. Mar. 5, 2024) Colvin authored opinion in which all justice concurred. On appeal the Court affirmed the judgement of trial court in part and dismissed appeal in part. The Court held the “Appellant’s constitutional challenges to the grandparent visitation statute are moot because a reversal of the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s request to declare the statute unconstitutional ‘would have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.'” (citing Knox v. State, 316 Ga. 426, 427-428 (888 SE2d 497) (2023)) (8) The Court stated it had “no province to determine whether or not [the] statute, in the abstract, is valid.” The Appellant (mother) argued “Appellant argues that a declaration regarding the constitutionality of the grandparent visitation statute is nevertheless authorized here because ‘she remains in a position of uncertainty with respect to her child and her parents’[.]” (8-9) The Court dismissed as moot this portion of the Appellant’s appeal finding that “Appellant, like any parent, could raise her constitutional challenges to the statutory standards for granting or revoking grandparent visitation in a new action for grandparent visitation, if one is filed, or in a new petition to revoke grandparent visitation, if visitation is ordered in the future.” (10-11) The Court next affirmed the trial court’s “denial of [Appellants’s] motion to hold Appellee in contempt.” The Court held “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a contempt citation was unwarranted.” (12) Lastly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, stating, “the trial court was not required to hold a hearing or take evidence before ruling on Appellant’s request for attorney fees and expenses because the request was denied.” (14) Facts: The case centered around a dispute regarding grandparent visitation rights. Allison Crary, the appellant, had been granted sole legal and physical custody of her minor child in 2017, with visitation rights granted to the child's father. However, the maternal grandparents of the child filed a petition for grandparent visitation rights under OCGA § 19-7-3. After a final consent order was entered in 2022 allowing the Clautices visitation rights, Crary filed a petition to revoke this order, alleging various defects and constitutional issues with the grandparent visitation statute.

• Hightower v. State, 315 Ga. 399, 883 S.E.2d 335 (2023) McMillian authored opinion. All justice concurred. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that a high degree of necessity existed for the mistrial due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its potential threat to trial participants' health. The court noted that the trial court had considered the circumstances surrounding the mistrial, including the Fulton County Order declaring a judicial emergency, and had solicited arguments from both parties before making its decision. Furthermore, the court concluded that rejecting alternatives proposed by the defense was within the trial court's discretion, given the uncertainties surrounding the pandemic and the need to protect participants' health. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial, and further prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy. Facts: Michelle Antoinette Hightower was charged with malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Michael McGee on September 5, 2017. Her trial began on March 9, 2020, but four days later, a judicial emergency due to COVID-19 was declared, prompting the trial court to declare a mistrial over defense objections. Hightower argued that further prosecution was barred by double jeopardy clauses due to the lack of manifest necessity for the mistrial and the trial court's failure to consider alternatives. However, the trial court denied Hightower's plea in bar, and she appealed. Law: Footnote 6 includes language of Double Jeopardy Clause of the Georgia Constitution. ““[e]ven after jeopardy has attached, trial courts may declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, without barring retrial, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for doing so.” (citing Rios v. State, 311 Ga. 639, 643 (2) (859 SE2d 65) (2021)) “The manifest necessity standard requires a “high degree of necessity” to grant a mistrial. “ (citing Laguerre v. State, 301 Ga. 122, 124 (799 SE2d 736) (2017)) “Whether such necessity exists is to be determined by weighing the defendant’s right to have his trial completed before the particular tribunal against the interest of the public in having fair trials designed to end in just judgments; and the decision must take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances.” (10-11) “[I]n the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, ‘the decision whether to grant a mistrial is reserved to the “broad discretion” of the trial judge.’” (11) The Court found that “the United States Supreme Court has recognized that considering the health of trial participants can be integral to conducting a criminal trial.” (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-80 (II) (91 SCt 547, 27 LE2d 543) (1971).) (13) 

• Raffensperger v. Jackson, 316 Ga. 383, 888 S.E.2d 483 (2023) Concurred. The Court concluded the Georgia Lactation Consultation Practice Act (“the Act”) “violate[d] Plaintiffs' due process rights under the Georgia Constitution to practice the chosen profession of lactation care provider.” (13) The Court reverses the trial court’s ruling because it “determined that the Act is unconstitutional on one of the grounds asserted” thus the Court found it “need not address Plaintiffs' arguments that the trial court erred in ruling that the Act does not violate their equal protection rights under the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, [the Court] vacate[d] the trial court's ruling in S23A0017. The Court initially found that construction of Georgia’s Due Process Clause had “remain[ed] materialy unchanged since [they] first appeared.” (5) Issue: Whether the Act violated an individual's right to due process under the Georgia Constitution. The Court established a framework for considering the challenge. “First…challengers bear the burden of establishing that the Act ‘manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people.’” (6-7) “The challenger must show that the occupation sought is, at a minimum, lawful but for the challenged restriction.” (7) “And the challenger must also show that the regulation ‘unreasonabl[y] . . . interfere[s]’ with the ability ‘to pursue a lawful occupation of their choosing free from unreasonable government interference[.]’” (7) Second, “the government must offer a legitimate interest behind the regulation justifying some interference with the ability to pursue the occupation. This is not an open-ended exercise in interest-balancing - our consistent and definitive understanding of the Due Process Clause shows well-settled limits on what government interests are sufficient for these purposes: a burden on the ability to practice a lawful occupation is only constitutional if it is reasonably necessary to advance an interest in health, safety, or public morals.” (7) “[O]nce the challenger has made a prima facie case, the government must offer (but not necessarily prove the veracity or efficacy of) a specific interest in health, safety, or public morals. If the government fails to offer such an interest, or offers only an illegitimate interest, the regulation violates the right to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable government interference.” (8) “Third, and finally, the challenger has the ultimate burden to prove that the regulation unreasonably interferes with her right to practice the occupation of her choosing. Because statutes are presumed to be constitutional, this burden starts and remains with the challenger throughout.” (8) The Court found “Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to that issue.” (9) The Court concluded the “Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the Act in fact imposes significant burdens on them in providing lactation care and services for remuneration.” (11) The Court, “conclude[d] that the Secretary's proffered interest in the restrictions imposed by the Act - promoting access to quality care - is an insufficient basis upon which to authorize only IBCLCs to provide lactation care and services for compensation given our consistent and definitive understanding of the scope of the due process right to practice one's chosen profession free from unreasonable government restrictions.” (12) The Court reviewed the trial court order de novo and reviewed viewed evidence in light most favorable to the nonmovants relating to the motions for summary judgement.

Notable Cases Continued:

• McBrayer v. Scarbrough, 317 Ga. 387, 893 S.E.2d 660 (2023) Ellington authored opinion. All Justices concurred. The Supreme Court later reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that “the ‘use’ of a motor vehicle as provided in OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 is not limited by the terms ‘actively in use’ ‘as a vehicle.’ Further, loading a person into and restraining a person in a patrol car constitutes a ‘use’ of a patrol car as to which sovereign immunity is waived under OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2.” (21) The Court found, “that the General Assembly understood that the word ‘use’ was broad enough to embrace uses of a motor vehicle that extend beyond mere transportation. If the General Assembly had meant to limit the meaning of ‘use’ to actively using a motor vehicle as a vehicle, it could have said so, but it did not.” (19-20) Further the Court found that “By reading into the statutes the terms ‘actively’ and ‘as a vehicle,’ the Court of Appeals altered the plain meaning of ‘use’ and restricted the scope of the local government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.” (21) Thus the Court “overruled the court’s precedent construing ‘use’ of moter vehicle in OCGA § 33-24-51 (b) and OCGA § 36-92-2 (a) as being limited to the ‘active’ use of the motor vehicle “as a vehicle.” (21-22) Issues: “Does “use” of a motor vehicle as provided in OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 require the motor vehicle to be ‘actively in use’ ‘as a vehicle” when the injury arose?’” (2) And “Does loading a person into or restraining a person in a patrol car constitute the ‘use’ of a motor vehicle as to which sovereign immunity is waived under OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2?” (2) Standard of review: “Our review of a trial court’s decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is de novo.” (2) “[Q]uestions concerning the application of sovereign immunity are legal questions subject to de novo review.” (2-3) Facts: In McBrayer v. Scarbrough, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of Sheriff Gene Scarbrough in a wrongful death case brought by Sherrie McBrayer for her husband's death. The court ruled that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer's complaint didn't demonstrate that her husband's death, which occurred while he was restrained in a patrol car, resulted from the deputies' "use" of the patrol car as a vehicle, a prerequisite for waiving sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals held that the patrol car wasn't "actively in use" as a vehicle when the injury occurred, rejecting McBrayer's argument that insurance coverage determined waiver of sovereign immunity.

• State v. SASS Grp., LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 885 S.E.2d 761 (2023) Bethel authored the opinion in which all justices concurred, The Court “reverse[d] the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate the grant of Plaintiff’s interlocutory injunction.” (11) The Court held that “action” as used in Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V refers to “entire case or lawsuit” not “claim.” (11) “Accordingly, if a lawsuit is filed against the State pursuant to Paragraph V and that suit includes an independent claim against another party not specified in that paragraph’s waiver provision, then the entire lawsuit must be dismissed.” (26-27) “[W]hen [the Court] consider the meaning of a constitutional provision, we must seek to ascertain the way in which the text most reasonably would have been understood at the time of its adoption, reading it as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” (11) Issue: “[W]hether the word ‘action,’ as used in Paragraph V, means an entire lawsuit or only a claim that is brought in a lawsuit.” (14) The Court found dictionary definitions for “action” support its interpretation. The Court also found “[i]n both judicial decisions and statutes, ‘action’ is more commonly used to refer to a ‘whole lawsuit’ rather than a claim.” (15) The Court found that other provisions in the state’s constitution support its interpretation as they distinguish between “action” and “claim.” (23) Further, the Court found that other language within Paragraph V support its interpretation. “[W]hen [the Court] determine[s] the meaning of a particular word or phrase in a constitutional provision or statute, we consider text in context, not in isolation.” (18) “[The Court] may also ‘refer to the rules of English grammar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by which ordinary speakers of the English language commonly structure their words,’ and the drafters of the constitutional amendment are presumed to know the rules of grammar.” (19) 

• Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 880 S.E.2d 544 (2022) Colvin authored the majority. All the Justices concur, except McMillian and Colvin,  who concur in part and dissent in part. Pinson concurred and wrote separately. Pinson found the majority was correct to hold “that a person's right against compelled self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I., Para. XVI ("Paragraph XVI"), prevents the State from using that person's refusal to perform preliminary breath tests and certain field sobriety tests against her at trial to suggest an adverse inference of guilt.” (16) Pinson stated, the “holding follows directly from this Court's recent decisions in Olevik v. State , 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017), Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019), and Awad v. State , 313 Ga. 99, 868 S.E.2d 219 (2022).” (16) Pinson considered the Court's analysis in Olevik and Elliott to be thorough and deliberate. Pinson found that even if there is debate over the above cases (shown in dissent), that the cases reflect commitment to the rule of law because of its thorough and deliberate considerations of legal principles and extensive analysis of relevant precedent. He stated, “Given the deliberate nature of these decisions, anyone who seeks to overrule them has to marshal much more than mere disagreement with their outcome—to me, they need to show in some way that following them would cause even more serious damage to the rule of law than overruling them would.” (19) Pinson explained the rationale behind stare decesis. He explained, “applying stare decisis makes a body of law more stable, predictable, and reliable, and it deters the inefficient and expensive ‘endless relitigation’ of basic and settled legal rules.” (16) He stated, “ [i]n our constitutional structure, courts have the special duty to say what the law is (as needed to resolve the controversies that come before us).” (16) He further explained, “following a past decision confirms that it is law, and that even the Court, like any other government actor and the litigants before us, is bound by it. This is the essence of the rule of law, and each time we overrule a past decision—choosing not to follow what our Court has said the law is—we risk chipping away at its foundation.” (16) “But one important threshold question is whether the past decision can reasonably be understood as doing law. Was the decision ‘deliberate,’ the product of applying sound and accepted legal principles to reach a reasoned answer to a disputed question, or was it a ‘hasty and crude’ decision that seems conclusory, arbitrary, or based on something other than law, like personal preference?” (17) “If a court reaches that resolution through a decision that carefully applies sound, generally accepted legal principles, it is clear evidence of a proper exercise of the judicial power—that is, that the court is simply doing the job our Constitution gives it.” (17) “The calculus is different for past decisions of the ‘hasty and crude’ variety. If a past decision ignores or flatly disregards sound, generally accepted legal principles, or relies only on bald, unreasoned assertions, or some combination of the above, the inference that such decisions are proper exercises of the judicial power grounded in law is much weaker.” (18) “If a past decision is ‘not law,’ Doe , 23 Ga. at 86, treat it accordingly. On the other hand, if the past decision in question is the product of the careful and deliberate application of sound and accepted legal principles, it seems to me that the burden on any would-be overrulers is to show something pretty extraordinary to justify the serious harm to the rule of law that comes from overruling that kind of decision.” (18)
  • In 2022 the Green Bag Almanac and Reader selected Pinson's concurrence as an example of "good legal writing[.]"