Joseph T. Deters

“Joe Deters has the right combination of experience, legal knowledge, and passion for public service that will serve the citizens of Ohio well as an associate justice of the Ohio Supreme Court,” said Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. “Joe is a long-serving and well-regarded public servant who is known for his legal intellect, reverence for the rule of law, and his accessibility.” 

Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-2787. Authored majority opinion.

Holding(s): The Court affirmed the court of appeals decision finding that whether a food supplier breached a duty of care hinges on whether consumers could reasonably expect an injurious substance in the food. The Court found that this expectation is influenced by whether the substance is natural or foreign to the food. The Court held that the Twelfth District appropriately applied a blended analysis, concluding that the bone found in the boneless wing was natural to chicken and could reasonably be expected by consumers.  The court emphasized that the term "boneless wing" does not guarantee the absence of bones, and thus, the defendants did not breach their duty of care. The Court declined to adopt a broad standard for food negligence cases finding that food negligence should not be treated differently from other negligence cases during summary judgment. 

Dissent: The dissent stated, "[t]he result in this case is another nail in the coffin of the American jury system." (11) It found, "the majority declare[d] as a matter of law that no reasonable person could consider the facts of this case and reach a conclusion contrary to the one it reache[d]." (11) The dissent argued that "[t]his is, of course, patently untrue given that [three] justices of this court dissent[ed] from the majority’s judgment." (11) The dissent emphasized the need to reaffirm the "reasonable-expectation" test established in Allen which focused on what consumers could reasonably expect when purchasing food. The justice criticized the majority for adopting a "foreign-natural" test that limited liability based on the classification of substances in food, thereby undermining consumer protection. The dissent insisted that a jury should have been allowed to evaluate the facts, as jurors possessed common sense and better represented community expectations regarding food labeled as "boneless." It disputed the majority's assertion that Berkheimer should have guarded against the bone’s presence, arguing that this determination was best left to a jury. Furthermore, the dissent asserted that consumers generally expected "boneless" items to be free of bones, and this expectation should have been legally recognized. Ultimately, the dissent called for a reversal of the majority’s decision, advocating for a jury trial where Berkheimer's claim could have been fairly assessed under the reasonable-expectation standard.

Background: Michael Berkheimer filed a lawsuit against a restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm after experiencing serious medical issues due to a chicken bone getting lodged in his throat while eating a "boneless wing." The trial court found that the defendants were not negligent, a decision that was upheld by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. Berkheimer argued that the critical question was whether he could reasonably expect to find a bone in a boneless wing and believed this issue should be left for a jury to decide. He urged the court to adopt the "reasonable expectation" test for determining negligence in food safety. Berkheimer contended the Twelfth District incorrectly applied the "foreign-natural" test instead of this standard. Berkheimer argued that negligence cases involving food should allow for jury consideration of whether consumers can reasonably expect an injurious substance, especially when a seller claims it has been removed. Berkheimer argued that negligence cases involving food should allow for jury consideration of whether consumers can reasonably expect an injurious substance, especially when a seller claims it has been removed.

Applicable Law(s): 

• "'[I]n order to establish actionable negligence, one must show the existence of a duty, a breach of the duty, and an injury resulting proximately therefrom.' Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1984)[.]" (5) 
• "With respect to a sale of food, this court has framed the question of negligence as whether the seller, 'in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that [the food] was unfit to eat.' Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 251 (1960)." (5)
  
• The court discusses two primary tests used to assess negligence: the foreign-natural test, which determines if the harmful substance is foreign to the food, and the reasonable-expectation test, which evaluates whether a reasonable consumer would expect to encounter such a substance. 
  

• "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate 'when an examination of all relevant materials filed in the action reveals that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Smith v. McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C)." (8)

"As Justice, my chief responsibility is to respect and honor the rule of law and the Supreme Court’s role as a co-equal branch of government. I view the role of the Court to interpret our constitution while showing judicial restraint from influencing legislation."

"As Justice, my chief responsibility is to respect and honor the rule of law and the Supreme Court’s role as a co-equal branch of government. I view the role of the Court to interpret our constitution while showing judicial restraint from influencing legislation."

See [Joe Deters for Ohio Supreme Court]

Joe Deters for Ohio Supreme Court: Key Priorities

According to Justice Deters' campaign website, his priorities as a Justice include:

• Honoring the Constitution: Upholding the law with a commitment to constitutional principles.
• Strict Interpretation of Laws: Making decisions based on a strict interpretation of laws as they are written.
• Community Safety: Prioritizing the safety and well-being of Ohio’s communities.
• Conservative Constitutionalism: Maintaining a position as a strict conservative constitutionalist who values the rights of all Ohioans.
• Integrity of the Court: Upholding the integrity and honesty of the Ohio Supreme Court.

For more information, visit [Joe Deters for Ohio Supreme Court]

State ex rel. One Pers. One Vote v. LaRose, 2023-Ohio-1992.  Deters concurred in majority.

Holding(s): The court held that the August 8, 2023, special election called by General Assembly in Senate Joint Resolution 2(SJR 2) is authorized by Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and therefore denies the writ. (14).  The Court concluded that "[t]he General Assembly’s valid exercise of its constitutional power granted in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution overrides any election statute that would otherwise prohibit the special election called for in the General Assembly’s joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment for submission to the state’s electors." (12) The Court also concluded, "R.C. 3501.40 cannot restrain the secretary from proceeding with a special election that the General Assembly has validly prescribed under the Ohio Constitution. A statute that conflicts with the General Assembly’s constitutional power under Article XVI, Section 1 to authorize a special election on a certain day is unenforceable to prevent the special election." (13)

Analysis: The Court found that “Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution control[ed] the matter[.]” (6) The Court found “Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes the General Assembly to ‘prescribe’ a special election on a proposed constitutional amendment without requiring that it do so by statute.” (7) Looking to The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English  and Black’s Law Dictionary the Court held “…the use of the word ‘prescribe’ in Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes the General Assembly to impose or direct a special election in furtherance of a proposed constitutional amendment.” (8) Further the Court found this “leaves to the General Assembly the details—like the date of the special election—to be established in pursuance of its authority to call for a vote of citizens on the amendment.” (8) The Court noted that “[i]n other parts of the Ohio Constitution, when the General Assembly’s exercise of a constitutional power requires the action to be taken ‘by law’ (i.e., pursuant to a statute), the constitutional language has so specified.” (8) The Court said, “This court cannot impose a similar ‘by law’ limitation on the General Assembly’s power to prescribe a special election in Article XVI, Section 1 when the constitutional language does not include one.” (9) The Court disagreed with the Relators argument that election statutes govern; finding the Court that their “argument was contrary to the language used in the Constitution.” (9) "Relators ... argue[d] that the election statutes in the Revised Code should apply because those statutes are simply the means by which the General Assembly has exercised its Article XVI, Section 1 power to submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the electors. Therefore, according to relators, the General Assembly has chosen to limit by statute its power to 'prescribe' a special election on a proposed amendment. And relators [argued] that the Ohio Constitution does not forbid the General Assembly from prescribing by statute the date on which a proposed constitutional amendment is to be submitted to Ohio voters." (10) "The Court concluded, Article III, Section 1 and Article XVII, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution mandate that general elections occur on "the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November." (10) However, since the Constitution does not specify dates for special elections, the General Assembly can determine the timing of special elections without violating constitutional provisions.

The Court stated, "But even if relators are correct that the General Assembly may prescribe by statute a special election on a constitutional amendment proposed by joint resolution, it is not required to do so. Regardless of what the Revised Code may provide for the holding of elections generally, Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to call for a special election on a constitutional amendment proposed by a joint resolution and to specify the date of the special election in that joint resolution, subject only to the limitations contained in the constitutional provision itself." (10) The Court found support for its conclusion in Foreman. “In Foreman, the General Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment by joint resolution, specifically calling for a special election on May 2, 1967. Foreman at 139-140.” (11) The Court found that “[t]his court rejected the relators’ argument and denied the writ, relying on the language of Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. ‘These words clearly authorize the General Assembly to prescribe that an amendment to the Constitution, proposed by the General Assembly pursuant to that section, be submitted at a special election on a certain date.’ Id. at 141.” (12) 

Background: Relators One Person One Vote sought a writ of mandamus to remove the proposed constitutional amendment in S.J.R. 2 from the 2023 ballot. The issue before the court was whether the General Assembly could schedule a special election for a legislatively-initiated constitutional amendment on any date or if it must adhere to existing statutes that dictate when special elections can be held. “[R]elators argue[d] that the election statutes restricting the date of special elections must govern the submission of the proposed constitutional amendment to the voters. They argue[d] that nothing in Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes the General Assembly ‘to choose whatever date it wishes for such an election, in violation of the Revised Code.’” (9) 

Applicable Law(s):

• “Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution empowers the General Assembly to submit legislatively proposed constitutional amendments to a vote of the people when three-fifths of both houses of the General Assembly pass a resolution calling for such a vote. The provision states in part: ‘Either branch of the General Assembly may propose amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days before the date of the election at which they are to be submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection. They shall be submitted on a separate ballot without party designation of any kind, at either a special or a general election as the General Assembly may prescribe.’” (2)
• “H.B. 458 amended R.C. 3501.01(D) as follows to provide that special elections be held “only” on certain days specified in the statute: ‘A special election may be held only on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May or November, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in August in accordance with section 3501.022 of the Revised Code, or on the day authorized by a particular municipal or county charter for the holding of a primary election, except that in any year in which a presidential primary election is held, no special election shall be held in May, except as authorized by a municipal or county charter, but may be held on the third Tuesday after the first Monday in March.’” (3)   

• "R.C. 3501.40 states: 'Except as permitted under section 161.09 of the Revised Code [emergency postponement of elections], and notwithstanding  any other contrary provision of the Revised Code, no public official shall cause an election to be conducted other than in the time, place, and manner prescribed by the Revised Code. As used in this section, “public official” means any elected or appointed officer, employee, or agent of the state or any political subdivision, board, commission, bureau, or other public body established by law." (12-13)

State ex rel. Ohioans United for Reprod. Rts. v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 2023-Ohio-3325, 174 Ohio St. 3d 285, 237 N.E.3d 1. Per Curiam. Authored a concurrence in part and dissent in part.

Holding(s): The Court held, "that the term 'citizens of the State' in the ballot language is misleading. The Court found the language misleading primarily because the phrase "citizens of the State of Ohio" could confuse voters about who the amendment actually restricts. [The court] therefore grant[ed] a limited writ of mandamus ordering the secretary to reconvene the ballot board forthwith and ordering the board to adopt ballot language that accurately describes that the proposed amendment regulates actions of the 'State.'" The court denied all other claims of the "relators." (2) 

Analysis: The Court found the term "citizens of the State of Ohio" misleading for the average voter. Citing Markus v. Trumbull County Board of Elections, the court emphasized that ballot language must promote an informed vote. The use of "citizens" might imply that individual citizens could be restricted from actions regarding abortion, which the Court found contradicts the amendment's intent. The court noted that the Ohio Constitution does not use "citizens of the State" interchangeably with "the State" and identified instances where the two terms differ. Ultimately, the court concluded that the ballot language inaccurately represented the amendment, violating Article XVI, Section 1's requirement for clear and accurate ballot language.

Stewart's Conurrence in part and dissent in part: Stewart "concur[red] in the portion of the judgment that grants the requested writ of mandamus in part and orders respondents to change the ballot language from 'the citizens of the State of Ohio' to 'the State of Ohio,' but I would go further and grant the requested writ in its entirety. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part." The Relators "contend that the ballot language misleads voters about (1) the right the amendment would create, (2) whom the amendment would restrict, (3) whether the amendment would protect an individual’s right to continue a pregnancy, (4) the scope of a treating physician’s discretion to determine 'fetal viability,; and (5) how the amendment would limit regulation by the state." (5)

Deters concurrence and dissent: Deters wrote, "I agree with much of the lead opinion’s analysis. Where I part ways, however, is with the opinion’s characterization of respondent Ohio Ballot Board’s use of the term 'citizens of the State.' The majority concludes that the term is misleading. It is not. Nothing in the ballot language would lead the average voter to understand that the proposed amendment would curb his or her individual right to object to abortion. So while I concur with the majority’s judgment denying the writ in most respects, I dissent from the majority’s judgment granting a limited writ[.]" (43) Deters found when "citizens of the State" is read in context that, "it seem[ed] unlikely that a voter would conclude that the bullet points using the term 'citizens of the State' describe the amendment’s effect on his or her individual rights." Overall, Deter's agreed with the majority's partial denial of the writ but disagreed with its granting the writ based on its finding that "citizens of the State" is misleading.

Background: On November 7, 2023, Ohio voters decided on Issue 1, a proposed constitutional amendment titled “The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety.” The case involved concerns about the ballot language approved by the Ohio Ballot Board. Ohioans United for Reproductive Rights, a coalition advocating for Issue 1, argued that the language was misleading and contained omissions. "Relators argue[d] that the ballot language’s use of the phrase 'citizens of the State of Ohio” instead of the “State”—as used and defined in the proposed amendment itself—distorts the amendment’s text and meaning. They argue that by using the phrase “citizens of the State,” the ballot language “converts a right held by the citizens against the State into a restriction enforced by the State against the citizens.” (11)

They sought a court order to either use the full text of the amendment or to create appropriate ballot language. According to the Ohio Constitution, ballot language must accurately convey the proposal's substance. The Court can only invalidate the language if it misled voters, thus the issue was whether the language clearly informed voters about the issue and whether it was improperly argumentative. If defects were found in the ballot language, the court would consider their overall impact on constitutional compliance.The court concluded that that the phrase “citizens of the State” was misleading and ordered the Ballot Board to revise the language to accurately reflect that the amendment regulated state actions, but denied other requests from the relators. 

Applicable Law(s): 

• "Under Article II, Section 1g, the ballot board shall prescribe the ballot language “in the same manner, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as apply to issues submitted by the general assembly pursuant to Section 1 of Article XVI of [the Ohio] constitution.” (2)
•  Article XVI, Section 1 provides: The ballot language for such proposed amendments shall be prescribed by a majority of the Ohio ballot board, consisting of the secretary of state and four other members, who shall be designated in a manner prescribed by law and not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party. The ballot language shall properly identify the substance of the proposal to be voted upon. The ballot need not contain the full text nor a condensed text of the proposal. The board shall also prepare an explanation of the proposal, which may include its purpose and effects, and shall certify the ballot language and the explanation to the secretary of state not later than seventy-five days before the election. The ballot language and the explanation shall be available for public inspection in the office of the secretary of state." (2-3)
• "The proposed amendment would: 
  • Prohibit the citizens of the State of Ohio from directly or indirectly burdening, penalizing, or prohibiting abortion before an unborn child is determined to be viable, unless the State demonstrates that it is using the least restrictive means
  • Only allow the citizens of the State of Ohio to prohibit an abortion after an unborn child is determined by a pregnant woman’s treating physician to be viable and only if the physician does not consider the abortion necessary to protect the pregnant woman’s life or health."

State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-1752. Joined Kennedy concurrence in part and concurrence in judgement only.

Holding(s): The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the appellate court erred in both determinations. 

Analysis: The Court found that the adult court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor, relying on the prior versions of R.C. 2151.23(H) and precedent established in Smith and Burns. The Court found the cases support the conclusion that if a juvenile court finds probable cause for certain acts, the adult court can proceed with related charges, even if those specific charges were not named in the juvenile court. In Smith, the court established that an adult court lacks jurisdiction if the juvenile court found no probable cause for a charge. Burns elaborated that charges can arise in adult court as long as they are rooted in the acts from the juvenile complaint. Here the juvenile court found probable cause for complicity to commit murder, and the felony-murder charge was connected to the same facts. Thus, the Court found jurisdiction was valid under the law.

Additionally, the Court concluded that Taylor’s statements to police were admissible, overturning the court of appeals' decision The Court found that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached at the time of interrogation, and any waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights following Miranda warnings was valid. The appeals court had ruled that these statements violated Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which the Supreme Court clarified does not attach until a criminal prosecution has commenced. Citing Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, the court noted that the initiation of a prosecution occurs with formal charges or arraignment, not at the time of interrogation. Since the juvenile complaint against Taylor was filed several hours after his interrogation, the court found that his Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached. Additionally, the Court found under Montejo v. Louisiana, a defendant can waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Taylor had been informed of his Miranda rights, which include the right to counsel, and he agreed to waive these rights, thus the Court found he waived his Sixth Amendment claims.

The court also addressed the due-process right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is recognized in juvenile proceedings. This right is codified in R.C. 2151.352, granting juveniles the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. The Court found, however since Taylor was an adult during the interrogation, the due-process right to counsel did not attach until the juvenile complaint was filed, which occurred after his police statements.

Kennedy Concurring in part and concurring in judgement only: Justice Kennedy's agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erred in concluding Taylor's statements to police should have been suppressed. He agreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the Sixth Amendment, affirming that the right to counsel had not yet attached during the interrogation. However, Kennedy disagreed with the majority regarding the jurisdiction of the General Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas over Taylor's felony murder charge. 

He argued that while the majority found that the court had jurisdiction based on previous cases (Smith and Burns), that these decisions imposed new limitations not present in the plain language of former R.C. 2151.23(H). He argued that the statute allowed the adult court to have jurisdiction over any offenses related to the juvenile's actions, regardless of whether probable cause had been found in juvenile court. Kennedy emphasized that the statutory language did not restrict the adult court's jurisdiction to only charges where probable cause had been established, nor did it limit the court to charges explicitly mentioned in the juvenile complaint. He asserted that the majority’s reliance on Smith and Burns was unwarranted and called for their overruling, arguing that these decisions contradicted the legislative intent of the bindover statutes.

Background: In 2016, Straughter was fatally shot. The policed "discovered the gun rail of a Smith & Wesson M&P semiautomatic pistol, live rounds, shell casings, and a key fob that unlocked a nearby Chevrolet Malibu[]" lassociated with Taylor. Taylor, 17 at the time, invoked his right to counsel after he was taken into custody and read his Miranda rights."Despite his invocation, the detective continued speaking with and questioning Taylor, and collected a DNA sample and conducted a gunshot residue test." (3) The evidence later linked him to the crime scene. Law enforcement know Taylor was represented by an attorney. "Without his attorney present, Taylor waived his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, answered questions, gave conflicting stories, and eventually claimed that he had witnessed another person, Damion Wade, shoot Straughter." (3) Taylor was charged with murder and the case was transferred to adult court after the juvenile court found probable cause. The adult court suppressed Taylor's initial DNA sample and statements but admitted statements given on December 12, 2016. Taylor was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to 18 years to life in prison.The Tenth District Court of Appeals vacated Taylor’s conviction, ruling that the adult court lacked jurisdiction over the felony murder charge and that Taylor’s December 12 statements should have been suppressed due to a Sixth Amendment violation. The appellate court found that Taylor’s right to counsel had attached by the time of his December interrogation and that he had not knowingly waived this right. In this discretionary appeal, the court reviewed two issues: whether the appellate court was correct in determining that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (adult court) lacked jurisdiction over Taylor for felony murder, and whether Taylor’s statements to police should have been suppressed.