Jack Panella

Relevant Work History:

• Jack A. Panella (D) has served as a Superior Court Judge in Pennsylvania since 2003 (pacourts.com) 
• From Wikipedia:
  • "In 2005, he was appointed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to the Judicial Conduct Board (JCB), which is the investigatory and prosecutorial arm of the judicial discipline system in Pennsylvania."
  • "In July 2007, he was elected Chair of the Judicial Conduct Board, making him the only judge in the history of Pennsylvania to be elected both Chair of the JCB as well as President Judge of the CJD."
  • "In 2013, Panella became the only judge to be reappointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the Court of Judicial Discipline."
• In 2018 he was elected President Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (pacourts.com)

Education

• He received his J.D. from The Catholic University of American Columbia School of Law.  (Wikipedia)

Notable Cases

• Authored Commonwealth v. Lopez in which the Court “conclude[d] that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing. Although the court had the discretion to consider that motion at sentencing, it was not required to do so by Rule 706 because Appellant had not yet been threatened with incarceration as a result of a default. Should that occur, Appellant will be entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing pursuant to Rule 706 at that time.”[12] The court found that “[w]hen the sections of Rule 706 are read sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of statutory construction direct, it becomes clear that Section C only requires a trial court to determine a defendant's ability to pay at a hearing that occurs prior to incarceration, as referenced in Sections A and B.” [5]  The court found support from Commonwealth v. Ciptak, 441 Pa.Super. 534, 657 A.2d 1296 (1995) which “reject[ed]  the defendant's claim that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(c), the predecessor to [page number omitted]  Rule 706,  required the sentencing court to determine his ability to pay prior to imposing costs at sentencing[.]”[5-6] Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court had the opportunity to explicitly repudiate the interpretation of Rule 1407 by our Court in Ciptak when renumbering Rule 1407 as Rule 706 and it did not do so. Instead, it left the Rule materially unchanged without any reference to the issue raised in Ciptak. Our Supreme Court, in fact, recently indicated its agreement with Ciptak’s interpretation[.]” [7] Additionally, this interpretation “most closely aligns with the case that is cited by the Comment to Rule 706 as a general reference point for the Rule. In that case, Commonwealth ex. rel. Benedict v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973), our Supreme Court held that a defendant has the constitutional right to an opportunity to show that he cannot afford the fine or costs that have been imposed on him prior to being incarcerated for failure to pay the fine or costs.”[9]  Issue1: Did “the court err[] by denying [appellant’s] Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing because Section C of Rule 706 obliges a sentencing court to conduct an Ability-to-Pay Hearing before imposing court costs on a defendant at sentencing.” [4] Appellant argues that “. . . Section C ... unambiguously requires that a court consider a defendant's ability to pay when it imposes costs.”[4]
• Joined Stabile's opinion in MacMiles, LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange, where the court “conclude[d] the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of MacMiles and in denying Erie’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.” The court first held that “[t]he trial court’s reading of the Policy is strained, and f[ound] [they were] constrained to reject that holding.” [16] The court stated “[u]ltimately, our analysis, aided by persuasive authority from numerous other federal and state jurisdictions, leads us to conclude the trial court erred in finding that MacMiles established a valid claim for coverage under the business income provisions of the Policy.” [17] This Court found “[c]ourt decisions from across the country overwhelmingly and persuasively support a conclusion that MacMiles’ loss of income claim is not covered.” [8] The court found the policy required “physical damage” or “physical loss or damage” that “render[s] the building ‘uninhabitable and unusable.’” [2] The court found the “physical damage … necessary, especially in light of language in the policy contemplating a period of restoration during which physical repairs take place.” [10-11] The court found “pure economic loss is not property damage.” [13] And that the “policy language covering ‘direct physical loss or damage’ unambiguously requires that the ‘claimed loss or damage must be physical in nature.’” [13] Here, “the prohibition on in-person dining had nothing to do with any condition, visible or invisible[.]” The court further found the trial court erred in finding a “material issues of fact exist[ed] under the civil authority provisions of the Policy.” They stated, “...where the alleged property damage is invisible (as is the possible presence of Covid-19 on surfaces), it does not qualify as physical damage for purposes of a commercial property insurance policy.” [18] Issue 1: “Did the trial court commit an error of law in granting MacMiles’ motion for summary judgment in part, and denying Erie’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this record, concluding that MacMiles has shown direct physical loss of or damage to covered property where there was an alleged mere loss of use, absent any harm to the property.” [4] Did “material issues of fact exist under the civil authority provisions of the Policy.” The court next held “[b]ecause we have concluded that MacMiles has failed to establish the existence of coverage, we need not assess the applicability of any exclusion.” [19] Issue 2: “Erie challenge[d] the trial court’s finding that the Policy’s governmental authority exclusion was inapplicable.”

Notable Cases Continued...

• Joined Commonwealth v. Brogdon where the Court affirmed the judgment entered [by Timika R. Lane, J.] in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The defendant appealed "his conviction at a bench trial on the charges of persons not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without license, carrying firearms on a public street, and resisting arrest." [1] The Superior Court found "the police certainly had sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest Appellant." [9] They found "the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, and [the Court]  agree[d] with the suppression court's sound analysis." [9] "'While the [police] must have a reasonable belief in the probability of criminal activity by the person to be arrested, the belief may rest solely in information supplied by another person where there is a 'substantial basis' for crediting that information." [9] "Here, the police had a 'substantial basis' for crediting [] the information provided by Ms. Gomez, whose trustworthiness as an identified civilian witness may be presumed, as well as the information provided by Mr. Carroll, an alleged accomplice of Appellant [citation omitted]." [10]  The Court further held that the witnesses were not "inherently untrustworthy" because "probable cause does not require certainty, but rather a reasonable inference." [10] The Court found "the suppression court did not err in concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable inference that Appellant committed the crime existed so as to establish probable cause to arrest him." [10]  Issue: Did the "lower court err by denying appellant's motion to suppress physical evidence where the police officer who seized appellant and arrested him did not himself have independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause sufficient to detain and arrest, but did so based upon information supplied by a detective who himself did not have reasonably trustworthy evidence supporting the claim that appellant had been involved in a robbery?" [7]  Thus the question was whether the superior officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Standard of review: The court "may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole." [7]  "Where...the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court . . . Thus, [they] are subject to plenary review." [7] In Commonwealth v. Kennedy (1972) the court found "the collective knowledge doctrine dictates that an officer making a warrantless arrest based on orders from a superior officer need not have probable cause so long as the superior officer had probable cause for the arrest[.]"[8]  Probable cause requires "only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." [8] Court cites "numerous cases [where] information of the kind introduced during the suppression hearing herein has been deemed sufficient to sustain an order denying a motion to suppress." [9]
• Dissents in Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, finding that “Section 1738(c) requires a new stacking waiver whenever the stacked amount of UIM coverage changes — regardless of whether the change is an increase or decrease in the amount of stacked coverage. This interpretation complies with our stated policy of construing the statute ‘liberally in favor of the insured’ so as to ‘afford[ ] the injured claimant the greatest possible coverage.’ See Jones, 40 A.3d at 127. Thus, I would conclude the Frankses were entitled to stacked UIM coverage in the amount of $200,000, and I would reverse the declaratory '' Justice McCaffery found “the Majority's focus [ ] too narrow. [And] [f]urther, [the Majority’s]  myopic interpretation undermines the stated purpose of the MVFRL which is to afford coverage to insureds.” Justice McCaffery found “[i]n determining whether a new stacking waiver is required, what is critical is whether there is a change in the potential amount of stacked coverage.” McCaffery cites Sackett where “the Supreme Court concluded a new waiver of the increased stacked coverage was required.” And cites “Barnard, [where] the Court held that a new waiver was required when the insured increased their UIM coverage on vehicles they already possessed, noting the insurer ‘was required to offer [the insured] the opportunity to waive stacking of the new, aggregate amount of UIM coverage at that time.’”  Justice McCaffery further disagreed with the Majority that Shipp was “inapplicable” finding their interpretation “too restricted.” Justice McCaffery noted that “[t]he Shipp Court could have narrowed its holding by stating a new stacking waiver is required only when an insured's coverage increases.”
• Authored Commonwealth v. Sandusky (2013), where the Court affirmed the trial court's sentence. The Court first held that the trial court did not "err[] in refusing to give the jury the prompt complaint instruction found at Section 4.13A of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions." [1] The Court found the trial court "should have evaluated the appropriateness of the instruction with respect to the age and maturity of each victim[]" but that the error caused no prejudice to Sandusky. [3] This Court found "the trial court's analysis of the prompt complaint instruction and its application to cases involving children [were] not supported in the case law." [3] Issue: "Sandusky first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury the prompt complaint instruction found at Section 4.13A of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. Sandusky argues that the instruction was necessary as all but one of the victims waited several years to report the sexual abuse[.]" [1] The Court next held that Sandusky had not preserved his claim by objecting to the prosecutors as "[e]ven where a defendant objects to specific conduct, the failure to request a remedy such as a mistrial or curative instruction is sufficient to constitute waiver." [5] Issue: "Sandusky next argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his objection that the prosecutor commented adversely on his choice not to testify at trial." [4] The Court held next that the trial court denying the request for continuance did not "effectively deprive[] [Sandusky] of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel." [5] The Court noted "[f]ew constitutional errors qualify as structural defects." [5] Additionally, "[t]he matter of granting or denying a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court." [6] "A trial court exceeds its constitutional authority only when it exercises its discretion to deny a continuance on the basis of 'an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay....'" [6] The Court found "[t]he trial court's explanation denotes a careful consideration of the matter. The[ir] decision does not reflect a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of Sandusky's request; it was not an arbitrary denial." [7] Thus, the Court held there was "no constitutional error, nor abuse of discretion, in the denial of the continuance requests." [7] The Court notes that had they found the trial court erred, they would find a harmless error because, "[a]s evidenced by counsel's own testimony, Sandusky suffered no prejudice from the trial court's denial of the continuance requests." [7] Issue: "Sandusky next argues that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance effectively deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel." [5] The Court held "pursuant to Khamphouseane, the trial court committed no error in charging the jury on the issue of character evidence." [8] "It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that "[e]vidence of good character is always admissible for the defendant in a criminal case. It is to be weighed and considered in connection with all the other evidence in the cause. It may of itself, in some instances, create the reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to an acquittal." [8] The Court found "[t]he trial court properly instructed the jury. Accordingly, Sandusky's argument fails." [9] Issues: "Sandusky argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on character evidence." [7] "He argues, however, 'the [c]ourt immediately thereafter gave a contradictory charge,' when it instructed the jury that it had to weigh and consider the evidence of good character with the other evidence in the case." [7-8] "Sandusky further argues that that use of the word 'weigh' with the word 'must' is erroneous a 'it conveyed to the jury that the character evidence had to outweigh other evidence in the case, and if it did it would then "justify" a verdict of not guilty.'" [8-9] 
• Authored Commonwealth v. Hicks, C. (2023)