Ingrid Gustafson

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Justice Gustafson has served on the Montana Supreme Court since 2017. Before that, she served as a district court judge for 14 years.

Notable Cases:

• Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2018): Wrote concurrence. The case was over a program which "provide[d] a taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar tax credit based on the taxpayer’s donation to a Student Scholarship Organization (SSO). SSOs fund tuition scholarships for students who attend private schools meeting the definition of Qualified Education Provider (QEP). The Department of Revenue later adopted Rule 1, excluding religiously-affiliated private schools from qualifying as QEPs, "which it believed was necessary to constitutionally administer the Tax Credit Program. Affected parents brought suit (3). Argued that the Tax Credit Program also violated the federal Establishment and Free Exercise clauses (26). Justice Gustafson argued that the law was based on indirect payments rather than "donations" as the text of the law suggested, since donations receive nothing in return (27). Argued Justice Baker's dissent was incorrect because the only reason the payments did not enter the public treasury was because they were diverted (29). Cited that tax credits constitute subsidies (30). Argued federal precedent in Nyquist held that individual payments put to religious purposes violated the Establishment Clause (32). Argued that the Tax Credit Program violated the Free Exercise Clause because it compelled taxpayers to acquiesce in the use of their donations to support religious schools in order to claim a tax credit (39); taxpayers who wish to partake in the credit faced no option to avoid supporting religious schools or only specific religious schools (40). Also signed Justice McKinnion's majority opinion.
  
• The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he application of the Montana Constitution’s 'no-aid' provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause."
• Weems v. State (2019): Signed Justice Baker's majority opinion. Held that Weems and Doe had standing to bring a suit against a law excluding their professions from providing abortions, and that they presented sufficient evidence for the district court to grant a preliminary injunction against the law (8,16). The state law limited the performance of pre-viability abortions to licensed physicians and physician assistants-certified. Court held that the precedent of Armstrong held that plaintiff healthcare providers had standing "to assert on behalf of their women patients the individual privacy rights under Montana’s Constitution of such women to obtain a pre-viability abortion from a health care provider of their choosing" (8). Held that the central issue in the case was whether the law was responsible for the harm to plaintiffs or if it was the Board of Nursing (8). Held that, but for the statute, Weams would be likely be qualified to prescribe abortion medication (15). Held that the state's argument that plaintiffs did not have standing, as they were not qualified to perform abortions, was circular because the statute is what prevented plaintiffs from being able to perform abortions (9). Cited that plaintiffs need only show a prima facie case for some degree of harm in order to qualify for a preliminary injunction (11). Rejected state's argument that an injunction is meant to preserve the status quo, and that the law had been on the books for some time, because the plaintiffs contested the bar placed on them by the law (18).
  
• McLaughlin v. Montana State Legislature (2021): Signed Justice McKinnon's majority opinion. Held that the legislature's motion to disqualify all members of the Montana Supreme Court was denied (16). Background: McLaughlin, the judicial branch's Court Administrator, conducted a poll of active judges on a bill to change the governor's process for appointing judges. The legislature issued a subpoena investigating misconduct which was blocked by the Montana Supreme Court. The legislature then and ordered judges to turn over all communications with McLaughlin (2-7). Held that the legislature's investigation represented an interest for all judges in the judicial branch (7-8). Held that there was no conflict of interest because no judges are "parties," and they were not "interested" aside from inherently being judges because the subpoena was not issued to them (8). Cited that the court had previously presided over cases involving the court administrator, and the argument that the court could not preside violates Article II, Section 16 of the MT Const., which guarantees "“[c]ourts of justice shall be open to every person . . . and that no person should be deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment..." (9). The legislature alleged no bias by the judges, and each judge said they did not participate in the activity under investigation (10). Held that the Rule of Necessity applied (12). The court's duty would be compromised if it stepped aside for every case involving separation of powers (14). Held that the legislature's subpoena of judges did not disqualify judges because of precedent holding that "a party’s unilateral acts personally attacking or suing the judge for acts taken in his or her judicial capacity do not create a proper basis for recusal. Recusal under such circumstances would permit a party to avoid a particular judge simply by attacking or suing him... Here, the Legislature itself has created the conflict by issuing a subpoena to each justice during a pending proceeding involving the same issues raised in a legislative subpoena. The Legislature’s unilateral act of issuing subpoenas to the justices during the pendency of this case is not ground for recusal of every member of this Court. A judge is required to act in a manner that promotes 'public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety...' Were the Court to succumb to the Legislature’s request and evade our responsibilities and obligations as a Court, we are convinced that public confidence in our integrity, honesty, leadership, and ability to function as the highest court of this State would be compromised" (15-16).