Appointed by Governor Jerry Brown and confirmed on September 1, 2011

Justice Liu appointed by Governor Jerry Brown (D) and confirmed on September 1, 2011.  Prior he was law professor at UC Berkeley School of Law. Justice Liu clerked for Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s after law school.

Notable Cases:

Justice Liu signed Justice Cantil-Sakauye's majority opinion in Smith v. LoanMe, Inc (2021). The court held section 632.7 applied to intentional recordings of communications by both parties and non-parties. Issue–”whether section 632.7 applies to the parties to a communication, prohibiting them from recording a covered communication without the consent of all participants, or whether the section is concerned only with recording by persons other than parties (sometimes hereinafter referred to as “nonparties” to the communication), such as an individual who covertly intercepts a phone call and eavesdrops upon it” (1). Facts–LoanMe recorded a call between Smith and LoanMe. Smith alleges they did not consent and LoanMe argues that the beep tone was indication of the start of recording and the continued conversation “acquiences.” Smith brought class action on behalf of “‘[a]ll persons in California whose inbound and outbound telephone conversations involving their cellular or cordless telephones were recorded without their consent by [LoanMe] or its agent/s within the one year prior to the filing of this action.’ The complaint alleged that the recording of these calls violated section 632.7.” (1) Originalist elements: includes 632.7 text; interprets language using plain or common sense meaning to harmonize with other parts of the scheme. Activist elements: goal is to determine legislative intent through text. Court found language ambiguous and used legislative history to determine intent. 

Justice Liu Signed Justice Cuellar's majority opinion in In re Humphrey (2021). The court held “[t]he common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional,” Additionally, “where a financial condition is nonetheless necessary, the court must consider the arrestee’s ability to pay the stated amount of bail—and may not effectively detain the arrestee ‘solely because’ the arrestee ‘lacked the resources’ to post bail.” (2) Citing Bearden v. Georgia court “perceive[d] a theme”  Court must have made an “individualized determination that (1) the arrestee has the financial ability to pay, but nonetheless failed to pay, the amount of bail the court finds reasonably necessary to protect compelling government interests; or (2) detention is necessary to protect victim or public safety, or ensure the defendant's appearance, and there is clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive alternative will reasonably vindicate those interests” (24). issue– “whether it is constitutional to incarcerate a defendant solely because he lacks financial resources.” (12)

Justice Liu signed Justice Kruger’s majority in In re A.R. (2020) Court held the untimely filing of an appeal by counsel in a dependency case does not prevent appeal because she is entitled to relief from her statutory right to competent counsel which affected her right to appeal. (Relied on In Re Kristin.) Found the appropriate procedure is a petition for habeas corpus finding the judge has discretion in determining what procedures to follow. The court found to show incompetence the parent must show prejudice which could be shown through evidence that the appeal would have been filed timely without counsel’s failure. Further they must show they requested relief from the incompetent attorney within a reasonable time. The court rejects the argument that the parent would have to show potential success of the appeal as well. Facts—After a court terminated M.B. 's parental rights she requested that her attorney appeal the case prior to the 60 day deadline but the attorney did not file the motion until 4 days after the deadline was over.  Issue—”(1) whether a parent has the right to challenge her counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal from an order terminating her parental rights, and (2) if she has such a right, the proper procedures for raising such a claim.” (3-4)  Reverse judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings. Notes: Good conclusion.  however favors precedent (stare decisis) over inclusion of state laws and regulation regarding the issue. Not activist but not originalist. Cites cases discussing the statutory scheme without including the specific language.  Activist element: Follows In re Kristin which focused on legislative intent of statute.

Justice Liu wrote the concurrence in Briggs v. Brown–(2017). Said that he found both the majority and the concurrence/dissent to be reasonable (1). Argued that there was a conflict between the ballot materials and advocacy campaign which treated the five-year time limit as mandatory and the state's precedent which said that such limits may be non-mandatory when necessary to save a law's constitutionality (applying canon that legislators are aware of existing laws and judicial constructions of those laws) (1-2). Concluded that precedent was the proper authority to follow (2). Argued that a five-year time limit would be an impossible obstacle, given how long California's death penalty process typically takes (2). Explained what factors delayed the process (3-11). "I agree that section 190.6(d), construed in light of our precedent, is 'directive.' (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 57.) But what does directive mean? Our case law suggests that the answer depends on the nature of the statutory directive and the judicial interest at stake" (72). "Directive statutes that set realistic time limits on judicial decisions may inform how quickly cases should be decided, although the issue is ultimately left to judicial discretion. But when a time limit purports to dictate what is not 'reasonably possible' to achieve (maj. opn., ante, at p. 58), it cannot serve as a meaningful benchmark" (13). Good elements: critized voters for delegating the task of shorting the death penalty process to the Judicial Council rather than setting the policy out in the law (14-15). Signed Justice Corrigan's majority opinion. Exercised public interest original jurisdiction (1). Held that Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, did not 1) violate the single-subject rule 2) interfere with the jurisdiction of California courts to hear original petitions for habeas corpus relief 3) violate equal protection principles by treating capital prisoners differently from other prisoners with respect to successive habeas corpus petitions, or 4) run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine by materially impairing the courts’ ability to resolve capital appeals and habeas corpus petitions, and to manage their dockets in general (1-2). The Court held that the strict deadlines of Prop 66 should be interpreted as directive rather than mandatory in order to avoid separation of powers problems (2). Emphasized the importance of the people’s initiative power (9). Cited that it is sufficient for a law’s provisions to be “reasonably related to a common theme or purpose” or “reasonably germane” in order to be in accordance with the single-subject rule (10-11). Noted that germaneness had been construed broadly (11). Held that Proposition 66 passed the germaneness test, and noted that it was more related to a single subject than numerous other pieces of constitutional legislation (11,14). On the section 1509 habeas claim, noted that all CA courts shared original habeas corpus jurisdiction (16). Held that the changes to Article VI, Section 10 of the CA Const permitted the regulations present in Proposition 66 (17-18). Noted that the law still contained a “good cause” exception to its requirement that petitions be transferred to the sentencing court (18). Held that the constitution did not regulate one of petitioner’s claims (19). Held that habeas corpus proceedings are separate from criminal trials based on state precedent, and, as a result, Section 1509.1 subsection A did not violate the state constitution granting appellate jurisdiction to the courts of appeal in capital habeas corpus proceedings (27). Held that Proposition 66’s restrictions on successive habeas corpus petitions by prisoners sentenced to death did not violate the state and federal Equal Protection clauses by treating them differently from other prisoners because an equal protection claim requires that the plaintiffs be "similarly situated" and capital and noncapital prisoners are not similar situated under In re Reno (30,32). Held that Proposition 66 did not violate separation of powers principles because petitioner did not show that the court's authority to decide the statute on limitations on habeas corpus claims was exclusive and the Court had held the opposite in Clark (38). Cited Mendocino that "while the courts have inherent power to act in certain areas without specific constitutional or legislative authorization, that does not mean a statute 'necessarily violates the separation of powers doctrine whenever it legislates with regard to such an inherent judicial power or function.'" (39). "Our case law establishes that while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion" (49). Held that the statutory deadlines were to be interpreted as guidelines because the law contained no enforcement mechanisms and there was no court higher than the California Supreme Court to issues writs of mandamus to the Court on state law (50-53). Held that the Court may exercise its power of reformation to "rewrite" laws to preserve their constitutionality and avoid constitutional problems (53). Activist elements: Held that a law was a guideline because there was no enforcement mechanism to ensure that the law was followed, no higher court to issue writs of mandamus on state law to the CA Supreme Court, and the Court found that it was able to "rewrite" laws to preserve their constitutionality (53). The court found that the law was a guideline despite admitted that voters intended five-year time limit in the law to be mandatory (53). One page later, the Court said that it cannot be sure that voters intended the time limit to be mandatory (54). Admitted that, while courts in other states have struck laws down for having strict timelines, California's precedent does something different (54). Good elements: did not consider the wisdom of the law (9). presumption of constitutionality (9). Cited the history of a state constitutional provision (17). Cited that the language of Article VI, Section 10 of the CA Const was specifically changed to permit jurisdictional changes such as the ones in this law (17). Concerning elements: did not cite the difficulty of a facial challenge (9).

Justice Liu signed Justice Werdegar’s dissent. (2015) Johnson v. Department of Justice Argued that the majority unnecessarily overruled Hofsheier (1). "This discrimination [between intercourse and other sexual acts] does not rest on a rational ground of legislative distinction but is an anachronistic holdover from a period (before 1975, when California laws on consensual adult sex acts were liberalized) when oral copulation and sodomy were regarded as abhorrent sexual perversions closely associated with homosexuality and were therefore outlawed regardless of the participants’ ages" (2). Argued that Hofsheier was relied upon by lower courts and has "afforded trial courts the flexibility to forgo ordering registration in circumstances where it would be unjust and counterproductive" (3). Said that "Hofsheier allows relief from these strictures [mandating sex offender registration for sex crimes] for an offender who, from the circumstances of the offense and the personal history of the offender, the court in its discretion considers to be nonpredatory and at low risk of committing future sex offenses" and that upholding Hofsheier would "alleviate the overinclusiveness that has plagued California’s registration system"(6). Argued that prohibitions against non-vaginal sex was used to discriminate against "deviant" sexual lifestyle such as those of homosexuals (17). Argued that "Hofsheier mitigated the discriminatory effects of our registration scheme as it had survived since preliberalization days" (28). Activist elements: assigned motive to the legislature rather than limiting the opinion to finding a "rational basis" for the law (2) said that Hofsheier should be upheld because it offered the courts discretion on what an offender merits (6). Concerning elements: argued that overruling Hofsheier would have bad side effects (e.g. a man who committed a crime against his minor girlfriend and later married her would be considered a sex offender) (7). Argued that California's sex offender laws were overinclusive because it had so many registered sex offenders and required lifetime registration (8)

Judge Voter Guide gave 2 Stars and voted to "replace".