Karen Baker

Facebook Posts:

• “Today, I continue my fight to uphold the Rule of Law.” [Posted April 8, 2022]
• “Defending our Constitution for Decades” [Posted May 24, 2022]
• “The people of Arkansas have spoken with their votees today, clarifying that experience, impartiality, and dedicated service, rather than partisanship, are the qualities most important in our judiciary.” [Posted May 24, 2022] 
• “Take a look at God’s creation through the lends of my daughter’s camera. Emily has always has a gift for recognizing beauty in our everyday lives.” [Post April 25, 2022]

Notable Cases Continued:

• In re Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic/Vaccine Eligibility (2021). Justice Baker joined the unanimous order that the governor immediately make the COVID vaccine available to Arkansas judges, lawyers, and juries (1-2). Found that "[i]t is the duty of this court to define the essential workers within the justice system and where each should be placed in the priority schedule[.]" (1)
• In re Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (2021): Justice Baker joined the majority order that (with certain caveats) landlords must argue that their property is not included in the CARES Act before evicting their tenants. (1) 
• Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763 (2022) Signed Kemp's majority opinion. Reversed the circuit court's temporary restraining order prohibiting Bentonville School District from enforcing its mask policy (1). Held that case was not moot because the policy qualified for the exception for "issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation" (6-7). Held that parents who brought the suit demonstrated a justiciable controversy (8). Held that the parents had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the case because the policy did not violate the parents' constitutional rights and the school district had the authority to put the policy in place (9-13). On the former, the Court cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), which said that the proper framework applicable in the context of a public health crisis was a two part test examining whether the policy had a "real or substantial relation" to the public health crisis and whether the policy was "beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion” of the parents’ rights (10-11). Held that the policy survived this analysis because the policy was designed to combat COVID and because the Supreme Court held in Prince v. Massachusetts that the government "has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare" and in Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L (2021) that "schools at times stand in loco parentis" (11). On the latter, the Court held that the school district properly authorized its policy because the Arkansas Constitution Article 14, Section 1 states that "the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education" (12). Cited multiple cases that school directors have "implied powers" and "a broad discretion is vested in the board of directors of each school district in the matter of directing the operation of the schools" (12-13). Held that statutes "allow for a school’s broad authority to determine its policies" (13). Held that parents did not show that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order (14). Therefore, held that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the temporary restraining order (14).

• St. Vincent Med. Grp. v. Baldwin, 2023 Ark. 151, 675 S.W.3d 862 (2023). Justice Baker dissented arguing that the majority “delve[d] into the merits of the underlying claim.” (9) Justice Baker disagreed with the majority’s decision to “reverse and remand the class-certification order,” and dissented. Justice Baker argued that “[t]he majority’s erroneous decision [wa]s founded on an inferential leap made in reliance on dicta in ChartOne, Inc. v. Raglon, 373 Ark. 275, 283 S.W.3d 576 (2008).” (9) Justice baker argued the majority ignored precedent. Justice Baker disagreed with the majority that “it must stand for recognizing there might be a case where statutory interpretation would be essential to review of class certification.” (10) “ As recognized by ChartOne, it is improper for this court to consider the merits of the underlying lawsuit in reviewing the appropriateness of a class- certification order.” (10) Justice Baker argued that the majority “need not review the circuit court’s statutory interpretation [,] because “the circuit court certified the class definition as follows: The 2,143 people identified by Defendant in response to Interrogatory 14 as Existing Patients, as defined by the Arkansas Patient-Right-to-Know Act, of Dr. Leslie Anderson on February 3, 2020.” (10) Baker argued that “[t]o do so would force us to delve into the merits, which the majority … improperly d[id].” (10) Justice Baker also disagreed with the majority’s “that the circuit court’s interpretation of the Act ‘control[ed] [the Court’s] review of the class definition and whether the 11 individual claims or the class claims predominate[d].” (10-11)
  
• Macklin v. Arkansas Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. 151, 624 S.W.3d 869 (2021). Justice Baker joined Justice Wood's dissent. The majority held that a circuit court erred by dismissing a mother whose daughter had been found dependent-neglected and placed into foster care. The dissent argued that the majority expanded the list of types of medical care that require a court order when a child is in foster care. "The Supreme Court of Arkansas applies the law; we do not make the law. Here, the General Assembly placed only three limits on the type of medical care that requires a court order when a child is in foster care: removal of bodily organs; withholding life-saving or life-sustaining treatment; and amputation. That’s it. Vaccinations were simply not on the list. That was the only issue for the juvenile court to decide. The statute and issue raised were plain and uncomplicated. The juvenile court refused to enter a court order to immunize or not to immunize because the legislature had not assigned it that role. It’s not our job either. The majority today expands the statutory list to include immunizations. Those of us in dissent may agree this might be good policy, and we might even believe the legislature may take that step in the future—but it’s not our role to forecast the legislature’s decisions. We cannot take a piece of legislation, decide it’s lousy, and rewrite it. If the statute reflects poor policy, the people of Arkansas, through their elected representatives, must act. I believe the people want us to remain faithful to our judicial role. To paraphrase Justice Scalia, a good justice must be willing to make decisions she does not like and to apply the law regardless. One must begin with the text of the statute and apply principles of statutory construction. That result compels the opposite decision from the majority. What’s more, the majority’s decision violates stare decisis. The majority’s decision is flawed for the following four reasons. First, it violates our primary rule of statutory construction, which is to interpret a statute according to its plain meaning. This is always the court’s first step." (10) "The majority skips the plain-meaning step and jumps to legislative intent." (11) "Second, the majority further offends the rules of statutory construction by, without ever identifying an ambiguity, grafting the legislative intent of an inapposite immunization exemption in the Education Code onto the Juvenile Code’s medical-authorization statute." (11) "Third, the majority opinion violates stare decisis." (13) "Finally, I encourage the reader to reexamine footnote 1 from the majority opinion. This citationless footnote, contradicting the statute, holds the vaccine waiver doesn’t apply to tetanus and rabies. But for what reason? Good policy? It certainly wasn’t an issue raised in the case. And to be clear, the immunization-exception statute doesn’t give tetanus special status. The legislature instead thought tetanus should be encompassed by the waiver. But by a contrary order, the majority created an exception to an exception." (13)
• Miller v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 267, 605 S.W.3d 255 (2020) Justice Baker joined Justice Wynne's majority opinion. Held that the Secretary of State correctly rejected two ballot petitions because their certification language failed to comply with the law's requirements (2).
  
• Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd., 2020 Ark. 135, 597 S.W.3d 613 (2020). Justice Baker joined Justice Womack's majority opinion. Held that certain parent companies were protected from liability concerning the death of an employee of their child company (1-2).