Justice William Montgomery was appointed by Governor Ducey (R) in 2019. Prior, Justice Montgomery was the Republican Party attorney for Maricopa, Arizona from 2010-2019.

Judicial Philosophy “I apply the original public meaning of the words as written in order to give the best effect to the intent of those who drafted the law, whether that is the legislature or the people through the initiative process. In this manner, should alaw no longer adequately meet the circumstances it was enacted to address, a faithful interpretation will highlight for the legislature and people of Arizona what must be changed to render a different result. This approach also ensures that it is the intent of the drafters that remains constant for a law’s meaning and not the makeup of any number of justices in the Arizona Supreme Court.”

Notable Cases:

• S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue (2022). Justice Timmer authored a majority in which Justices Montgomery and Beene joined. The property South Point Energy leased on Tribal Land did not fall under section 5 of Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 because it was not land owned by the federal government. Found the land was not owned by the federal government because the lease between the IndianTribe and South Point specified that “‘all [i]improvements and associated materials, supplies, and equipment’ are ‘owned and controlled’ by South Point.” (3) The Act did not define government ownership and the court deferred to the Bureau Indian Affairs which defined it as “any interests, benefits, and rights inherent in the ownership of the real property.” (7) The court found “such rights generally include ownership of permanent improvements constructed by a tenant on leased property.” (7) The Act states land “taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” (6) Courts’ “primary goal in interpreting § 5 is to determine and give effect to Congress's intent.[]  We read words in context and effectuate the plain meaning of § 5 unless doing so would be absurd.[] If the language is ambiguous, we consider secondary interpretive principles, such as the Act's subject matter, history, and purpose, and the consequences of differing interpretations.” (6)
• Garcia v. State (2021) Authored by Beene. Timmer and Montgomery joined opinion. Held (1) that the trial court did have the discretion of order a sexually violent person (SVP) screening of the defendant he was deemed incompetent to stand trial and the statue uses the word “may” indicating discretion and “if”  indicating pre-condition. Additionally later sections used “shall '' thus the court found that the legislature used restrictive language to give discretion not language that is mandatory. Held (2)  the trial court abused its discretion; however, in ordering the SVP “[b]ecause the court erroneously concluded it lacked discretion to deny the State's request, its failure to exercise discretion constitutes legal error and is an abuse of discretion.” (9) Analysis–“We look first to § 13-4518’s language to determine whether it gives trial courts discretion to order an SVP screening. When interpreting a statute, we aim ‘to give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ . . . ‘A statute’s plain language best indicates legislative intent, and when the language is clear, we apply it unless an absurd or unconstitutional result would follow.” We must ‘give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.’” (6)  Background–The defendant charged with enganging in sexual conduct of a minor under age 15 and the state requested a SVP after he was deemed non-competent to stand trial. He argued that the court abused its discretion. 
• Saguaro Healing v. State (2020): Justice Montgomery wrote a concurrence in part and a dissent in part. The majority opinion held that the Arizona Department of Health Services violated the law by not granting a marijuana dispensary registration to Saguaro Healing in spite of Saguaro being the only qualified dispensary in its county (2). Justice Montgomery argued that, while the majority’s interpretation of the law was correct, its application of the law to the facts was not. He argued that the majority violated the separation of powers by creating a responsibility for the Department to continually monitor dispensaries in each county throughout the year, which is not present in the statute (11). He also argued that there was no support for the majority’s contention that the legislative purpose was to make dispensaries ubiquitous in Arizona (14).
• Terrell v. Torres (2020): Justice Montgomery signed Justice Timmer’s majority opinion, which held that a contract regarding the disposition of a divorced couple’s embryos could not be interpreted so as to cause one section of the agreement to fulfill the requirements of another section, as that would be contrary to the plain language of the contract (8-9). The court also rejected the lower court’s use of a balancing test, holding that the terms of the contract were clear and should be enforced (9).
• Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehabilitation, and Public Safety v. Hobbs (2020): Justice Montgomery signed Justice Gould’s majority opinion and Justice Lopez’s concurrence. The majority opinion held that an online signature alternative would not comply with Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9) of the Arizona Constitution’s requirement for wet signatures when seeking to place an initiative on the ballot (3). Held that none of the petitioners’ rights were violated by Section 1(9)’s requirement (3-4). The court issued dicta that it is important to uphold the rule of law, especially in times of crisis (5). The court also interpreted a term according to its meaning at the time the provision was adopted (11-12). Justice Lopez’s concurrence argued that laying aside constitutional and statutory requirements in this situation would set an even more dangerous precedent than denying relief in this case would (35). Justice Timmer wrote a concurrence and dissent in part. However, the dissent argued that the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case was questionable because the petitioner did not clearly fulfill any of the requirements of Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Special Action (46)
• State ex rel v. Hannah (2020): Justice Montgomery signed Justice Beene’s majority opinion, which held that an Enmund/Tison verdict in a murder case could not be vacated under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.2 because it did not qualify as a “judgement” or “sentence” pursuant to the definitions provided in Rule 26.1 (5). The court rejected arguments to reinterpret rule 24.2 because it was allegedly inefficient, arguing that the inefficiency was found in the law, not in its interpretation (6).
• State v. Mixton (2020): Montgomery signed Justice Lopez’s majority opinion, which held that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution required the state to obtain search warrants to gather IP addresses and ISP subscriber information provided willingly to the provider (2). The opinion held that the court could look to legislative history in order to find the law’s intent, and the court considers factors such as the law’s consequences and purpose when construing ambiguous concepts (13). The dissent argued (33) that the majority ignored substantive differences when ruling that Article 2, Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment offer essentially the same privacy protections (40).

Judge Voter Guide gave 5 Stars and voted to "retain".