Justice Timmer (R) was nominated to the Arizona Supreme Court by Governor Jan Brewer (R) in 2012. Prior she was nominated by Governor Hull to the Court of Appeal s in 2000.

Judicial Philosophy “I firmly believe that the role of a judge is to interpret the law or administrative rule as intended by the enacting body and to objectively apply the law or rule to the facts of a given case. It is not the province of a judge to create the law or rules as that role is reserved for others, such as the legislative and executive branches of government and, through the initiative process, the people of Arizona. . .therefore I have no license to solve societal problems as I see fit. Rather my job is to decide cases after applying the rule of law established by those authorized to do so and within our constitutional framework.”

Notable Cases:

• Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix (2019): Justice Timmer dissented from the majority, which held that Brush & Nib’s refusal to provide custom wedding invitations for a same-sex wedding was protected by the compelled speech doctrine (23) and the Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act (4). Justice Timmer argued that the majority incorrectly held that Brush & Nibs’ refusal was due to speech, rather than discriminatory conduct (59) and that the public interest in preventing sexual-orientation-based discrimination ought to suffice to prevent Brush & Nib’s refusal of service (65).
• Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehabilitation, and Public Safety v. Hobbs (2020):  Justice Timmer concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion, which held that an online signature alternative would not comply with Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9) of the Arizona Constitution’s requirement for wet signatures when seeking to place an initiative on the ballot (3). Justice Timmer argued that the combination of the state’s strict enforcement of Section 1(9) and the governor’s COVID-19 Stay-At-Home Order impinged on the voting and associational rights of the First and Fourteenth Amendments (36). The dissent argued that the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case was questionable because the petitioner did not clearly fulfill any of the requirements of Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Special Action (46)
• Saguaro Healing v. State (2020): Justice Beene wrote the majority opinion, which held that the Arizona Department of Health Services violated the law by not granting a marijuana dispensaries registration to Saguaro Healing in spite of Saguaro being the only qualified dispensary in its county (2). Found "the words 'if necessary to ensure' indicate that 'may' is not permissive in this context."(5) Found the statute included both a maximum number of dispensaries as well as a minimum of one in each county. Found that "'may' when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion,” [but] this principle “can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute.” (4) Found such intent and held "may" to be interpreted as a mandate. Justice Montgomery's concurrence in part and dissent in part agrees with the majorities interpretation of the statue but disagrees with its application to the case because the he argued that the court may have created a responsibility for the Department to continually monitor dispensaries in each county throughout the year, which is not present in the statute (11). Emphasized on Separation of Powers. 
• Paul E. v. Courtney F. (2019) Justice Timmer wrote the majority opinion, holding that a family court was unjustified in ordering a gender dysphoric child’s sole legal decisionmaker to place the child in a specific gender therapy clinic (13). The court held that the order was unjustified because it did not focus on how physical or emotional harm would be done to the child in absence of an order (13).
• Terrell v. Torres (2020): Justice Timmer wrote the majority opinion, which held that a contract regarding the disposition of a divorced couple’s embryos could not be interpreted so as to cause one section of the agreement to fulfill the requirements of another section, contrary to the plain language of the contract (8-9). The court also rejected the lower court’s use of a balancing test, holding that the terms of the contract were clear and should be enforced (9).
• State v. Mixton (2020): Justice Timmer signed Justice Bolick’s dissent. The majority held that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution required the state to obtain search warrants to gather IP addresses and ISP subscriber information provided willingly to the provider (2). Justice Bolick’s dissent argued that Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution was written deliberately different from its federal counterpart (32), and that such departures from such established language signals that there may be a different meaning (33). Argued that the majority’s decision made it difficult for courts to discern when different language should have the same interpretation and that it deprived Arizonans of their liberty to create boarder state protections for themselves (36).
• Soto-Fong v. State (2020): Justice Timmer signed Justice Lopez’s majority opinion, which held that separate sentences which accumulate to exceed a minor’s life expectancy do not violate the Eighth Amendment (3). The court rejected arguments to apply the precedent of Graham and Miller, holding that those cases were related to sentences for single crimes (12). The court also rejected arguments to make a ruling based on U.S. Supreme Court dictum, which had been used to make rulings in other courts (13). The court also upheld the separation of powers by holding that to establish its own criminal sentences was not within its authority (14).
• Garcia v. State (2021) Justice Timmer signed Justice Beenes' majority opinion. Held (1) that the trial court did have the discretion of order a sexually violent person (SVP) screening of the defendant he was deemed incompetent to stand trial and the statue uses the word “may” indicating discretion and “if”  indicating pre-condition. Additionally later sections used “shall” thus the court found that the legislature used restrictive language to give discretion not language that is mandatory. Held (2)  the trial court abused its discretion; however, in ordering the SVP “[b]ecause the court erroneously concluded it lacked discretion to deny the State's request, its failure to exercise discretion constitutes legal error and is an abuse of discretion.” (9) Analysis–“We look first to § 13-4518’s language to determine whether it gives trial courts discretion to order an SVP screening. When interpreting a statute, we aim ‘to give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ . . . ‘A statute’s plain language best indicates legislative intent, and when the language is clear, we apply it unless an absurd or unconstitutional result would follow.” We must ‘give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.’” (6)  Background–The defendant charged with enganging in sexual conduct of a minor under age 15 and the state requested a SVP after he was deemed non-competent to stand trial. He argued that the court abused its discretion
• S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue (2022). Justice Timmer authored a majority in which Justices Montgomery and Beene joined. The property South Point Energy leased on Tribal Land did not fall under section 5 of Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 because it was not land owned by the federal government. Found the land was not owned by the federal government because the lease between the IndianTribe and South Point specified that “‘all [i]improvements and associated materials, supplies, and equipment’ are ‘owned and controlled’ by South Point.” (3) The Act did not define government ownership and the court deferred to the Bureau Indian Affairs which defined it as “any interests, benefits, and rights inherent in the ownership of the real property.” (7) The court found “such rights generally include ownership of permanent improvements constructed by a tenant on leased property.” (7) The Act states land “taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” (6) Courts’ “primary goal in interpreting § 5 is to determine and give effect to Congress's intent.[]  We read words in context and effectuate the plain meaning of § 5 unless doing so would be absurd.[] If the language is ambiguous, we consider secondary interpretive principles, such as the Act's subject matter, history, and purpose, and the consequences of differing interpretations.” (6)

Judge Voter Guide gave 4 Stars and voted to "retain".

Ballotpedia gave Justice Timmer a Confidence Score of Intermediate which "indicates that there is either not enough information about the justice’s partisan affiliations or that our research found conflicting partisan affiliations."