David May

"Judges don't exercise the powers of the executive and the Legislature. We have a different job." —Justice David May

"...I think of judging as an opportunity to be authentically neutral in resolving disputes. This provides an extraordinarily valuable service to the public." —Justice David May

Bohlmann, Haley. “Interview with the Newest Iowa Supreme Court Justice David May.” Iowa Bar Association, 4 Oct. 2022.

Belin v. Reynolds, 989 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa 2023). Authored opinion. *pertains to open records*

Holding(s):  The Court “affirm[ed] the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court held “the Act may permit the plaintiffs to pursue claims based on untimeliness.” (4) 

Analysis: “[T]he plaintiffs … pursu[ed] two kinds of claims: (1) claims of insufficient production, that is, failure to produce records; and (2) claims for delay in producing records. The plaintiffs’ insufficiency claims can be further divided into (a) claims about the records that have now been produced, and (b) claims about records that still haven’t been produced—or that have been produced only in a redacted state—because defendants claim they are confidential. Similarly, the plaintiffs’ delay claims can be divided into (a) claims about the defendants’ delay in asserting their confidentiality objections, and (b) claims about the defendants’ delay in actually producing records.” (7-8) The Court addressed each claim individual.  

The Court first addressed the plaintiff’s insufficiency claims and held that claims regarding defendants failure to produce records was moot because the defendant has since provided said records. The Court noted that when there is no underlying controversy the case become nonjusticiable and court refrain from making a decision. The Court found no mootness exception applied because the defendants were unlikely to withhold records already produced and because it found it would not be in the public interest to further litigate over records that had been produced. The Court found that mootness did not apply the remainder of the Plaintiff’s claims such as seeking attorney’s fees related ot the suit. The Court emphasized this holding only applied to documents already produced.  

Next the Court addressed whether the plaintiff’s may “pursue claims that the defendant violated chapter 22 through delays in responding to the plaintiff’s open records’ request.” (10) The Court held that the plaintiff can pursue claims against the defendants for delay in responding to the open-records requests. The Court found that defendant implicitly refused to produce the record through its delay in responding to the request. “In summary, when a court evaluates whether a plaintiff has carried its burden under section 22.10(2), the relevant questions are: (1) Is the defendant ‘subject to the requirements of’ chapter 22?; (2) Did the plaintiff ask for ‘government records’?; and (3) Has ‘the defendant refused to make those government records available’ for the plaintiff? Iowa Code § 22.10(2)” (15) 

Last the Court addressed the defendant’s constitutionality claim. “[T]he Governor contend[ed] that ‘if chapter 22 [imposes] an amorphous reasonableness standard for assessing the timeliness of responses to open- records requests, such a standard cannot be applied to the Governor. It would violate the separation of powers by enmeshing the courts in answering a political question.” (17) “the Governor warns that ‘[r]equiring the Governor to prove the reasonableness of her response time . . . would . . . infringe on her executive privilege by requiring her to disclose protected information.’” (18) The Court found the Act only required that the Court determine that the Governor was subject to it and that the governor refused to provide the documents. The Court held that the plaintiffs could puruse their timeliness claim without violating the constitution—disagreeing with the governor. 

Background: Plaintiffs, three journalist, two news organizations, and a nonprofit sent eight open-records requests to the defendants, Governor Reynolds and staff, over a year period and with continuous follow-ups regarding the requests. After the defendant failed to provide the records, the plaintiff sued alleging violation of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the case alleging that the case was moot as the requested materials were eventually provided. They argued that the claims regarding timeliness were nonjusticiable political questions and would infringe on executive privilege. The plaintiffs argued that not all records were provided, citing redactions and withholding of certain documents. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss . The defendants asked for an interlocutory review.  

Applicable Law(s):  

1. “Iowa’s Open Records Act is codified in Iowa Code chapter 22. The policy of chapter 22 emphasizes that ‘free and open examination of public records is generally in the public interest even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others.’ (Iowa Code § 22.8(3)).” (10-11) 
2. “The Act grants ‘every person [a] right’ to examine, copy, and publish ‘a public record.’ (Id. § 22.2(1)). Section 22.1 defines ‘[p]ublic record[]’ to encompass ‘all records, documents,’ and ‘other information . . . of or belonging to this state’ or any of its ‘branch[es]’ or ‘department[s].’ (Id. § 22.1(3)(a)). However, section 22.7 designates certain documents—such as medical and school records—as confidential, thus generally protecting them from disclosure. (Id. § 22.7).” (11) 
3. “If a request is refused, an ‘aggrieved person... may seek judicial enforcement of the requirements of [the Act] in an action brought against the lawful custodian and any other persons who would be appropriate defendants under the circumstances.’ (Iowa Code § 22.10(1)).” (11) 
4. “Section 22.10(2) explains the trial process: Once a party seeking judicial enforcement of [the Act] demonstrates to the court that the defendant is subject to the requirements of [the Act], that the records in question are government records, and that the defendant refused to make those government records available for examination and copying by the plaintiff, the burden of going forward shall be on the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of [the Act].” (11-12) 

State v. Geddes, 998 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa 2023), as amended (Dec. 13, 2023). Joined opinion. Justice Mansfield authored opinion in which Justices Christensen, Waterman, McDonald, Oxley and May joined. Justice Waterman filed a concurrence in which Justice Christensen joined. Justice McDermott filed a dissent. *Pertains to hate crimes* 

Holding(s): The court upheld the defendants conviction for trespass as a hate crime. This Court found that the statute targeted conduct rather than speech. The Court affirmed that the residents' display of the  (rainbow) flag was protected by their First Amendment rights, but found the defendant's conduct was not. 

Analysis:  

(1) The Court first asked whether “hate crime trespass require[d] that the defendant have the intent to commit a second trespass.” Geddes argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the law required that a defendant commit a trespass and intend to commit a distinct hate crime. The Court found “three possible constructions of section 716.8(3)[.]” (7) The Court found that “the intended hate crime under section 716.8(3) [could] be the underlying trespass itself.” (8) The Court rejected an interpretation which finds that one must have intent to commit one of three listed hate crimes (assault, arson, or criminal mischief). The Court “conclude[d] that [7166.8(3)] applie[d] to any trespass committed with the intent required by the general hate crime provision, i.e., section 729A.2.” (9)  

(2) Next the Court address whether there was “sufficient evidence that Gedde’s victims were targeted for their ‘association with’ LGBTQ+ persons because they displayed the LGBTQ+ Pride flag? Geddes “argue[ed[ that the state failed to establish that he trespassed ‘because of’ the secual orientation of the property owners or lessees, or because of their associations with person of a particular sexual orientation, as required by Iowa Code section 729A.2(4).” (9) Finding no evidence that the “victims” were members of the LGBTQ+ community the Court found “[t]he issue thus boil[ed] down to whether Geddes targeted his victims because of their ‘association with’ persons of a particular sexual orientation.” (9) The Court held that there was sufficient evidence in the minutes to support that Geddes “acted because of the victim’s association with a person of a certain sexual orientation, as required by Iowa Code Section 729A.2(4).” (11) The Court found that the district court could have reasonably found that individuals associated to LGBTQ+ community due to display of a rainbow flag.   

(3) Next the Court addressed whether “the Trespass-as-a-Hate-Crime Statute as applied to Geddes violate[d] his freedom of speech under the United States or the Iowa Constitution?” (11) The Court held that that Iowa Code sections 716.7(2)(a), 716.8(3), and 729A.2(4) do not violate the First Amendment or the Iowa Constitution as applied to Geddes. The court distinguished this case from R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, focusing on the nature of the conduct involved. The Court Geddes found Geddes did not “engage in expressive conduct” protected by the First Amendment. (15) Last the Court asked whether Iowa Code Section 716.7(2)(a)(1) [was] unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under the United States or the Iowa Constitution? (19) Geddes … argue[d] that ‘[i]n American society, it is often assumed by its citizens that a person has implied permission to approach a residential home to leave an object, often a piece of paper, such as a note or a flyer, on [the front] door or main entrance of a home.’” (21) The Court found the section was not void-for-vagueness nor overbroad. 

McDermott Dissent: Justice McDermott dissented “[b]ecause the State failed to establish the statutory elements set forth in the text of Iowa Code § 729A.2[.]” (37) McDermott “ would reverse Geddes’s hate crime convictions and remand to the district court for dismissal.” (37) McDermott argued that the court could not uphold Geddes's hate crime convictions under Iowa Code § 729A.2 due to insufficient evidence proving that Geddes targeted the homeowners based on their characteristics or their associations with others who possessed protected traits. He argued the only relevant detail about the victims was that they displayed Pride flags, which did not provide adequate evidence of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. 

McDermott criticized the majority for assuming that displaying a Pride flag signified an association with the LGBTQ+ community, emphasizing that symbols did not inherently link individuals to specific groups or people. Furthermore, he pointed out that the State had to demonstrate the homeowners’ association with individuals of certain protected characteristics, which the record did not support. McDermott wrote, “The majority attempts to bridge this chasm in the evidence by declaring that displaying a Pride flag shows ‘association with’ ‘persons of lesbian, gay, and other sexual orientations within the LGBTQ+ community.’ But how does displaying a flag connect its displayer to an actual person? A flag is a symbol. “ (33) 

Background: The case arose after a Geddes was charged with five counts of trespass as a hate crime and five counts of third-degree harassment after leaving anonymous notes on the lawns of individuals who displayed LBGT+ Pride flags (rainbow flag). On appeal, Geddes argued there was insufficient evidence for his conviction, that his prosecution infringed upon his free speech rights protected by the First Amendment and article 1, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution. He argued that Iowa Code section 716.7(2)(a)(1)(hate crime statute) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, violating the Fourteenth Amendment and article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. 

Applicable Law: 

• “Iowa Code section 716.7(2)(a) sets forth the general definition of trespass….One of those acts is: ‘Entering upon or in property without the express permission of the owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession with the intent to commit a public offense, to use, remove therefrom, alter, damage, harass, or place thereon or therein anything animate or inanimate . . . .’ Id. § 716.7(2)(a)(1). Another of those acts is: ‘Being upon or in property and . . . placing thereon or therein anything animate or inanimate, without the implied or actual permission of the owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession.’ Id. § 716.7(2)(a)(4).” (5) 
• “Section 716.8(3) is part of the hate crime law. It says that ‘[a] person who knowingly trespasses on the property of another with the intent to commit a hate crime, as defined in section 729A.2, commits a serious misdemeanor.’ Id. § 716.8(3).” (5-6)  
• “And Iowa Code section 729A.2(4) is another part of the hate crime law. It defines a hate crime as follows: ‘Hate crime’ means one of the following public offenses when committed against a person or a person’s property because of the person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability, or the person’s association with a person of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability: 1. Assault in violation of individual rights under section 708.2C. 2. Violations of individual rights under section 712.9. 3. Criminal mischief in violation of individual rights under section 716.6A. 4. Trespass in violation of individual rights under section 716.8, subsections 3 and 4. Id. § 729A.2.” (6) 
• Void-for-vagueness doctrine: “There are three components to this doctrine: First, a statute cannot be so vague that it does not give persons of ordinary understanding fair notice that certain conduct is prohibited. Second, due process requires that statutes provide those clothed with authority sufficient guidance to prevent the exercise of power in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. Third, a statute cannot sweep so broadly as to prohibit substantial amounts of constitutionally-protected activities, such as speech protected under the First Amendment.” (19) “  

Vasquez v. Iowa Dep't of Hum. Servs., 990 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2023). Justice Waterman authored opinion in which all Justices joined. *Involved sex-reassignment surgery*

Holding(s): The Court dismissed appellant’s direct appeal as moot because DHS had since “agreed to pay for those surgeries. [Thus] [t]hat concession render[ed] DHS’s direct appeal moot.” (11) The Court declined to address the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 216.7(3). The Court declined to apply the mootness exception finding that, “[t]he issues concerning Medicaid coverage for adult sex reassignment surgery [were] of public importance and likely to recur, but not in a manner that will evade appellate review.” (12)

Background: The case involved Aiden Vasquez and Mika Covington, two individuals who believe themselves to be transgender, who requested Medicaid coverage for sex reassignment surgeries (referred to as "bottom surgeries"). The surgeries were denied by Amerigroup of Iowa, their managed care organization (MCO), citing a longstanding administrative rule and a 2019 amendment to the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which excluded sex reassignment surgeries from Medicaid coverage.  

Vasquez and Covington appealed the denial, arguing that the exclusion violated their equal protection rights under the Iowa Constitution. The district court found that transgender individuals are a quasi-suspect class, which required heightened scrutiny of the regulations. The court ruled that both the administrative regulation and the ICRA amendment were unconstitutional, violating the equal protection guarantee.

DHS appealed the ruling on the ICRA amendment but did not contest the ruling regarding the Regulation, leading to arguments about whether the constitutionality of the Regulation remained a live issue. DHS characterized the ICRA amendment as a clarification rather than a prohibition on coverage, while Vasquez and Covington argued the Amendment “exempt[s] only transgender people from the normal nondiscrimination protections and remedies that apply to all Iowans under [the] ICRA with respect to Medicaid coverage.”

Applicable Law(s): 

1. “’[The ICRA] shall not require any state or local government unit or tax-supported district to provide for sex reassignment surgery or any other cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery procedure related to transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender identity disorder, or body dysmorphic disorder.’ 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 85, § 93 (codified at Iowa Code § 216.7(3) (2020)).” (8)

Planned Parenthood of Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 9 N.W.3d 37 (Iowa 2024), reh'g denied (July 22, 2024), amended (Sept. 6, 2024). Justice McDermott authored the opinion in which Justices McDonald, Oxley and May joined. Justice Christensen dissented in which Justices Mansfield and Waterman joined. Justice Mansfield dissented in which Justice Christensen and Waterman joined. *Involved abortion legislation*

Holding(s): The Court reversed a temporary injunction that blocked abortion legislation prohibiting most abortions after a heartbeat is detected. The Court held that the rational basis test applied to the claim because abortion was not recognized as a fundamental right in Iowa. The Court held “that the fetal heartbeat statute [wa]s rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting unborn life.” (4) The Court found "that Planned Parenthood [wa]s not entitled to a temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the fetal heartbeat statute." [24] The Court found that "As [the Court] held in PPH 2022, neither text nor history establishes abortion as a fundamental right under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 739–42." [16] 

Analysis: This Court reiterated that when assessing due process violations, the nature of the right involved dictated the applicable constitutional test. Since abortion was not recognized as a fundamental right in Iowa, the rational basis test applied. The court concluded that the fetal heartbeat statute was rationally related to the state's interest in protecting unborn life. As a result, the court reversed the district court's injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Christensen’s Dissent: Justice Christensen dissented arguing that the Court’s “…majority strip[ped] Iowa women of their bodily autonomy by holding that there is no fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy under our state constitution. I cannot stand by this decision. The majority’s rigid approach relies heavily on the male-dominated history and traditions of the 1800s, all the while ignoring how far women’s rights have come since the Civil War era. It is a bold assumption to think that the drafters of our state constitution intended for their interpretation to stand still while we move forward as a society. Instead, we should interpret our constitution through a modern lens that recognizes how our lives have changed with the passage of time.” (25) Chief Justice Christensen emphasized that women possess the right to decide whether to continue their pregnancies, referencing a previous court ruling from 2018 that recognized this decision as a fundamental right under the Iowa Constitution (later overturned).

Christensen criticized the majority for relying solely on historical interpretations of the constitution from 1857, which neglected the oppression women faced throughout Iowa's history. She argued that the majority's reasoning improperly dismissed the complexity of Iowa's history regarding abortion. Christensen joined Justice Mansfield’s dissent and advocated for applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate abortion regulations.

Mansfield Dissent: Justice Manfield dissented arguing that the Court should adopt the intermediate scrutiny test and the Casey
undue burden standard. Justice Manfield would affirm the temporary injunction enjoining the statute from taking effect. (82)

Background: Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which removed the federal "undue burden" standard, the State sought to dissolve a prior permanent injunction against a fetal heartbeat law.  Previously, the district court had granted the injunction based on an "undue burden" standard, concluding that the petitioners were likely to succeed in their constitutional challenge. The State argued that the court should have applied the "rational basis" test instead, claiming that abortion was not a fundamental right under the Iowa Constitution. Planned Parenthood argue[d] that [the Court] should instead adopt the undue burden test from
Casey. [16] The central issue here was whether Planned Parenthood could demonstrate a "likelihood of success on the merits," which is necessary for a temporary injunction (Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2001)).

Applicable Law(s):

• Under Iowa Code § 146E.2(2)(a) (2023) “a physician must perform an abdominal ultrasound to detect cardiac activity and ‘shall inform the pregnant woman, in writing,’ whether any cardiac activity was detected and, if so, that ‘an abortion is prohibited.’"
• Exceptions to this statute allow for an abortion after a heartbeat is detected in cases of medical emergencies, rape, or incest (Id. §§ 146E.1(3)–(4), .2(2)(a)). 
• “We thus will apply the rational basis test. ‘Under a rational basis analysis, a statute is constitutional if we find a “reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.”’” (19)