Jefferson G. Griffin

Judge Voter Guide "endorsed" Griffin and gave him 5 stars rating.

Justice Griffin's campaign website states that, "Judge Griffin is an originalist and a textualist. Judge Griffin believes the words of the Constitution mean what they say. Judge Griffin believes in the separation of powers, judicial restraint and the independence of the judiciary.” 

Judge Griffin's campaign page states: "Protecting Our Constitution. Integrity in the Courtroom. Defending the Rule of Law."

Posted to Facebook “Judge Jefferson Griffin believes in defending the rule of law.” He linked to article “‘The Law Is Applied the Same to All Citizens’: Republican N.C. Appeals Court Judges Use Concurring Opinions to Slam Defendant’s Racial Bias Claims”

Justice Griffin's campaign website states, "Protecting Our Constitution. Integrity in the Courtroom. Defending Rule of Law."

Matter of Z.M.C.B., No. COA23-1024, 2024 WL 3039813 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2024) Griffin authored the opinion. *involves key issue*

Holding: The Court of Appeals held that “the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(3).” (8) The Court concluded that “YFS presented undisputed clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support Finding of Fact 24, and Findings of Fact 24 and 25 [were] sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(3).” (8) The Court found that the North Carolina “Supreme Court ha[d] held that additional evidence of a parent’s living expenses [was] irrelevant undersection 7B-1111(a)(3) where the evidence presented shows the parent ‘made no payments whatsoever to cover the costs of [his child’s] care, [and] the trial court found that [the parent] was employed with some income[.]’” (7) The Court stated that the trial court found that Mother “had gainful employment throughout the relevant period[]” and that the Court “will not reweigh the evidence, notwithstanding the existence of contradictory evidence presented during the hearing.” (8)

Background: “Mother appeals the trial court’s Termination Order, arguing the court erred in terminating her parental rights under each of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6) at the adjudication stage.” (4) Mother challenged Finding of Fact 24 arguing that “[t]he trial court’s findings that [Mother] had the ability to pay a sum greater than zero and willfully failed to do so [were] not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (6-7) Mother argued that conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing and asserted that YFS failed to provide proof of her ability to pay. The Court "review[s] a trial court’s adjudication under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-1111 to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” (4-5) “The court’s ‘conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.’’ (5) 

Rule(s):  Applicable law: “Section 7B-1111 of the North Carolina General Statutes states ‘[t]he court may terminate [a parent’s] parental rights upon a finding of one or more of’ eleven enumerated grounds. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2023).” (5) “[A]n adjudication of any single ground in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.” (6)

Matter of N.J.R.C., 291 N.C. App. 174, 895 S.E.2d 443 (2023) Griffin authored the opinion. *Involved key issue*

Holding(s): The Court held that “[b]ecause Father was convicted of taking indecent liberties with children under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1—a sexually related offense—and because the relations which resulted in the conception of Nathan also led to Father’s conviction under Chapter 14, the trial court did not err in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11).” (7) The Court found that, “the ‘Related’ language provided in the statute, together with our Courts’ precedent, indicate[d] the offense of taking indecent liberties with children under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 constitutes a sexually related offense within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11).” (7) Additionally, “Section 7B-1111(a)(11) does not require a respondent to be convicted of a sexual act or offense, but only of a ‘sexually related offense.’” (5)

Background: “Father argue[d] there was insufficient evidence to support a termination under section 7B-1111(a)(11) because he was not convicted of a sexually related offense.” (1) "When a respondent appeals a courts adjudication decision this Court reviews the “decision to determine ‘whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether [the] findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.’” (3)

Rule(s): “Under our North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(11), the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights upon finding ‘[t]he parent has been convicted of a sexually related offense under Chapter 14 of the General Statutes that resulted in the conception of the juvenile.’ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(11) (2021).” (4) Chapter14, section 202.1 states, “(a) A person is guilty of taking indecent liberties with children if, being 16 years of age or more and at least five years older than the child in question, he either: (1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or (2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years.” (4)

Vaitovas v. City of Greenville, 2022-NCCOA-169, 282 N.C. App. 393, 871 S.E.2d 816, appeal dismissed, review denied, 873 S.E.2d 10 (N.C. 2022). Dietz wrote majority opinion.

Holding(s): The Court held that a law governing automated traffic signal cameras (present only in some cities in NC) did not violate N.C. Const. art. II § 24(1)(a), which prohibits "local" laws "[r]elating to health, sanitation, and abatement of nuisances" because the precedent of City of Asheville v. State (2016) limited the phrase "relating to" to laws with a "material" connection to health and not those with a "tangential or incidental connection" (1-2). The Court noted that the plaintiff did not challenge the statute that authorized Greenville to use the cameras, but rather a law governing the city's ability to lease the cameras (2). The Court held that the challenged act did not shift responsibility for the program and did not change the health-related aspects of the program. The Court held that whether the underlying statute authorizing the cameras was unconstitutional was not before the court (3). Said that Vaitovas' reference to public statements by city officials did not prove that the purpose of the statute was health related because "what individual legislators think about the purpose of a statute is rarely (if ever) helpful in interpreting the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. And what local officials think about a statute is even less so" (9). The Court held that the challenged law did not materially affect health because it neither changed who was responsible for the cameras nor how the cameras operated (10).

Background: North Carolina's General Assembly passed a law allowing the City of Charlotte to establish an automated red-light camera program for traffic enforcement. Over time, this law was extended to several other cities and towns in the state. Later, the City of Greenville was added to the statute. In 2016, Greenville sought legislative changes to make the red-light camera program financially feasible, specifically requesting the ability to contract with private entities for camera equipment. The General Assembly passed Session Law 2016-64, which allowed Greenville to lease or purchase the equipment and set specific terms for such contracts. In 2018, Vaitovas contested a red-light violation notice she received, arguing that the 2016 law was unconstitutional under North Carolina’s limitation on local health laws. "Vaitovas argue[d] that Session Law 2016-64 [wa]s unconstitutional because it [wa]s barred by Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution, which prevents the General Assembly from passing any local acts related to health: (1) Prohibited Subjects. The General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution: (a) Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances . . . (3) Prohibited acts void. Any local, private, or special act or resolution enacted in violation of the provisions of this Section shall be void. N.C. Const. art II, § 24(1)(a), (3)." (8)

State v. Johnson, 2021-NCSC-85, 378 N.C. 236, 861 S.E.2d 474 Griffin concurred with separate opinion.

Holding(s): The Court of Appeals (Court) "reverse[d] the trial court’s denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, vacate[d] the Judgment, and remand[ed] this matter for further proceedings.” (23) The Court “exercis[ed] [its] Rule 2 discretion to address the merits of Defendant’s arguments.” (12) The Court held that the search conducted by Lieutenant Stone “measurably —and impermissibly—extended the traffic stop[.]” (22) The Court found that the Defendant’s consent was involuntary as a matter of law. The Court found that Lieutenant Stone did not receive consent nor have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a full search of defendant’s pockets.

Griffin's Concurrence: Griffin concurred with the reasoning of the majority and wrote separately “to indicate exactly where Lieutenant Stone violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.” (26) Griffin noted that while the initial traffic stop was justified based on the observed seatbelt violation, and Lieutenant Stone was legally permitted to ask the Defendant to exit the vehicle for safety reasons, the issue arises when Stone requested to search the Defendant's person. This request lacked additional reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity and unreasonably extended the duration of the stop, which violated the Fourth Amendment. Griffin also addressed Defendant argument “that U.S. citizens are treated differently under our laws based on the color of their skin.” (28) He wrote “I reject this argument. The law is color blind and applies equally to every citizen in the United States of American. This argument is Defendant’s brief is inflammatory and unnecessary.” (28-29) He further stated that “[t]he brief quoted former North Carolina Chief Justice Beasley, who also implied in a speech on 2 June 2020 that our justice system does not treat people equally in the courtroom based on the color of their skin[.]” (29) Judge Griffin found that “Defendant’s statement highlights the problem with the judiciary becoming involved in public policy.” (30) “It also encourages and charges the courts to become an active body by involving our judicial branch in policy decisions. The judiciary should at all times practice judicial restraint.” (31)  

Background: Johnson appealed a judgment entered following his guilty pleas to Felony Possession of Cocaine and Habitual-Felon Status. The case stemmed from a traffic stop in 2017, by Lieutenant Stone. Stone stopped Johnson for not wearing a seatbelt and, after informing Johnson that he would issue only a warning, asked to search him. Johnson consented, and Stone discovered what he believed to be cocaine in Johnson's pocket. Johnson filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawful and that his consent to search did not extend beyond a pat-down for weapons. At the suppression hearing, both Stone and Johnson provided conflicting accounts of the consent given. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop and that Johnson had consented to the search. After his Motion to Suppress was denied, Johnson plead guilty to Felony Possession of Cocaine and Habitual-Felon Status. In his Transcript of Plea, Johnson reserved the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress. He provided oral Notice of Appeal at the plea hearing and filed a written Notice of Appeal. 

On appeal, the issues were whether: (I) Defendant preserved his argument that his consent to the search was involuntary because Lieutenant Stone extended and deviated from the original traffic stop; and (II) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence of the cocaine, based on the claim that his consent was involuntary as a matter of law.

Fearrington v. City of Greenville, 2022-NCCOA-158, 282 N.C. App. 218, 871 S.E.2d 366, writ allowed, 884 S.E.2d 727 (N.C. 2023), and appeal dismissed, review allowed, 884 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 2023), and review denied, 885 S.E.2d 91 (N.C. 2023), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 900 S.E.2d 851 (N.C. 2024), reh'g denied, 902 S.E.2d 737 (N.C. 2024). Authored opinion.

Conclusion(s): The Court held that the funding framework of Greenville’s Red Light Camera Enforcement Program violated the Fines and Forfeitures Clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim related to this clause and remanded the case for summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. The Court otherwise affirmed the trial court's other decisions. Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ argument, regarding the trial court's consideration of an unqualified expert's affidavit, was not preserved for appeal.

Holding(s) & Analysis: The Court first held that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' claim under Chapter 89C of the North Carolina General Statutes finding that Chapter 89C does not provide a private right of action for violations of its provisions. Second the Court next that Greenville’s RLCEP’s administrative appeal hearings do not violate procedural due process. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The Court concluded that Greenville’s process, which included an administrative hearing and the option to appeal to Superior Court by certiorari, meets these requirements. Next the Court found that Greenville’s RLCEP does not infringe upon fundamental rights and was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—public safety. The Court noted, the law’s aim was to address safety hazards caused by red light violations, and although the effectiveness of the RLCEP in specific scenarios can be debated, it is reasonably related to the goal of improving public safety. The Court emphasized that it does not assess policy effectiveness but rather ensures that the law has a rational connection to its stated goals. Lastly, the Court held that the RLCEP's funding scheme violated the Fines and Forfeitures Clause of Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina State Constitution. The Clause mandates that "clear proceeds" of fines and forfeitures be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools. (27) The Court found that Greenville's interlocal agreement with the School Board did not comply with this requirement. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.

Background: Under North Carolina law, failure to stop at a red light is an infraction with a maximum penalty of $100. However, municipalities are allowed to use red light cameras for civil enforcement. In 2016, the General Assembly authorized Greenville to implement a Red Light Camera Enforcement Program (RLCEP), which imposed a $100 civil penalty for red light violations. Greenville entered into a contract with American Traffic Solutions (ATS) for managing the RLCEP. The agreement involved Greenville collecting the fines and forwarding them to the School Board, which then reimbursed Greenville for its expenses. From 2017 to mid-2019, the School Board received a substantial portion of the fines collected. Plaintiffs, Fearrington and Malmrose, appealed the denial of their motion for summary judgment and the granting of motions to dismiss by the City of Greenville and the Pitt County Board of Education. They contended that Greenville's Red Light Camera Enforcement Program (RLCEP) was illegal and unconstitutional. The court found that the RLCEP's funding framework violated the Fines and Forfeitures Clause of the North Carolina Constitution.  

Posted Facebook, "These conservative statewide judicial candidates are committed to upholding the law, defending the Constitution, and ensuring a balanced and fair judiciary."

From Judge Griffin's campaign page states: "JUDGE GRIFFIN’S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: Judge Griffin is an originalist and a textualist. Judge Griffin believes the words of the Constitution mean what they say. Judge Griffin believes in the separation of powers, judicial restraint and the independence of the judiciary."

State v. Cable, No. COA23-192, 2024 WL 3033884 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2024). Authored opinion.

Holding(s):  The Court held that Defendant Kimberly Cable's convictions for two counts of failure to store a firearm to protect a minor and involuntary manslaughter were in error. The Court reversed the convictions for failure to store a firearm and vacated the conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

Background: The case stemmed from an incident where a 16-year-old boy, Kevin, accidentally shot himself with a revolver while visiting Defendant's home. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the failure to store a firearm charges because the revolver in question was unloaded and thus not stored "in a condition that the firearm can be discharged," as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-315.1. Additionally, the Court found that there was no substantial evidence that Kevin accessed any firearms other than the revolver or that he caused the death with another firearm. Consequently, the Court reversed Defendant's convictions for failure to store a firearm to protect a minor and vacated her conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which was based on the reversed misdemeanor conviction.

Applicable Law: "North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-315.1 states, in part: (a) Any person who resides in the same premises as a minor, owns or possesses a firearm, and stores or leaves the firearm (i) in a condition that the firearm can be discharged and (ii) in a manner that the person knew or should have known that an unsupervised minor would be able to gain access to the firearm, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor if a minor gains access to the firearm without the lawful permission of the minor’s parents or a person having charge of the minor and the minor: . . .(3) Causes personal injury or death with it not in self defense; or . . . (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person from carrying a firearm on his or her body, or placed in such close proximity that it can be used as easily and quickly as if carried on the body. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-315.1(a)-(b) (2023)." (7)

See also: "Unloaded Weapons Don't Violate North Carolina Safe Gun Storage Law, Appeals Court Says." Associated Press, 18 June 2024.