Brian Walker

Justice Brian Walker is running for Supreme Court of Texas, Place 4. Justice Walker is married and the couple have a daughter. The Walker’s reside in Fort Worth, Texas and are members of The Hills Church. Walker also previously served as a Youth Pastor. 

Employment: 

• Serves as a Justice on the Court of Appeals for the second Judicial District of Texas since 2021.
• Former Judge Advocate (JAG) in the United States Air Force Reserves (USAFR) from 2010-2019.
• Worked in private practice for almost fifteen years, handling matters in Military and Veteran's Law, Civil Litigation, and Criminal Defense.   

Education: 

• Received Master of Biblical and Theological Studies from Dallas Theological Seminary, 
• Received J.D. from the University of Houston. 
  • During law school in Houston, Justice Walker clerked for the late famed criminal defense attorney Richard "Racehorse" Haynes. 

Campaign Website: 

• “A conservative republican judge with the right background and judicial philosophy” 
• See video “Why I’m Running for the Texas Supreme Court” Justice Walker stated he is called to run for election the Supreme Court of Texas because he has the right judicial philosophy.
• Said, "I am a believer and I love our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.... I have had several callings in my life, but this is the most specific calling that I’ve ever had.... Let’s talk about judicial philosophy. I am conservative, ideologically and a conservative judge. Those aren’t always the same things. There is a misconception that conservative values mean conservative judge.... We have judicial activists in our own party. We have judicial activists on the right. They are conservative ideologically but don’t exercise judicial restraint at all. Unfortunately, I see that more and more [.] That is why I think it is so important that we get good God-fearing judges who are truly willing to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. To interpret the law narrowly, not to legislate from the bench. Not to thumb their nose at the legislature. Why? Because the legislature is the branch of the government thar represents most closely the will of the people. I believe when judges violate and do things that are violative of what the legislature writes... they are thumbing their nose not just at the legislature but at the people. I am conservative ideologically. I am fiscal conservative and social conservative. I have two Reagon quotes that sum it up the best, ‘believe the government that governs the best also governs the least.’ And i also believe the scariest sentence to hear is ‘I am from the government, and I am here to help.” 
• Said, “Conservative judges are those that interpret the law narrowly.” 

Associations: 

• Federalist Society, member 
• National Rifle Association 
• Ducks Unlimited 
• Texas Farm Bureau 

Notable Cases:

• Texas Real Estate Commission v. Neel (2023) Authored opinion. Held “that the Neels’ actual damages [were] not recoverable from the fund, [the Court] modif[ied] the trial court’s order to delete their actual damages and related pre- judgment interest.” (8-9) The court “affirm[ed] the portion of the trial court’s order awarding them $11,500 in attorney’s fees and $452 in court costs, modify the judgment to reflect an award of $11,952 from the fund, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” (8-9) The court notes “TREC is required to maintain the fund, the purpose of which is “to reimburse aggrieved persons who suffer actual damages caused by an act described by Section 1101.602 committed by . . . a license holder[.]” “However, the Act—as construed by Pace and its progeny—also makes it clear that recovery of one’s actual damages from the fund is available only to reimburse or ‘pay back’ money that the person actually expended. Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.601; Pace, 650 S.W.2d at 65; Murphy, 2023 WL 2926411, at *3–4; Arlington Equities, 765 S.W.2d at 473.” “In Murphy, [the Court] stated that ‘[t]he ‘reimbursement’ language in the statute has already been construed by the Texas Supreme Court’ and that this construction ‘does not encompass payment for damages that serve any purpose other than reimbursement.’” Regarding attorney’s fee’s the court cites, “… Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.610(d) (providing that ‘[a] person receiving payment from the trust account is entitled to receive reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount determined by the court’).” (9) 
  
• Alkayyali v. State (2023) Authored opinion.  “Guided by constitutional principles and considering the record before us” (12) the Court “held that Alkayyali was egregiously and reversibly harmed by jury-charge  error and overruled his points on evidentiary sufficiency…See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.” (1) The court “reversed [the] murder conviction and remand[ed] to the trial court for further proceedings. See Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 174 (reversing and remanding upon holding that appellant was egregiously harmed by jury-charge error). “(20) The Court held “[u]nder the facts of this case, the omission of the ‘causes the death of’ element from the application paragraph of the jury charge deprived Alkayyali of his right to due process and affected his main defensive theory by (1) relieving the State of its high burden of proving that he caused Moussa’s death beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) undermining his right to present a complete defense that sought to question that causation. Thus, [the Court] h[eld] that this error egregiously harmed Alkayyali[.]” (17) Issue: The court found it “…must determine from the entire record—in light of the Almanza factors—whether the jury-charge error here affected the very basis of the case, deprived Alkayyali of a valuable right, or vitally affected one of his defensive theories. See Villareal, 453 S.W.3d at 433; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172; see also Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 370.” (12) “Alkayyali argues that he was egregiously harmed by the omission of the “causes the death of” element from the second theory alleged in the jury charge’s application paragraph.” (10) Standard of review: Egregious harm. (9) “’[C]ourts are required to examine the relevant portions of the entire record to determine whether [the defendant] suffered actual harm, as opposed to theoretical harm, as a result of the error.’ Marshall, 479 S.W.3d at 843 (emphasis in original); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.” “’Charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.’ Villareal, 453 S.W.3d at 433; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172.” 
  
• Stevens v. State (2022) Authored opinion. Quo warranto proceeding. The court held tht “[t]he trial court’s conclusion of law that subsection 86.0021(b) ‘requiring a constable to maintain an active permanent peace officer license within 270 days of being sworn into office’ is erroneous as a matter of law. Subsection 86.0021(b) does not require a constable to maintain an active license within the 270-day window, only a permanent license.” The court found that “Stevens maintained an inactive but permanent license at all relevant times.” (8) Additionally, the Court held “Stevens substantially complied with subsection 86.0021(b)’s notice requirement. See Roccaforte, 341 S.W.3d at 926.” (13) The court found “the purpose of subsection 86.0021(b)’s notice requirements was fulfilled in this case.” (14) The court “reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a take- nothing judgment against the State. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.” (15) “Appellant Donald Wayne Stevens appeal[ed] from the trial court’s judgment ousting him from the office of constable in Archer County, Texas.” (2) “Stevens contend[ed] on appeal that the trial court reversibly erred by concluding that subsection 86.0021(b) require[d] a constable to maintain an active permanent peace officer license and that Stevens forfeited his office by failing to show evidence of an active permanent license to the commissioners court within the 270-day window.” (7) Standard of review: reviewed trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. (7) “A conclusion of law will be reversed if it is erroneous as a matter of law and led to the rendition of an improper judgment. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 794; Wise Elec., 476 S.W.3d at 679; In re J.J.L.-P., 256 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.); see Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (providing that no error in a civil case may be reversed on appeal unless the error ‘probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment’).” (7-8) The Court “will review de novo whether Stevens provided evidence of a permanent peace officer license to the commissioners court within 270 days of taking office as required by subsection 86.0021(b), and then render judgment accordingly. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.0021(b).” (9) Rule: “Among other possible qualifiers, a person is eligible to serve as constable if he is ‘an active or inactive licensed peace officer.’ Id. § 86.0021(a)(1)–(2). Further, ‘[o]n or before the 270th day after the date a constable takes office, the constable shall provide, to the commissioners court of the county in which the constable serves, evidence that the constable has been issued a permanent peace officer license under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code.’ Id. § 86.0021(b). A constable who fails to provide such evidence forfeits his office and is subject to removal in a quo warranto proceeding. Id.” (2) Issue: Whether “the trial court’s judgement was based on erroneous conclusion of law related to whether he provided evidence of a permanent peace officer license to the commissioner’s court as required by subsection 86.0021(b) of the Texas Local Government Code. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.0021(b).” (2) 
  
• Finley v. State (2022) Authored opinion. The Court held “that the trial court erred when it allowed T.G. to testify while wearing a mask in the absence of a sufficient particularized finding as to her particular need to do so.” The Court “found no pandemic-era Texas cases applying the Craig factors to a masked-witness situation.” (20) The Court further held “that the State failed to meet its burden establishing from other evidence that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (23) The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. (2) Rules: “The Sixth Amendment protects an accused’s right to confront, face-to-face, any witnesses that testifies against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801 (1988); Haggard v. State, 612 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).” (14)“A jury’s ability to view a witness’s facial expressions is paramount to the confrontation right because the face is ‘the most expressive part of the body and something that is traditionally regarded as one of the most important factors in assessing credibility.’ Romero, 173 S.W.3d at 505–06 (stating that allowing a witness to testify while disguising his face would “remove the ‘face’ from ‘face-to-face confrontation’”).” (15) “’[The Supreme Court] has nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right.’ Craig, 497 U.S. at 847, 110 S. Ct. at 3165 (internal citations and quotations omitted).” (15) “Instead, a defendant’s confrontation right may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation ‘only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.’ Id. at 850.” (15) “To show such necessity, the trial court must hear evidence and then make a case-specific, evidence-based finding that the departure from the face-to- face confrontation right is necessary to protect the well-being of the particular witness. Id.; see Haggard, 612 S.W.3d at 324–26; Romero, 136 S.W.3d at 690–91.” (15)  Issue: “Finley argues that his Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was violated when T.G. was permitted to testify while wearing a mask that covered her nose and mouth…. Finley posits that reversal is required because the trial court made no case-specific findings as to why it was necessary for T.G., in particular, to wear a mask at trial.” (13-14) Whether trial court error was harmful. (21) 
  

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