John Devine

TXJudges.org candidate comparison.

Awarded  "Texas Size Hero" by Focus on the Family magazine. 

In Devine's announcement for re-election he stated,  “It is with much prayer and consideration that I am enthusiastically announcing my candidacy for reelection to the Texas Supreme Court. During my tenure on the court, I have had the privilege of presiding over a wide range of cases and have always applied the law impartially and with careful consideration of all the arguments presented. I am committed to maintaining the trust and confidence the people of Texas have placed in me over the past 11 years. The Texas Supreme Court is critical in upholding the rule of law and protecting the rights of all Texans. I remain steadfast in ensuring the court system is fair and just."

State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2024). Justice Huddle delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Young joined. Justice Blacklock filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Devine joined. Justice Busby filed a concurring opinion. Justice Young filed a concurring opinion. Justice Lehrmann filed a dissenting opinion. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate probable right to relief. The Court reversed and vacated the trial court’s order. The Court, “conclude[d] the Legislature made a permissible, rational policy choice to limit the types of available medical procedures for children, particularly in light of the relative nascency of both gender dysphoria and its various modes of treatment and the Legislature’s express constitutional authority to regulate the practice of medicine. [The Court] therefore conclude[d] the statute d[id] not unconstitutionally deprive parents of their rights or physicians or health care providers of an alleged property right in their medical licenses or claimed right to occupational freedom. [The Court] also conclude[d] the law d[id] not unconstitutionally deny or abridge equality under the law because of sex or any other characteristic asserted by plaintiffs.

Blacklock’s concurrence: Blacklock concurred affirming that the Texas Legislature has the authority to uphold the Traditional Vision of human nature and regulate such treatments, aligning with a collective moral judgment to protect children. He concluded that while parental autonomy in medical decisions regarding children is significant, the right to disrupt a child’s biological functions through transgender treatments is not constitutionally protected. 

Blacklock discussed the deep conflict between the Traditional Vision, which views biological sex as immutable and opposes medical interventions for gender dysphoria as harmful, and the Transgender Vision, which prioritizes gender identity and supports such treatments as necessary for mental well-being. He emphasized that the dispute is rooted in fundamental philosophical and moral differences rather than medical facts. Blacklock argued that neither doctors nor judges should resolve these issues; instead, the Texas Constitution empowers the people, through their legislature, to address moral questions about childhood transgender therapy in line with the Traditional Vision. 

Blacklock argued that gender identity is fundamentally rooted in biology and genetics, rejecting the idea of "sex assigned at birth" as a misleading construct. (7)  He contended that the belief in transgender identities can lead to harmful medical practices, particularly regarding minors. He argued that the Transgender Vision would have been inconceivable to the Constitution's framers and that Texans of that era would not have recognized such a right. While acknowledging the historical strong belief in parental rights regarding children's medical care, he maintained that there is no historical precedent for the legislature being powerless to prohibit practices it considers harmful. 

Blacklock concluded that the legislature’s regulation of these treatments is justified under the Texas Constitution, as it reflects a moral and political judgment about what constitutes legitimate medical care, independent of prevailing expert opinions or societal trends. He cautioned against allowing politically influential views to override constitutional protections, suggesting that such a stance would reflect a judicial bias rather than adherence to constitutional text and history. 

Background: A new law in Texas prohibited medical treatments for children aimed at transitioning their biological sex. Prior to its enforcement several parents of children with gender dysphoria, along with affected physicians and groups, sued to block the law, claiming it was unconstitutional. The trial court found that the law likely violated the Texas Constitution and issued a temporary injunction against its enforcement. The question was whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a probable right to relief regarding the law's constitutionality. The plaintiff’s argued that S.B. 14 was facially unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it infringed on the fundamental rights of parents to make decisions about their children's care, violating Article I, Section 19 (the Due Course of Law Clause); (2) it deprived Texas physicians of a vested property interest in their medical licenses and infringed on the occupational freedoms of healthcare providers, also in violation of the Due Course of Law Clause; and (3) it discriminated against transgender children and their parents based on sex and transgender status, violating Article I, Section 3 (the Equal Protection Clause) and Article I, Section 3a (the Equal Rights Amendment). (13) 

Applicable Law(s):  “Senate Bill 14, captioned a statute ‘relating to prohibitions on the provision to certain children of procedures and treatments for gender transitioning, gender reassignment, or gender dysphoria.’” (5) “The statute prohibits a physician or health care provider from performing certain actions on a child6 when those actions are performed for one of two purposes: (1) ‘transitioning a child’s biological sex as determined by the sex organs, chromosomes, and endogenous profiles of the child’; or (2) ‘affirming the child’s perception of the child’s sex if that perception is inconsistent with the child’s biological sex.’ TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.702. The statute identifies three forms of prohibited surgical intervention: (1) ‘a surgery that sterilizes the child’; (2) ‘a mastectomy’; and (3) removal of “any otherwise healthy or non-diseased body part or tissue.’” (5-6) Section 161.702 provides two exceptions to its prohibitions. 

In Int. of H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018) Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Boyd, and Justice Devine joined. Justice Guzman filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Blacklock filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, and Justice Brown joined. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case to evaluate the merits of the Grandparents' petition. The Court held that the The court held that the grandparents had standing to file a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) under Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9). 

Discussion: The Court found that "actual care, control, and possession" meant providing for a child's physical and psychological needs while also guiding and managing their daily activities. The court held that the Grandparents had exercised "actual care, control, and possession" of Heather for the required six-month statutory period, thus establishing their standing to file a petition. The court noted several key facts supporting this conclusion. First, Heather's primary residence was with the Grandparents from birth until she was nearly two years old, and during the six months prior to the petition, she mostly lived with them while spending weekends at her Father's. The Grandparents acted as her primary caregivers, attending to her daily physical and emotional needs, managing her healthcare, and ensuring her well-being. The court emphasized that the Grandparents played a parent-like role in Heather's life, making their involvement substantial.  The Court found that the parents’ ongoing involvement in some decisions did not undermine the Grandparents’ role, as the parents had agreed to this caregiving arrangement, which, though intended to be temporary, had not been revoked.  

The Court distinguished the case from Troxel v. Granville, affirming that the Texas statute applied a higher threshold for nonparent standing than the broader statute struck down in Troxel.  

Dissent: Blacklock argued that the court of appeals' holding that parents had to have given up "actual control" for the grandparents to have standing was proper because it comported with the statute's text and avoided potential encroachment on “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children" from Troxel. (1) Blacklock argued that even if there were to equally valid interpretations, the Court should err on the side that avoid constitutional questions. (22) He argued the majority condensed the statute's three-pronged requirement into a single "parent-like role" criterion. (2) "No one can fully stand in a parent’s shoes unless the parent first steps out of those shoes and walks away." (3) He argued that "control" must be distinct from "care." (7) He argued that deciding who a child will spend time with is an aspect of control but that the parents did not surrender it. (8) Blacklock argued against the majority that the classic understanding of in loco parentis would say that a parent retains control while designating possession. (8-9) He argued that SCOTUS had recognized the importance of parental rights, yet those rights are not well defined. (17-18)  

Background: Heather lived with her maternal grandparents for the first 23 months of her life, with them serving as her primary caretakers for the last eight months. In 2014 the grandparents filed a petition to modify the SAPCR, claiming they had provided actual care and control for over six months, thereby asserting their standing to sue. The father countered this with a plea to dismiss the grandparents’ petition, which the trial court granted. The grandparents appealed, but the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision, asserting that nonparents cannot gain standing without evidence of the parent's unfitness or abdication of their role. The legal issue at hand was whether the grandparents had standing to file a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) under Texas law, which allows nonparents with "actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months" to seek such standing. Both the trial court and court of appeals concluded that the grandparents lacked standing. 

Applicable Law(s): “Section 102.003, entitled ‘General Standing to File Suit,’ enumerates fourteen categories of persons who have standing to file a SAPCR.” (7)  The “Grandparents rely[ied] on subsection (a)(9), which confers such standing on ‘a person, other than a foster parent,[5] who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition.’” (7) 

In re A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. 2019).Justice Blacklock, joined by Justice Devine, concurred in the denial of the petition for review. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding: The Court denied a petition for review of court of appeals decision terminating a father’s of parental rights.

Concurrence: Justice Blacklock concurred but wrote separately to discuss concern with the court of appeals relying on old fashion disciplinary methods in its decision to terminate a father’s parental rights. Justice Blacklock wrote, "This natural parental right [is] a basic civil right of man and far more precious than property rights. (1) “The rigorous ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is one way in which Texas law protects the unique, natural bond between parent and child. The law did not create this bond. The law merely recognizes and respects a bond that already exists by virtue of our human nature. Like the inalienable rights of which the Declaration of Independence speaks, the bond between parent and child was not given by law. We were endowed with it by our Creator.” (1-2) Justice Blacklock concluded, “[i]n this parental-rights termination case, some of the evidence presented at trial and cited by the court of appeals, when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment as it must be on appeal, arguably supports the judgment terminating the petitioner’s parental rights. For that reason, granting this petition would be unlikely to change the outcome. However, other evidence relied on by the court of appeals—concerning the petitioner’s use of traditional disciplinary methods with his daughter—has no relevance in a termination case, in my view. I write separately to caution against use of such evidence as grounds for judicial interference with parental rights." (2-3) The court of appeals’ opinion suggests that these punishments amounted to child abuse justifying the judicial destruction of a family. I disagree." (4) "However far out of favor such traditional disciplinary measures may have fallen in some quarters, a parent’s choice to employ them should be afforded no weight in a termination proceeding…. If reliance on these old-fashioned punishments – and others like them, such as spanking – can be used against parents by a government that seeks to take away their parental rights, then ‘the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children’ is no longer what it once was." (4) "If some judges and juries around the state now believe that punishing children the way previous generations of American children were punished amounts to ‘sordid maltreatment’ justifying government intervention, the legislature may wish to make its views known. The advisability or efficacy of these punishments is not the issue. The issue is whether Texas parents still have the liberty to employ them as they see fit without fearing a knock on the door from Child Protective Services. I believe they do." (5)

In re State, 682 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. 2023). Per Curiam. Justice Devine and Justic Blacklock concurred in the order granting relief. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The Court concluded that the trial court erred when it “issued an order restraining the Attorney General from enforcing the abortion laws against Dr. Karsan[.]” (3) The Court “conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary restraining order.” (7) The Court found that the law specified that an abortion is permissible only when a woman has a life-threatening condition, determined by a physician's "reasonable medical judgment." (2)

Analysis: The court found that while the doctor indicated that the medical necessity exception might apply, they did not clearly assert that the woman's condition was life-threatening as required by law. The Court emphasized that it is the responsibility of medical professionals, not judges, to make these determinations. The court said " [i]f a doctor, using her 'reasonable medical judgment,' decides that a pregnant woman has such a condition, then the exception applies, and Texas law does not prohibit the abortion." (2) "Though the statute affords physicians discretion, it requires more than a doctor’s mere subjective belief. By requiring the doctor to exercise 'reasonable medical judgment,' the Legislature determined that the medical judgment involved must meet an objective standard." (4) These laws reflect the policy choice that the Legislature has made, and the courts must respect that choice. Part of the Legislature’s choice is to permit a significant exception to the general prohibition against abortion. And it has delegated to the medical—rather than the legal—profession the decision about when a woman’s medical circumstances warrant this exception." (1)  

Background: Kate Cox was pregnant when she received a diagnosis regarding the baby. Her husband, Justine, Kate’s doctors and Kate “sue[d] to prevent the enforcement of the Texas laws that generally prohibit abortion.” (1)The trial court "ruled that a prospective abortion would 'fall within the medical exception' to Texas’s abortion laws. Based solely on the verified pleading, it issued an order restraining the Attorney General from enforcing the abortion laws against Dr. Karsan and others related to the case." (3) The State [sought] relief from the trial court’s order." (3)  

Applicable Law(s): The abortion law prohibits abortion except when "in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, the pregnant female . . . has a life-threatening physical condition aggravated by, caused by, or arising from a pregnancy that places the female at risk of death or poses a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function unless the abortion is performed or induced." (2)

In re Salon a La Mode, 629 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2020). Justice Bland participated in the denial of the writ. Justice Blacklock, joined by Justice Guzman, Justice Boyd, and Justice Devine, concurred in the denial of the petition for writ of mandamus. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The Court denied a mandamus petition which argued that COVID-19 restrictions violated Texas statutory law and the Texas Constitution. 

Concurrence: Justice Blacklock argued that global pandemics do not suspend state and federal constitutional provisions (1). "Whether it is strict scrutiny or some other rigorous form of review, courts must identify and apply a legal standard by which to judge the constitutional validity of the government’s anti-virus actions."(2) Justice Blacklock concluded, "[t]his original petition, which challenges several local officials’ coronavirus response measures, should first be presented to the appropriate district courts. The Supreme Court is generally a court of last resort. Our original jurisdiction to issue the requested relief is doubtful, and the petition is presented without supporting affidavits and with no record on which the Court could base its inquiry. Just as other government officials must not exceed their rightful power inextraordinary circumstances, this Court also must not do so. I therefore concur in the denial of the petition." (3).

Background: Case involved the state’s emergency measures enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2020) Chief Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Green, Justice Guzman, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, and Justice Busby joined. Justice Guzman filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann and Justice Busby joined. Justice Boyd and Justice Bland issued opinions concurring in the judgment. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The Court denied the State’s petititon for writ of mandamus. The Court said “we are confident that the Clerks and all election official will comply with the law in good faith.” (2) Additionally, the Court held that lack of immunity to COVID was not a “disability” according to statutory mail-in ballot requirements (2). The Court concluded that it "agree[d] with the State that a lack of immunity to COVID-19 is not itself a 'physical condition' that renders a voter eligible to vote by mail within the meaning of § 82.002(a)." (24)

Concurrence: “Justice Boyd and Justice Bland would hold that a lack of immunity to COVID-19 is a ‘physical condition’ under § 82.002(a), though a voter would not be entitled to vote by mail without a ‘likelihood’ that voting in person would injure the voter’s health.” (21) While acknowledging that certain individuals may face higher risks, they maintain that the overall risk of contracting COVID-19 is low, particularly with measures being taken to ensure safety at polling places. Justice Boyd and Justice Bland “agree[d] with the State that a lack of immunity to COVID-19 is not itself a ‘physical condition’ that renders a voter eligible to vote by mail within the meaning of § 82.002(a).” (24)

Background: The Texas Democratic Party (TDP) and others sued the Secretary of State and the Travis County Clerk, seeking a declaration that the Texas Election Code's provision for voting by mail due to "disability" included voters concerned about social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The TDP argued for a mandatory injunction to ensure mail-in ballots were accepted for those citing COVID-19 as a disability. The trial court granted a temporary injunction, stating that voters without established immunity to the virus met the definition of "disability" under the law. This injunction prevented Travis County from rejecting such ballots and restricted state officials from issuing contrary guidance. The State of Texas appealed the decision, claiming that fear of contracting COVID-19 alone does not qualify as a disability for mail-in voting.

Applicable law:“Chapter 82. Section 82.002(a), entitled ‘Disability’, provides that ‘[a] qualified voter is eligible for early voting by mail if the voter has a sickness or physical condition that prevents the voter from appearing at the polling place on election day without a likelihood of needing personal assistance or of injuring the voter’s health.’” (16)  

Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2020). Signed Per Curiam opinion. Justice Guzman filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann joined. Justice Blacklock filed a concurring opinion. *Involved Key Issue*

Holding(s): The Court held that "[t]he plaintiffs ha[d] not established a probable right to an injunction blocking the October Proclamation. As a result, they were not entitled to a temporary injunction, and the trial court erred in granting that relief. The judgment of the court of appeals [wa]s reversed, and the temporary injunction issued by the trial court [wa]s dissolved." (17) Thus, the Court denied the petition for a temporary injunction against the governor’s requirement that there only be one mail-in drop off site per county. (6) The Court found that the governor’s proclamations had expanded rather than impaired voting rights. (6) The Court held that the Governor was permitted by the Disaster Act’s emergency powers to amend his earlier emergency proclamations even if the content was not directly tied to the disaster. (7-8) The Court held that the October Proclamation placed a “lesser burden” on the right to vote, which according to precedent does not trigger strict scrutiny. (11) The Court held that disparate impact claims due to county’s geographic size differences were not relevant because county size also had many impacts on elections under normal circumstances (16). 

Blacklock's Concurrence: Blacklock argued that in an ideal world the legislature should decide how elections operate, but that the pandemic caused the governor to step in. (1-2) The question before the court was whether in non-ideal circumstances it was the role of the governor or the court to determine public policy. The court found it was not empowered to second-guess the duly elected governor. (2) He argued that plaintiffs seek to subject the governor's overall expansion of the franchise to a federal voting rights standard. (4) He argued that courts have no business stepping into cases such as these unless strict scrutiny applied.(5) 

Guzman’s concurrence: Guzman argued that the judiciary’s function is only to say what the law is and not what it should be. (2) He argued that the dispositive question in the case was whether in expanding ballot access the governor harmed voting rights to which the answer was no. (3)

Background: On March 13, 2020, the Texas Governor declared a disaster due to COVID-19, triggering emergency powers to alter state regulations. This included changes to mail-in voting procedures for the 2020 election. On July 27, the Governor allowed voters to deliver mail-in ballots in person before Election Day, extending the hand-delivery period. However, on October 1, a proclamation limited this delivery to a single designated location per county prior to Election Day, while still allowing multiple sites on Election Day itself. The October Proclamation was challenged in federal court, but the Fifth Circuit upheld it, stating it still expanded voting opportunities compared to prior law. Plaintiffs later filed a state lawsuit arguing the October Proclamation overstepped the Governor's authority, infringed voting rights, and disproportionately affected voters in larger counties. A trial court temporarily blocked the October Proclamation, citing increased risks and burdens on voters.