Judicial Votes Count Candidate Questionnaire

Regarding partisan judicial elections Stewart said:

• "The politicization of the court does not serve any legitimate purpose." 
• "I think things are getting very politically partisan. It has no place in the judiciary. And I think it will serve to further erode confidence in the judiciary."
• In regard to running as a Democratic she said "It shouldn’t mean anything, because the fact that I’m running as a Democrat cannot tell you how I’m going to vote on an issue, because every judge in the state of Ohio, Democrat or Republican, takes the exact same oath.  It’s the oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United States and the Constitution and the laws in the state of Ohio. Now that doesn’t mean that we can’t differ on interpretations, but our oath is to uphold the law. So if the law says what it says, then it should be pretty plain.  ‘Liberal versus conservative’ shouldn’t have any place (on the court) because there are certain rules and standards that guide our review of cases."

See: Hill, Crystal. "Why Ohio Supreme Court Justice Melody Stewart Would Prefer Not to Run as a Democrat." Democracy Docket, 12 Sept. 2024.

See also:  "Ohio Supreme Court Justice Warns Against Politicizing the Courts." Democracy Docket, 15 Sept. 2024, YouTube. 

Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-2787. Joined Donnelly's dissent.

Holding(s): The Court affirmed the court of appeals decision finding that whether a food supplier breached a duty of care hinges on whether consumers could reasonably expect an injurious substance in the food. The Court found that this expectation is influenced by whether the substance is natural or foreign to the food. The Court held that the Twelfth District appropriately applied a blended analysis, concluding that the bone found in the boneless wing was natural to chicken and could reasonably be expected by consumers. The court emphasized that the term "boneless wing" does not guarantee the absence of bones, and thus, the defendants did not breach their duty of care. The Court declined to adopt a broad standard for food negligence cases finding that food negligence should not be treated differently from other negligence cases during summary judgment. 

Dissent: The dissent stated, "[t]he result in this case is another nail in the coffin of the American jury system." (11) It found, "the majority declare[d] as a matter of law that no reasonable person could consider the facts of this case and reach a conclusion contrary to the one it reache[d]." (11) The dissent argued that "[t]his is, of course, patently untrue given that [three] justices of this court dissent[ed] from the majority’s judgment." (11) The dissent emphasized the need to reaffirm the "reasonable-expectation" test established in Allen which focused on what consumers could reasonably expect when purchasing food. The justice criticized the majority for adopting a "foreign-natural" test that limited liability based on the classification of substances in food, thereby undermining consumer protection. The dissent insisted that a jury should have been allowed to evaluate the facts, as jurors possessed common sense and better represented community expectations regarding food labeled as "boneless." It disputed the majority's assertion that Berkheimer should have guarded against the bone’s presence, arguing that this determination was best left to a jury. Furthermore, the dissent asserted that consumers generally expected "boneless" items to be free of bones, and this expectation should have been legally recognized. Ultimately, the dissent called for a reversal of the majority’s decision, advocating for a jury trial where Berkheimer's claim could have been fairly assessed under the reasonable-expectation standard.

Background: Michael Berkheimer filed a lawsuit against a restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm after experiencing serious medical issues due to a chicken bone getting lodged in his throat while eating a "boneless wing." The trial court found that the defendants were not negligent, a decision that was upheld by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. Berkheimer argued that the critical question was whether he could reasonably expect to find a bone in a boneless wing and believed this issue should be left for a jury to decide. He urged the court to adopt the "reasonable expectation" test for determining negligence in food safety. Berkheimer contended the Twelfth District incorrectly applied the "foreign-natural" test instead of this standard. Berkheimer argued that negligence cases involving food should allow for jury consideration of whether consumers can reasonably expect an injurious substance, especially when a seller claims it has been removed. Berkheimer argued that negligence cases involving food should allow for jury consideration of whether consumers can reasonably expect an injurious substance, especially when a seller claims it has been removed.

Applicable Law(s): 

• "'[I]n order to establish actionable negligence, one must show the existence of a duty, a breach of the duty, and an injury resulting proximately therefrom.' Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1984)[.]" (5)
• "With respect to a sale of food, this court has framed the question of negligence as whether the seller, 'in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that [the food] was unfit to eat.' Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 251 (1960)." (5)
• The court discusses two primary tests used to assess negligence: the foreign-natural test, which determines if the harmful substance is foreign to the food, and the reasonable-expectation test, which evaluates whether a reasonable consumer would expect to encounter such a substance.
• "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate 'when an examination of all relevant materials filed in the action reveals that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Smith v. McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C)." (8)

State v. Nettles, 2020-Ohio-768, 159 Ohio St. 3d 180, 149 N.E.3d 496. Signed DeWine's majority opinion.

Holding(s): The Court held that wiretap "interceptions" occur both at the location of the cell phone and at the location of the government agent listening in on the call (1). Appellant claimed that police's warrant from the county he lived in was no good for the wiretap because they listened from another county (1). Intercept is given a broad definition by the statute, which permitted the police's warrant to cover their action (3). Applied state law to the construction of a statute (“the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.”)(5).

Analysis: The court analyzed R.C. 2933.53(A), which allowed an official to apply for an interception warrant in the county where the interception occurred or where the interception device was installed. It noted that the wiretap statutes did not clearly define where an interception was deemed to occur but broadly defined "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication" (R.C. 2933.51(C)). The court explained that "aural" acquisition happened at the location where the communication was first heard, referencing United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir.1992), and thus confirming that Lucas County had jurisdiction since that was where DEA agents overheard Nettles's calls.

Next the court emphasized that the definition of "intercept" includes both "aural" and "other acquisition," indicating that interception can occur in multiple ways. It explained that when the government, with assistance from phone companies, captures and redirects a call, this constitutes a nonaural form of acquisition that happens the moment a speaker initiates the call. Thus, interception occurs both at the location where the phone is used and at the listening post. The court rejected Nettles's argument that interception happens only at the listening point, noting that this perspective overlooks the concept of "other acquisition" and fails to consider modern interception technologies. Additionally, the court referred to R.C. 1.43(A), which states that in statutory interpretation, "the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular." Consequently, it concluded that Nettles's calls were intercepted in both Lucas and Sandusky Counties.

Applicable Law: "R.C. 2933.53(A), says that a warrant allowing law enforcement to listen in on telephone conversations may be issued by the common pleas court in a county 'in which the interception is to take place.'” (1)

Background: The case arose after a DEA agent obtained a warrant to intercept the cell phone calls of Nettles, a suspected drug trafficker. The warrant was issued by the common pleas court in Sandusky County, Nettles's home county, with the understanding that the calls would be intercepted there and monitored by agents in Toledo, Lucas County. Following the interception, Nettles was arrested and charged with multiple counts of drug trafficking. Before his trial, he moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrant, challenging the jurisdiction of the Sandusky County court and arguing that the warrant should have been issued in Lucas County, where the calls were actually listened to. The trial court denied his motion, leading to Nettles’s conviction and a lengthy prison sentence. The Sixth District Court of Appeals upheld his convictions, affirming that the interception occurred both at the location of the phone and at the listening post. Nettles then appealed, contending that under R.C. 2933.53, an interception occurs only at the listening point.

State ex rel. One Pers. One Vote v. LaRose, 2023-Ohio-1992.  Stewart concurred in both Donnelly's and Brunner's dissents.

Holding(s): The court held that the August 8, 2023, special election called by General Assembly in Senate Joint Resolution 2(SJR 2) is authorized by Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and therefore denies the writ. (14).  The Court concluded that "[t]he General Assembly’s valid exercise of its constitutional power granted in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution overrides any election statute that would otherwise prohibit the special election called for in the General Assembly’s joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment for submission to the state’s electors." (12) The Court also concluded, "R.C. 3501.40 cannot restrain the secretary from proceeding with a special election that the General Assembly has validly prescribed under the Ohio Constitution. A statute that conflicts with the General Assembly’s constitutional power under Article XVI, Section 1 to authorize a special election on a certain day is unenforceable to prevent the special election." (13) 

Donnelly's Dissent: Justice Donnelly's dissented arguing that the General Assembly's attempt to hold a special election on August 8, 2023, violated its own laws established in 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 458, which prohibits such elections in August. He argued that rather than amending the law to facilitate this special election, the Assembly is seeking judicial approval to circumvent its own statutory framework. Donnelly emphasizes that while the Ohio Constitution grants the General Assembly broad authority over election rules, this authority does not include the right to violate existing laws that it has enacted. He asserts that the Secretary of State is obligated to follow these laws and, therefore, should not present the proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot. Overall Donnelly's argued General Assembly must adhere to its own established rules regarding special elections, that Article XVI, Section 1 does not grant it the power to disregard these restrictions, and that the Secretary of State has a duty to enforce existing laws by striking the amendment from the ballot. He called for the court to grant the writ of mandamus sought by the Relators, asserting that the majority's decision improperly allows the Assembly to sidestep its legal obligations. Donnelly further found that the General Assembly is bound by Article II, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution, which requires it to amend or repeal laws through formal bills, not by joint resolution. 

Justice Donnelly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Ohio Constitution, particularly regarding the General Assembly's authority to schedule special elections. He argued that the majority oversimplifies the analysis by presenting it as a two-step process: first, that the General Assembly can "prescribe" whether constitutional amendments are presented at special or general elections, and second, that it can schedule special elections whenever it wishes, even in contradiction to its own laws. 

Donnelly emphasized that this reasoning skips essential analytical steps that are necessary to ensure the limits of governmental power are respected. He argued that courts have a duty to scrutinize actions by the legislative branch to prevent any overreach. According to him, the judicial branch must adhere to a more comprehensive analysis that considers the history and context of Article XVI, as well as the specific statutory provisions that govern elections. 

Furthermore, Donnelly insisted that the term "prescribe" should not be interpreted to allow the General Assembly to override existing laws it has enacted, particularly those established by R.C. 3501.01, which govern the dates for special elections. He argued that the Assembly’s attempt to create new rules for a special election through S.J.R. 2 cannot supersede the rules it has previously established. 

Brunner’s Dissent: Brunner also critiqued the lead opinion's interpretation of the word "prescribe" in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, arguing that it misinterprets the legislature's authority regarding election dates for proposed constitutional amendments. Brunner argued that the General Assembly can only choose between a special or general election as defined by existing law, not create new election dates that conflict with statutes prohibiting certain elections, such as August elections.  

Brunner emphasized that the legislature’s powers are bound by law and cannot circumvent existing statutes through joint resolutions. Brunner argued that the majority's interpretation undermines statutory provisions and allows the General Assembly to ignore the law. Brunner also highlighted that, while constitutional rights are paramount, they are not absolute, and the court must uphold existing laws unless proven unconstitutional. 

Ultimately, Brunner argued that the General Assembly must adhere to statutory restrictions on election dates, and any proposed amendments not compliant with these laws should be struck down by the court. 

Applicable Law(s):

• “Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution empowers the General Assembly to submit legislatively proposed constitutional amendments to a vote of the people when three-fifths of both houses of the General Assembly pass a resolution calling for such a vote. The provision states in part: ‘Either branch of the General Assembly may propose amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, and shall be filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days before the date of the election at which they are to be submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection. They shall be submitted on a separate ballot without party designation of any kind, at either a special or a general election as the General Assembly may prescribe.’” (2) 
• “H.B. 458 amended R.C. 3501.01(D) as follows to provide that special elections be held “only” on certain days specified in the statute: ‘A special election may be held only on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May or November, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in August in accordance with section 3501.022 of the Revised Code, or on the day authorized by a particular municipal or county charter for the holding of a primary election, except that in any year in which a presidential primary election is held, no special election shall be held in May, except as authorized by a municipal or county charter, but may be held on the third Tuesday after the first Monday in March.’” (3)    
• "R.C. 3501.40 states: 'Except as permitted under section 161.09 of the Revised Code [emergency postponement of elections], and notwithstanding  any other contrary provision of the Revised Code, no public official shall cause an election to be conducted other than in the time, place, and manner prescribed by the Revised Code. As used in this section, “public official” means any elected or appointed officer, employee, or agent of the state or any political subdivision, board, commission, bureau, or other public body established by law." (12-13) 

State ex rel. Ohioans United for Reprod. Rts. v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 2023-Ohio-3325, 174 Ohio St. 3d 285, 237 N.E.3d 1. Per Curiam. Authored a concurrence in part and dissent in part.

Holding(s): The Court held, "that the term 'citizens of the State' in the ballot language is misleading. The Court found the language misleading primarily because the phrase "citizens of the State of Ohio" could confuse voters about who the amendment actually restricts. [The court] therefore grant[ed] a limited writ of mandamus ordering the secretary to reconvene the ballot board forthwith and ordering the board to adopt ballot language that accurately describes that the proposed amendment regulates actions of the 'State.'" The court denied all other claims of the "relators." (2) 

Analysis: The Court found the term "citizens of the State of Ohio" misleading for the average voter. Citing Markus v. Trumbull County Board of Elections, the court emphasized that ballot language must promote an informed vote. The use of "citizens" might imply that individual citizens could be restricted from actions regarding abortion, which the Court found contradicts the amendment's intent. The court noted that the Ohio Constitution does not use "citizens of the State" interchangeably with "the State" and identified instances where the two terms differ. Ultimately, the court concluded that the ballot language inaccurately represented the amendment, violating Article XVI, Section 1's requirement for clear and accurate ballot language.

Stewart's Conurrence in part and dissent in part: Stewart "concur[red] in the portion of the judgment that grants the requested writ of mandamus in part and orders respondents to change the ballot language from 'the citizens of the State of Ohio' to 'the State of Ohio,' but I would go further and grant the requested writ in its entirety. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part." The Relators "contend that the ballot language misleads voters about (1) the right the amendment would create, (2) whom the amendment would restrict, (3) whether the amendment would protect an individual’s right to continue a pregnancy, (4) the scope of a treating physician’s discretion to determine 'fetal viability,; and (5) how the amendment would limit regulation by the state." (5)

Deters concurrence and dissent: Deters wrote, "I agree with much of the lead opinion’s analysis. Where I part ways, however, is with the opinion’s characterization of respondent Ohio Ballot Board’s use of the term 'citizens of the State.' The majority concludes that the term is misleading. It is not. Nothing in the ballot language would lead the average voter to understand that the proposed amendment would curb his or her individual right to object to abortion. So while I concur with the majority’s judgment denying the writ in most respects, I dissent from the majority’s judgment granting a limited writ[.]" (43) Deters found when "citizens of the State" is read in context that, "it seem[ed] unlikely that a voter would conclude that the bullet points using the term 'citizens of the State' describe the amendment’s effect on his or her individual rights." Overall, Deter's agreed with the majority's partial denial of the writ but disagreed with its granting the writ based on its finding that "citizens of the State" is misleading.

Background: On November 7, 2023, Ohio voters decided on Issue 1, a proposed constitutional amendment titled “The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety.” The case involved concerns about the ballot language approved by the Ohio Ballot Board. Ohioans United for Reproductive Rights, a coalition advocating for Issue 1, argued that the language was misleading and contained omissions. "Relators argue[d] that the ballot language’s use of the phrase 'citizens of the State of Ohio” instead of the “State”—as used and defined in the proposed amendment itself—distorts the amendment’s text and meaning. They argue that by using the phrase “citizens of the State,” the ballot language “converts a right held by the citizens against the State into a restriction enforced by the State against the citizens.” (11)

They sought a court order to either use the full text of the amendment or to create appropriate ballot language. According to the Ohio Constitution, ballot language must accurately convey the proposal's substance. The Court can only invalidate the language if it misled voters, thus the issue was whether the language clearly informed voters about the issue and whether it was improperly argumentative. If defects were found in the ballot language, the court would consider their overall impact on constitutional compliance.The court concluded that that the phrase “citizens of the State” was misleading and ordered the Ballot Board to revise the language to accurately reflect that the amendment regulated state actions, but denied other requests from the relators. 

Applicable Law(s): 

• "Under Article II, Section 1g, the ballot board shall prescribe the ballot language “in the same manner, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as apply to issues submitted by the general assembly pursuant to Section 1 of Article XVI of [the Ohio] constitution.” (2)
•  Article XVI, Section 1 provides: The ballot language for such proposed amendments shall be prescribed by a majority of the Ohio ballot board, consisting of the secretary of state and four other members, who shall be designated in a manner prescribed by law and not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party. The ballot language shall properly identify the substance of the proposal to be voted upon. The ballot need not contain the full text nor a condensed text of the proposal. The board shall also prepare an explanation of the proposal, which may include its purpose and effects, and shall certify the ballot language and the explanation to the secretary of state not later than seventy-five days before the election. The ballot language and the explanation shall be available for public inspection in the office of the secretary of state." (2-3)
• "The proposed amendment would: 
  • Prohibit the citizens of the State of Ohio from directly or indirectly burdening, penalizing, or prohibiting abortion before an unborn child is determined to be viable, unless the State demonstrates that it is using the least restrictive means
  • Only allow the citizens of the State of Ohio to prohibit an abortion after an unborn child is determined by a pregnant woman’s treating physician to be viable and only if the physician does not consider the abortion necessary to protect the pregnant woman’s life or health."

Gabbard v. Madison Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2021-Ohio-2067, 165 Ohio St. 3d 390, 179 N.E.3d 1169 v. Madison Local School District Board of Education. Signed O'Connor's majority opinion. 

Holding(s): The Court "affirm[ed] the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals." (20) The Court held that a Madison School Board resolution enabling teachers to carry firearms on school property did not comply with Ohio law. (2) The Court held that the plain meaning of "other position" included school employees. (9) The Court "conclude[d] that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) d[id] not clearly constitute a legislative grant of power for school boards to authorize their employees to go armed so long as the employees undergo whatever training a board might deem advisable." (16) Thus, the Court concluded that "R.C. 109.78(D) prohibits a school from employing a person who goes armed while on duty in his or her job unless the employee has satisfactorily completed an approved basic peace-officer-training program or has 20 years of experience as a peace officer. And R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) does not provide schools with a mechanism to circumvent that requirement." (19) 

Background: A school "board ... adopted a 'firearm authorization policy' for the purpose of implementing the April 2018 resolution. The policy states that pursuant to R.C. 2923.122, the board will authorize up to ten school employees designated by the superintendent to carry concealed firearms in a school safety zone. It specifies that to be so designated, an employee must maintain an Ohio concealed-handgun license, satisfactorily complete at least 24 hours of response-to-active-shooter training, hold a handgun-qualification certificate, receive training regarding mental preparation to respond to active killers, and pass a criminal-background check and mental-health exam. Neither the resolution nor the firearm-authorization policy requires designated persons to satisfy the training-or-experience requirement set out in R.C. 109.78(D)." (5) The issue was whether the training that R.C. 109.78(D) requires of people other than police officers and security guards who go armed while on duty applied to teachers, administrators, and other school staff whom a board of education has authorized to carry a deadly weapon in a school safety zone. (4) Appellant board argued that R.C. 109.78(D) applied specifically to security personnel, while appellee parents argued it applied to all armed staff. (9) 

Applicable Law(s): 

• "R.C. 109.78(D), provides: No public or private educational institution or superintendent of the state highway patrol shall employ a person as a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty, who has not received a certificate of having satisfactorily completed an approved basic peace officer training program, unless the person has completed twenty years of active duty as a peace officer." (3) 
• R.C. 2923.122 prohibits any person from knowingly conveying or possessing a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone, which includes schools, school buildings, school premises, school activities, and school buses. However, the statute outlines several exceptions to this prohibition. "[A] law enforcement officer who is authorized to carry deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance, a security officer employed by a board of education or governing body of a school during the time that the security officer is on duty pursuant to that contract of employment, or any other person who has written authorization from the board of education or governing body of a school to convey deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance into a school safety zone or to possess a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone and who conveys or possesses the deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in accordance with that authorization." (3-4)  

DeWine dissent: Correct conclusion. DeWine argued that the majority forsook the plain meaning of R.C. 109.78(D), and adopted a reading at odds with the way ordinary English speakers would understand the statute. (37) He argued that teachers could not be included in the third category of R.C. 109.78(D) because they are not a “position in which such person goes armed while on duty." (38) He argued that the majority erred by interpreting each word in isolation. (38) He further argued that the canon of ejusdem generis should be applied, which reads "other position" as tied to the kind described earlier in R.C. 109.78(D) (i.e. security personnel). (39-40) He argued the majority was mistaken to say ejusdem generis favored its meaning. (41-42) He found that the majority mistakenly relied upon the “presumption of consistent usage" canon in its point about R.C. 109.78(D) not repeating "in police capacies" because that canon admittedly relies on a level of perfection in drafting that is rarely achieved according to Scalia and Garner, and the canon is not strong enough to bear the contextual evidence that the majority's interpretation was incorrect (45). 

State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-1752. Justice Stewart wrote for the court with respect to Parts I and II(B) and announced the judgment of the court with respect to Parts II(A) and III. Forbes and Donnelly joined. 

Holding(s): The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the appellate court erred in both determinations. 

Analysis: The Court found that the adult court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor, relying on the prior versions of R.C. 2151.23(H) and precedent established in Smith and Burns. The Court found the cases support the conclusion that if a juvenile court finds probable cause for certain acts, the adult court can proceed with related charges, even if those specific charges were not named in the juvenile court. In Smith, the court established that an adult court lacks jurisdiction if the juvenile court found no probable cause for a charge. Burns elaborated that charges can arise in adult court as long as they are rooted in the acts from the juvenile complaint. Here the juvenile court found probable cause for complicity to commit murder, and the felony-murder charge was connected to the same facts. Thus, the Court found jurisdiction was valid under the law.

Additionally, the Court concluded that Taylor’s statements to police were admissible, overturning the court of appeals' decision The Court found that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached at the time of interrogation, and any waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights following Miranda warnings was valid. The appeals court had ruled that these statements violated Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which the Supreme Court clarified does not attach until a criminal prosecution has commenced. Citing Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, the court noted that the initiation of a prosecution occurs with formal charges or arraignment, not at the time of interrogation. Since the juvenile complaint against Taylor was filed several hours after his interrogation, the court found that his Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached. Additionally, the Court found under Montejo v. Louisiana, a defendant can waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Taylor had been informed of his Miranda rights, which include the right to counsel, and he agreed to waive these rights, thus the Court found he waived his Sixth Amendment claims.

The court also addressed the due-process right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is recognized in juvenile proceedings. This right is codified in R.C. 2151.352, granting juveniles the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. The Court found, however since Taylor was an adult during the interrogation, the due-process right to counsel did not attach until the juvenile complaint was filed, which occurred after his police statements.

Kennedy Concurring in part and concurring in judgement only: Justice Kennedy's agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erred in concluding Taylor's statements to police should have been suppressed. He agreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the Sixth Amendment, affirming that the right to counsel had not yet attached during the interrogation. However, Kennedy disagreed with the majority regarding the jurisdiction of the General Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas over Taylor's felony murder charge. 

He argued that while the majority found that the court had jurisdiction based on previous cases (Smith and Burns), that these decisions imposed new limitations not present in the plain language of former R.C. 2151.23(H). He argued that the statute allowed the adult court to have jurisdiction over any offenses related to the juvenile's actions, regardless of whether probable cause had been found in juvenile court. Kennedy emphasized that the statutory language did not restrict the adult court's jurisdiction to only charges where probable cause had been established, nor did it limit the court to charges explicitly mentioned in the juvenile complaint. He asserted that the majority’s reliance on Smith and Burns was unwarranted and called for their overruling, arguing that these decisions contradicted the legislative intent of the bindover statutes.

Background: In 2016, Straughter was fatally shot. The policed "discovered the gun rail of a Smith & Wesson M&P semiautomatic pistol, live rounds, shell casings, and a key fob that unlocked a nearby Chevrolet Malibu[]" lassociated with Taylor. Taylor, 17 at the time, invoked his right to counsel after he was taken into custody and read his Miranda rights."Despite his invocation, the detective continued speaking with and questioning Taylor, and collected a DNA sample and conducted a gunshot residue test." (3) The evidence later linked him to the crime scene. Law enforcement know Taylor was represented by an attorney. "Without his attorney present, Taylor waived his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, answered questions, gave conflicting stories, and eventually claimed that he had witnessed another person, Damion Wade, shoot Straughter." (3) Taylor was charged with murder and the case was transferred to adult court after the juvenile court found probable cause. The adult court suppressed Taylor's initial DNA sample and statements but admitted statements given on December 12, 2016. Taylor was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to 18 years to life in prison.The Tenth District Court of Appeals vacated Taylor’s conviction, ruling that the adult court lacked jurisdiction over the felony murder charge and that Taylor’s December 12 statements should have been suppressed due to a Sixth Amendment violation. The appellate court found that Taylor’s right to counsel had attached by the time of his December interrogation and that he had not knowingly waived this right. In this discretionary appeal, the court reviewed two issues: whether the appellate court was correct in determining that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (adult court) lacked jurisdiction over Taylor for felony murder, and whether Taylor’s statements to police should have been suppressed.