Bobby Chamberlin

"Chamberlin’s approach to deciding a case is straightforward. 'Apply the law to the facts of the case to reach a just and proper decision,' he said."

Notable Cases:

• Hines v. Caldwell, 384 So. 3d 1238 (Miss. 2024). Concurred in Beams' opinion. The Court initially held that “[t]he chancellor erred by awarding permanent relief without a hearing.” (5) The Court reasoned that “[d]ivesting and dismissing CPS from the case is permanent relief. Permanent relief cannot be done without a hearing, even under the guise of a temporary order.” (5) “In B.A.D., this Court held the chancellor erred by to Finnegan, the natural parent, ‘without any on-the-record-findings.’” (5) “[I]n Robison v. Lanford, this Court held, ‘[w]e cannot properly review a chancellor’s judgment without full knowledge of all the evidence the chancellor considered when making the judgment.’” (6) “Here, the chancellor did not make any on-the-record findings because he did not hold a hearing. Without a record or evidence, this Court has nothing to review. Accordingly, we reverse the temporary order, which granted permanent relief, and we remand the case for further proceedings.” (6-7) The Court further noted that “durable legal custody [wa]s not an appropriate award after a termination of parental rights[,]” because “the natural parents retain residual rights and responsibilities as to the child.” (7) notes: was it dicta for the Court to note that awarding durable legal custody was inappropriate when it was not an issue before the court? 
• Watson v. Oppenheim, 301 So. 3d 37 (Miss. 2020). En banc. Concurred. “Six Plaintiffs brought suit in the Hinds County Chancery Court on August 26, 2020, through an amended complaint,1 seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the absentee-ballot provision under Mississippi law and its most recent addition in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” (1) “The matter before us presents only a question of law concerning the chancery court’s interpretation of Section 23-15-713(d) in the Plaintiffs’ suit for declaratory relief. As with all questions of law, we review the chancery court’s decision de novo.” (6) “We find that the chancery court’s order erred to the extent it declared that Section 25- 15-713(d) “permits any voter with pre-existing conditions that cause COVID-19 to present a greater risk of severe illness or death to vote by absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Having a preexisting condition that puts a voter at a higher risk does not automatically create a temporary disability for absentee-voting purposes.” (7) “The Legislature addressed the COVID-19 pandemic and amended Section 23-15- 713(d) on July 8, 2020, to provide that, “‘temporary physical disability’ shall include any qualified elector who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 during the year 2020 or is caring for a dependent who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 . . . .” H.B. 1521, Reg. Sess., 2020 Miss. Laws ch.__, § 6.” (7) “Had the Legislature intended to allow a voter to vote absentee based on a physician’s recommendation, it would have provided so accordingly with plain language.” (8) 
  
• Ward v. Colom, 253 So. 3d 265 (Miss. 2018). En Banc. Concurred and wrote separate concurrence. The court held that the orders from the Chancery were facially unconstitutional, defying existing Mississippi statutory and case law and accordingly were vacated. The court concluded that the orders were “nullius juris–of no legal force.” (3) The Court concluded that, “the chancellors’ orders, as they currently [were] written, could never be constitutional [because] [t]he Mississippi Constitution vests only the Legislature with the authority to regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons. The orders at issue usurp[ed] that power.” (4) The Court concluded that Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7(2) was not ambiguous. The court found that “[t]he parties have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7 is unconstitutional. (9) The Court found that, “[t]he ‘inherent power’ of Mississippi courts, which is limited by our Constitution, lends no support to the dissenting justices’ opinions that the statute is unconstitutional.” (9) The Court concluded that when, “[a]pplying a plain reading of Section 97-37-7 to the orders at issue, the chancellors effectively repealed a statute as applied to the seven courthouses of the Fourteenth Judicial District, which is, ipso facto, a violation of Mississippi law.” (9) Standard of review: When interpreting legislation the Court “decides whether the statute is ambiguous.” (8) “If it is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles of statutory construction.” (8) Analysis: “Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Mississippi Constitution establish clear lines of demarcation among the three branches of government.” (3) “[W]hen the executive branch or legislative branch has been properly delegated a power, the judiciary is without authority to assume that power.” (3) The Court stated that, “[w]ithout equivocation, the Legislature is the branch of government that the citizens of Mississippi chose to regulate or forbid concealed weapons.” (4) Issues: 1) What is the authority of judges to exercise control over security issues beyond the four walls of the courtroom itself? 2) Whether the judiciary has the inherent authority to exercise control of security extending beyond the four walls of a courtroom. 3) Whether Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7(2) prohibits judges from controlling courthouse security.  Specifically, what is the definition of “courtrooms during a judicial proceeding,” and does that definition either allow or prohibit judges from exercising control of security beyond the four walls of a specific courtroom while court is in session? 4) If Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7(2) does prohibit judges from exercising control over courthouse security, whether it violates the separation of powers doctrine. Facts: “In 2011, the Mississippi Legislature amended Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7, granting enhanced concealed-carry licensees the privilege of carrying a concealed firearm in the courthouses of this state, save for courtrooms, which the Legislature left within the province of judges.” (1) “[T]hree chancellors of the Fourteenth Chancery District, on their own motion, issued a court order prohibiting enhanced concealed- carry licensees from possessing a firearm in and around courthouse buildings of the Fourteenth District.” (2) “The statute specifically exempts “courtrooms during a judicial proceeding,” and further states that ‘[t]his section shall in no way interfere with the right of a trial judge to restrict the carrying of firearms in the courtroom.’” (8) 
  
• King v. Mississippi Mil. Dep't, 245 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2018). Concurred . The Court affirmed the circuit court holding that while King may be considered a state service employee as defined by the Legislature, the Adjutant General, by virtue of three statutory provisions, is not subject to review by the Board. (2) Facts:  Cindy W. King's employment termination by the Adjutant General of the Mississippi Military Department was appealed to the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board. The Department challenged the Board's jurisdiction, citing Mississippi Code Section 33-3-11, which allows the Adjutant General to remove employees at his discretion. King argued she was a state service employee under Mississippi Code Section 25-9-107 and cited Section 25-9-129, a remedial statute, to assert the Board's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the dismissal of King's appeal. Issue: the Court reviews the decision of an administrative agency to determine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, was beyond the  agency’s power to adopt, or was violative of a constitutional or statutory provision.(4)Standard of Review: The court abandoned the old standard of review giving deference to agency interpretations of statutes.(7) Moreover, in deciding no longer to give deference to agency interpretations, we step fully into the role the Constitution of 1890 provides for the courts and the courts alone, to interpret statutes. (7) Analysis:  In her defense, King invoked Mississippi Code Section 25-9-107, which defines a state service employee, and Section 25-9-129, which specifies a remedy for a state service employee. (8)  “[W]henever potentially conflicting statutes are at issue, . . . in order to ascertain legislative intent, we employ rules of statutory construction and look to stare decisis for guidance.” (9) Lenoir v. Madison Cty., 641 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 1994)    Applying the canon of statutory interpretation that a specific statute will control over a general one, the court agreed with the department. Held that Section 33-3-11 is more specific because it directly addresses the termination of Department employees.  AFFIRMED.  The Conclusion is correct because the courts, in their decision to  no longer give deference to agency interpretations of statutes, applied the  judicial canon of statutory interpretation to determine which state statute was most appropriate.