Dawn H. Beam

Posted to Justice Beam's campaign Facebook page with attached video:

• "... Justice Beam has strong Christian beliefs and would be the first to say 'I can’t even walk without You holding my hand.'"

Justice Beam authored "The Fundamental Rights of Parents in an Ever-Changing World". Mississippi Law Journal, July 2024.. Excerpts from  "The Fundamental Rights of Parents in an Ever-Changing World":

•  "While the fundamental rights of parents are foundational to family law, I believe these rights are also sacred to our society and of the utmost importance in holding steadfast for the sake of our children."
• "More than twenty years have passed since the United States Supreme Court’s Troxel v. Granville decision reinforced an elevated view of parents’ fundamental rights, reaffirming more than a half-century’s worth of Supreme Court precedent."
• Artificial insemination is also becoming increasingly relevant. Following Obergefell v. Hodges, our court addressed same-sex parents’ fundamental rights and reproductive technology in Strickland v. Day. Our court assessed whether anonymous sperm donors, whose donations were used by then-married women for artificial insemination, possess parental rights over children born from their donations.39 We concluded that there was no basis to warrant parental rights to anonymous sperm donors. Instead, we found a strong presumption of parentage for both then-married women, ascertainable from ample evidence that they both intentionally agreed to have a child through artificial insemination as that child’s equal co-parents."
• "Even now, after more than one hundred years since Meyer, the fundamental rights of parents are foundational to so much in our society, and the United States Constitution, in which these fundamental rights have their roots, is not changing. Parental rights are “perhaps the oldest of the [recognized] fundamental liberty interests.
• "My role on the Mississippi Supreme Court involves upholding the federal and state Constitutions, promoting justice, and ensuring parental rights are protected. As we advance, the challenge to the court is to look at our Constitution, keeping the child’s best interest as a critical consideration when faced with social changes that bring novel and complex litigation."

Posted to Justice Beam's campaign Facebook page:

• "Justice Beam serves on the Supreme Court because she believes it is God’s will. She loved, loved helping people as a lawyer"
  
• "Frequently people ask me which job did you like the best- lawyer, judge, or Supreme Court Justice. I look back on the blessing of adoptions and life changing events and the answer is easy. I serve on the Supreme Court because I believe it is God’s will. My greatest joy was seeing God work as a lawyer just seeing Him work every day. These folks pictured here know how God can show up and show out!!!"
  

Posted to Justice Beams campaign Facebook page, "Justice Beam has served 8+ years on the Supreme Court with a record of strict construction of the Constitution. However, if you are on the fence with your vote check out her granddaughter’s plea!"

Hines v. Caldwell, 384 So. 3d 1238 (Miss. 2024). Authored opinion.

Background: The Court held that “[t]he chancellor erred by awarding permanent relief without a hearing.” (5) The Court reasoned that “[d]ivesting and dismissing CPS from the case is permanent relief. Permanent relief cannot be done without a hearing, even under the guise of a temporary order.” (5) “In B.A.D., this Court held the chancellor erred by to Finnegan, the natural parent, ‘without any on-the-record-findings.’” (5) “[I]n Robison v. Lanford, this Court held, ‘[w]e cannot properly review a chancellor’s judgment without full knowledge of all the evidence the chancellor considered when making the judgment.’” (6) “Here, the chancellor did not make any on-the-record findings because he did not hold a hearing. Without a record or evidence, this Court has nothing to review. Accordingly, [the Court] reverse[d] the temporary order, which granted permanent relief, and ...remand[ed] the case for further proceedings.” (6-7) The Court further noted that “durable legal custody [wa]s not an appropriate award after a termination of parental rights[,]” because “the natural parents retain residual rights and responsibilities as to the child.” (7) 

Watson v. Oppenheim, 301 So. 3d 37 (Miss. 2020). En banc. Authored by Beam.

Holding(s): “[The Court] f[ou]nd that the chancery court’s order erred to the extent it declared that Section 25- 15-713(d) “permits any voter with pre-existing conditions that cause COVID-19 to present a greater risk of severe illness or death to vote by absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Having a preexisting condition that puts a voter at a higher risk does not automatically create a temporary disability for absentee-voting purposes.” (7) “The Legislature addressed the COVID-19 pandemic and amended Section 23-15- 713(d) on July 8, 2020, to provide that, “‘temporary physical disability’ shall include any qualified elector who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 during the year 2020 or is caring for a dependent who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 . . . .” H.B. 1521, Reg. Sess., 2020 Miss. Laws ch.__, § 6.” (7) The Court found that “[h]ad the Legislature intended to allow a voter to vote absentee based on a physician’s recommendation, it would have provided so accordingly with plain language.” (8)

Background: “Six Plaintiffs brought suit in the Hinds County Chancery Court on August 26, 2020, through an amended complaint,1 seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the absentee-ballot provision under Mississippi law and its most recent addition in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” (1) “The matter before [the Court] present[ed] only a question of law concerning the chancery court’s interpretation of Section 23-15-713(d) in the Plaintiffs’ suit for declaratory relief. As with all questions of law, [the Court] review[ed] the chancery court’s decision de novo.” (6) 

Strickland v. Day, 239 So. 3d 486 (Miss. 2018). Beam concurred in plurality.

Holding(s): The Court held, “after review of the record and the relevant law, we find that the chancery court erred in this finding. First, an anonymous sperm donor is not a legal parent whose rights must be terminated. And second, the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Kimberly from challenging Christina’s legal parentage of Z.S. And so we reverse the findings of the chancery court and remand the case for a custody determination in a manner that is consistent with this opinion.” (2, 12) The Court relied on Section 93-9-10(2)(d) which states, “a father cannot seek to disestablish paternity when the child was conceived by AI during the marriage to the child’s mother. Reading this provision, in light of the context before [the Court], the logical conclusion—while not explicit—is that the Legislature never intended for an anonymous sperm donor to have parental rights in a child conceived from his sperm—irrespective of the sex of the married couple that utilized his sperm to have that child.” (7) The court further relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel that “applies when ‘there is a (1) belief and reliance on some representation; (2) a change of position as a result thereof; and (3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.’” (12)  The court found Christina met the requirements of the doctrine and stated, “[a]t bottom, to deny Christina the relationship she has built with Z.S. would be a miscarriage of justice.” Thus the court held that the non-biological parent need not terminate the right of the sperm donor and that equitable estoppel prevented the biological mother from challenging the non-biological mothers parenting, in cases of AI. 

Background: “Christina Strickland and Kimberly Day were a same-sex couple legally married in Massachusetts in 2009[.]” (1) They couple had a child through artificial insemination (AI). Kimberly was the gestational mother. The father was an anonymous sperm donor. The couple later divorced. “[T]he chancery court found, among other things, that Christina acted in loco parentis to Z.S., but that Christina was not Z.S.’s legal parent.” (2) The Court asked “whether the chancery court erred in finding that the rights of the anonymous sperm donor precluded a finding that Christina was Z.S.’s legal parent.” 

Concurrence in part: Waller concurred in part and in conclusion. He stated, “While this Court can use common-law principles to render a decision here,7 the Legislature should speak directly to the recognition of the legal status of children born during a marriage as the result of assisted reproductive technology. Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 931, 55 So. 2d 142, 152 (1951) (‘[T]he function of creating a public policy is primarily one to be exercised by the Legislature and not by the courts.’)” (17)

Concurrence in part: Coleman conurring in part and dissenting also disagreed with the Court’s application of equitable estoppel  as it was not an issue presented the trial court.

Concurrence in part: Maxwell concurring in part and dissenting in part wrote, “I also agree with Presiding Justice Randolph and Justice Coleman that it is improper to decide this case based on equitable estoppel—an argument not presented to the chancellor.” (18) 

Dissent: Randolph dissenting found “The statute referenced in the plurality’s opinion never was quoted or argued by either party at the trial level.” He found paragraphs ten through fourteen of the found the Chancellors final decree should be struck “only because they are obiter dictum.” “[T]he trial court found that Christina, standing in loco parentis to Z.S. and E.J., was entitled to the burdens and benefits of a parent, granting her rights to visitation and ordering child support. This finding is consistent with established legal principles, with or without the sperm donor or a determination of who is Z.S.’s natural father.” (22)

Ward v. Colom, 253 So. 3d 265 (Miss. 2018). En Banc. Joined Waller's concurrence and dissent in part, joined King's dissent and authored a concurrence and dissent in part.  

Beam's Concurrence: In Justice Beam's opinion she found that, "[t]he majority’s holding today that judges are without authority to control the security outside their courtrooms renders a sad day for justice in Mississippi." (17) "Knowing that litigants, witnesses, and court participants are secure in the sacred halls of the courthouse is imperative to assure 'justice for all.'" (17) Beam, " agree[d] with Justice King that the chancery court’s order is an appropriate exercise of inherent judicial authority, and that Section 97-37-7(2) as applied to the courts violate[d] the separation of powers." (17) Beam also, "agree[d] with Chief Justice Waller that extending a prohibition on firearms out into the parking lot (within 200 feet of any entrance door to the courthouses) may be overly broad." (17) "I would vacate the subject order without prejudice, and allow the trial judges to enter a specific, detailed analysis in a modified order for security restrictions beyond the courtroom walls." (17)

Concurrence and dissent in part: Waller found the Court should have "vacate[d] the trial-court order without prejudice for the trial judges to enter specific detailed analysis in a modified order supporting gun-carrying restrictions beyond the courtroom for the security of the courtroom." (13) Waller " d[id] not view a trial court’s inherent authority to secure the courtroom expansively." (14) Stated that "a trial court may impose only those measures that are necessary to secure the courtroom and the efficient disposition of judicial business conducted therein." (15)

Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Jackson Fed'n of Tchrs. & PSRPS, 372 So. 3d 997 (Miss. 2023). Concurred in Justice Griffis' majority opinion.

Holding(s): The Court "reversed the trial court's decision and render[ed] judgement in favor of JPS." (2)  The Court held that "JFT failed to establish standing[.]" (2) The Court specifically held that "JFT lack[ed] standing in its own right." (10) The Court found that evidence "fail[ed] to show that any JPS employees actually joined JFT, how long they maintained JFT membership, or that any JPS employees were JFT members at the time of litigation." (9) The Court stated, "there was no need for specific names. Instead, at any time throughout the litigation, JFT only needed one of its members to state that he or she knew of at least one member who currently worked for JPS. That did not happen." (9) The Court also held that JFT lacked associate standing. The Court stated, "[a]s previously discussed, JFT failed to show any current members employed by JPS. As a result, JFT failed to fulfill the first element of associate standing. Consequently, JFT lacks associate standing." (10)

S.F. v. Lamar Cnty. Dep't of Child Prot. Servs. by Davenport, 373 So. 3d 985 (Miss. 2023) Authored opinion. 

Holding(s): The Court upheld the previous ruling, which had “granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of [the] parents, finding that ‘the mother had refused and failed to protect the children after allegations of sexual abuse came to light.’” (3) The Court concluded that “the evidence supported the court’s findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.” (3) 

Addressing the dissent Beam wrote, “This Court will not disturb the [judge]’s opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the [judge] abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” (4)

Background: “Child Protection Services (CPS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents of three minor children who were sexually abused by their father. The mother, S.F., objected and argued that she should not lose her parental rights. The trial court granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of both parents. S.F. appeal[ed]” (1) The case arose after the stepfather of three children fathered a child with one of the three children who was 14 at the time. DNA test confirmed paternity. The step-fathered had previously been accused of sexual abuse of the three children. “At [a] permanency hearing, the court found that S.F. [(the Mother)] exhibited ‘mental abandonment and chronic disregard’ for both children through her continued relationship with J.F. and that S.F. lacked protective capacity.” (3) “The permanency plan was [then] changed to adoption, and CPS then petitioned for termination of both parents’ rights, asserting that reunification was not in the best interest of the children.” (3) “The court granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of both parents, finding that ‘the mother had refused and failed to protect the children after allegations of sexual abuse came to light. She refused to believe (or process in her words) and continued to live with [J.F.]—even after the DNA results.’” (3) 

Applicable law: “Mississippi Code Section 93-15-115 provides that a court may terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (a) ‘[t]he child has been adjudicated abused or neglected[,]’ (b) the child has been in CPS custody for at least six months and in that time period, CPS has developed a reunification plan for the parent and child, (c) the court has found after a permanency hearing that CPS has made reasonable efforts over a reasonable period to diligently assist the parent in complying with the reunification plan, ‘but the parent has failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the plan and that reunification with the abusive or neglectful parent is not in the best interests of the child[,] and’ (d) ‘[t]ermination of the parent’s parental rights is appropriate because reunification between the parent and child is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency outcome based on one or more of the grounds set out in Section 93-15-119 or 93-15-121.’” (5-6)““Abandonment is defined as ‘any conduct by a parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.’” (6)

Posted to Justice Beam's campaign Facebook page, "Enjoyed visiting with the Stone County Republican Party tonight and sharing what the Supreme Court does and why their vote is important."