Jim Kitchens

When asked why he was running for the Supreme Court Kitchens said, "There was a feeling that the Supreme Court was not well-balanced, that you got the same kind of result all the time. If you were on one side, you were always going to lose, and if you were on the other side, you were always going to win, so there was some truth to that. I didn't think Chief Justice James Smith was going to run again." (October 26, 2016)

When asked, "What is role of the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the role a justice on that court?" Justice Kitchen responded, "The Legislature passes laws, and then we interpret those laws, and our interpretation of the law is binding upon everybody in the state, including the Legislature. The individual justice's role is to make all that happen in an orderly and lawful manner. We are responsible for seeing that the rule of law prevails in Mississippi—not that we enforce laws. We don't do that, that's the executive branch's job. (We are responsible for) interpreting the laws in a consistent and usually in a predictable way, so that people can operate their businesses (and) can conduct their lives in a reasonable way, relying upon the courts of the state to keep things in due bounds, to keep things within the expected parameters that the public has a right to anticipate."

Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Jackson Fed'n of Tchrs. & PSRPS, 372 So. 3d 997 (Miss. 2023). Justice Kitchens joined Justice Coleman’s dissent.

Dissent: The dissent argued the Court should have “affirmed the judgement of the trial court[.]” (22) Justice Coleman stating that the majorty’s “holding [wa]s wrong for two reasons: (1) voluminous testimony in the record showed that the Federation [wa]s a legitimate organization, the interests of which [were] significantly affected by the District’s policies; and (2) parties are not required to present evidence in the record to prove what is common knowledge.” (10-11) Justice Coleman concluded that “[f]or the[] [above] reasons, and because the Federation’s First Amendment arguments [were] sound, [that he] would affirm the judgment of the trial court.” Justice Kitchen’s argued that “[t]he testimony clearly show[ed] a close, interdependent relationship between the Federation and the teachers.” (12) Justice Coleman detailed testimony of the five witnesses presented by JFT and found that “[t]he extent of interaction between the Federation and the District is demonstrated at length by the witnesses. Justice Coleman concluded that “[t]aken as a whole, the record provides ample evidence showing that the Federation is a legitimate organization that will be adversely impacted by the District’s policy changes unconstitutionally limiting their employee’s speech.” (16) “The majority holds that solely because there is no testimony containing the very specific magic words, ‘The Federation has members who teach in Jackson Public School,’ the Federation lacks standing.” (17) “When testimony established that the Federation was a teachers’ union, no further testimony was required to explain the basic purpose and function of a union. The court understands the plain meaning of words and does not require evidence to be presented to explain every definition.” (18) “By definition, a Jackson teachers’ union represents Jackson teachers. A court may, and should, proceed through trial without requiring parties to present evidence on definitions of words in the common knowledge. ‘The court can take judicial notice of a thing in the common knowledge and use of the people throughout the country.’ Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 38 (1875).” (18)

Justice Kitchens dissented finding that, “all three elements of associational standing [were] met, see Belhaven Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So. 2d 41, 47 (Miss. 1987) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977))[.]” (19) Next Justice Coleman concluded that “[t]he policies enacted by the District violate the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to Mississippi citizens by our constitution.” (20) Lastly Kitchen’s concluded that “the issue was not moot, and multiple free speech violations occurred.” (22)

Background: The issue pertained to the constitutionality of school policies. Specifically, “JFT claimed that JPS violated article 3, section 11, and article 3, section 13, of the Mississippi Constitution by restricting ‘the speech of its employees through a web of formal and informal policies, guidance documents, trainings and instructions’ through its Confidential Information Policy (GACC), Staff Ethics Policy (GBA), and Social Networking Websites Policy (GBAA).” (2)  JPS argued tht JFT lacked standing. “The trial court (1) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, (2) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for mootness, (3) found that JPS’s three policies were in violation of article 3, section 11, and article 3, section 13, of the Mississippi Constitution, and (4) issued a permanent injunction enjoining JPS from enforcing the policies.” (1-2) 

Hines v. Caldwell, 384 So. 3d 1238 (Miss. 2024). Concurred in Beams' opinion.

Holding: The Court held that “[t]he chancellor erred by awarding permanent relief without a hearing.” (5) The Court reasoned that “[d]ivesting and dismissing CPS from the case is permanent relief. Permanent relief cannot be done without a hearing, even under the guise of a temporary order.” (5) “In B.A.D., this Court held the chancellor erred by to Finnegan, the natural parent, ‘without any on-the-record-findings.’” (5) “[I]n Robison v. Lanford, this Court held, ‘[w]e cannot properly review a chancellor’s judgment without full knowledge of all the evidence the chancellor considered when making the judgment.’” (6) “Here, the chancellor did not make any on-the-record findings because he did not hold a hearing. Without a record or evidence, this Court has nothing to review. Accordingly, [the Court] reverse[d] the temporary order, which granted permanent relief, and ... remand[ed] the case for further proceedings.” (6-7) The Court further noted that “durable legal custody [wa]s not an appropriate award after a termination of parental rights[,]” because “the natural parents retain residual rights and responsibilities as to the child.” (7) 

Strickland v. Day, 239 So. 3d 486 (Miss. 2018). Kitchens concurred in plurality.

Holding(s) & Analysis: The Court held, “after review of the record and the relevant law, we find that the chancery court erred in this finding. First, an anonymous sperm donor is not a legal parent whose rights must be terminated. And second, the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Kimberly from challenging Christina’s legal parentage of Z.S. And so we reverse the findings of the chancery court and remand the case for a custody determination in a manner that is consistent with this opinion.” (2, 12) The Court relied on Section 93-9-10(2)(d) which states, “a father cannot seek to disestablish paternity when the child was conceived by AI during the marriage to the child’s mother. Reading this provision, in light of the context before [the Court], the logical conclusion—while not explicit—is that the Legislature never intended for an anonymous sperm donor to have parental rights in a child conceived from his sperm—irrespective of the sex of the married couple that utilized his sperm to have that child.” (7) The court further relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel that “applies when ‘there is a (1) belief and reliance on some representation; (2) a change of position as a result thereof; and (3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.’” (12)  The court found Christina met the requirements of the doctrine and stated, “[a]t bottom, to deny Christina the relationship she has built with Z.S. would be a miscarriage of justice.” Thus the court held that the non-biological parent need not terminate the right of the sperm donor and that equitable estoppel prevented the biological mother from challenging the non-biological mothers parenting, in cases of AI.

Background: “Christina Strickland and Kimberly Day were a same-sex couple legally married in Massachusetts in 2009[.]” (1) They couple had a child through artificial insemination (AI). Kimberly was the gestational mother. The father was an anonymous sperm donor. The couple later divorced. “[T]he chancery court found, among other things, that Christina acted in loco parentis to Z.S., but that Christina was not Z.S.’s legal parent.” (2) The Court asked, "whether the chancery court erred in finding that the rights of the anonymous sperm donor precluded a finding that Christina was Z.S.’s legal parent.” T

Concurrence in part: Waller concurred in part and in conclusion. He stated, “While this Court can use common-law principles to render a decision here, the Legislature should speak directly to the recognition of the legal status of children born during a marriage as the result of assisted reproductive technology." (17)

Concurrence in part: Coleman conurring in part and dissenting also disagreed with the Court’s application of equitable estoppel as it was not an issue presented the trial court.

Concurring in part: Maxwell concurring in part and dissenting in part wrote, “I also agree with Presiding Justice Randolph and Justice Coleman that it is improper to decide this case based on equitable estoppel—an argument not presented to the chancellor.” (18) 

Dissent: Randolph dissenting found “The statute referenced in the plurality’s opinion never was quoted or argued by either party at the trial level.” He found paragraphs ten through fourteen of the found the Chancellors final decree should be struck “only because they are obiter dictum.” “[T]he trial court found that Christina, standing in loco parentis to Z.S. and E.J., was entitled to the burdens and benefits of a parent, granting her rights to visitation and ordering child support. This finding is consistent with established legal principles, with or without the sperm donor or a determination of who is Z.S.’s natural father.” (22)

Watson v. Oppenheim, 301 So. 3d 37 (Miss. 2020). En banc. Beam authored opinion.

Holding(s): “[The Court] f[ou]nd that the chancery court’s order erred to the extent it declared that Section 25- 15-713(d) 'permits any voter with pre-existing conditions that cause COVID-19 to present a greater risk of severe illness or death to vote by absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic.' Having a preexisting condition that puts a voter at a higher risk does not automatically create a temporary disability for absentee-voting purposes.” (7) “The Legislature addressed the COVID-19 pandemic and amended Section 23-15- 713(d) on July 8, 2020, to provide that, “‘temporary physical disability’ shall include any qualified elector who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 during the year 2020 or is caring for a dependent who is under a physician-imposed quarantine due to COVID-19 . . . .” H.B. 1521, Reg. Sess., 2020 Miss. Laws ch.__, § 6.” (7) The Court found that “[h]ad the Legislature intended to allow a voter to vote absentee based on a physician’s recommendation, it would have provided so accordingly with plain language.” (8) 

Background: “Six Plaintiffs brought suit in the Hinds County Chancery Court on August 26, 2020, through an amended complaint,1 seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the absentee-ballot provision under Mississippi law and its most recent addition in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” (1) The Court stated, “[t]he matter before us presents only a question of law concerning the chancery court’s interpretation of Section 23-15-713(d) in the Plaintiffs’ suit for declaratory relief. As with all questions of law, we review the chancery court’s decision de novo.” (6)