Debra Lehrmann

Notable Cases:

In In re State of Texas (2020) Justice Lehrmann signed Guzman’s concurrence. Emphasized the importance of the issue and the court’s unity in its principal holdings (2-3).  Signed Hecht’s majority opinion. Denied a petition from the State for a writ of mandamus to prevent respondent county clerks from misinforming voters on disability requirements and improperly approving mail-in ballot applications. County Clerk found lack of immunity to COVID-19 to be a “disability” (2). Held that lack of immunity to COVID was not a “disability” according to statutory mail-in ballot requirements (2). Court included dicta that it was confident that clerks would comply with the law in issuing ballots (2). The court found that the legal requirement of “sickness or physical condition” did not apply to those who did not have immunity to COVID absent other factors, since individuals with no COVID immunity are not sick and have no abnormal health complications or incapacity (21). Court held that clerks have no ministerial duty to determine whether applicants have a “likelihood of injury due to a physical condition” in applying for a mail-in ballot—that determination rests on applicants (24). Good elements: court noted that it does not involve itself with political disputes, only in interpreting the law (2) rejected a broad interpretation of “physical condition” due to inconsistencies with the text (20). 

In Texas v. Hollins (2020) Justice Lehrmann signed a per curiam opinion. Held that the Harris County Clerk did not have the implied authority under the Election Code required to send mail-in ballot applications to all county voters under the age of 65 (1). The case was remanded to issue a temporary injunction against sending the ballots (2). Lower courts denied a temporary injunction because they found that the state would not be irreparably harmed by mailing out the applications (5). Found that the clerk’s action was not “necessary” because such a move was unprecedented (8). Held that ultra vires conduct (i.e. beyond an official’s authority) is inherently harmful to the state due to precedent (13-14).  Good elements: focused on the question of law rather than what would make good policy in light of COVID (2) court restated that municipalities are subdivisions of the state and only have the sovereignty assigned to them (7). Court affirmed trial courts finding that the case turns on the law, not the circumstances of COVID-19 (8). Originalist elements: statutes are interpreted according to their plain meaning and in context (9). Concerning elements: noted legislative intent (11, 12)—however used this to argue that in-person voting was the norm because mail-in faced heavy regulation under law.

In Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League (2022) Justice Lehrmann signed Guzman’s concurrence. Argued that the judiciary’s function is only to say what the law is and not what it should be (2). Argued that the dispositive question in the case is whether in expanding ballot access the governor harmed voting rights to which the answer is no (3). Signed per curiam opinion. Denied petition for a temporary injunction against the governor’s requirement that there only be one mail-in drop off site per county because plaintiffs failed to show a probable right to relief based on the merits of the case (6). Found that the governor’s proclamations has expanded rather than impaired voting rights (6). Held that the Governor was permitted by the Disaster Act’s emergency powers to amend his earlier emergency proclamations even if the content was not directly tied to the disaster (7-8). Held that the October Proclamation placed a “lesser burden” on the right to vote, which according to precedent does not trigger strict scrutiny (11). Held that disparate impact claims due to county’s geographic size differences was not relevant because county size also has many impacts on elections under normal circumstances (16). Originalist elements: separation of powers (2). 

In Pidgeon v. Turner (2017) Justice Lehrmann signed Boyd's majority opinion. Involved key issues. Held that the court had the authority to review the trial court’s interlocutory appeal. Appeals court said that the 5th Circuit precedent of De Leon should be followed, which is inconsistent with precedent that the 5th circuit is not binding on Texas (10). Held that the court of appeals language elevating De Leon to the level of binding rather than persuasive precedent was improper (11). The resulting uncertainty allowed the Supreme Court to review the interlocutory order (11). Plaintiff arguments (11-12). Held that De Leon is not binding on the trial court (12). Held that the injunction should not have been reversed but rather vacated, so that Pidgeon may petition for injunction again on remand (12-13)— this was not res judicata because Obergefell had substantially changed the law (13). Court declined to rule on questions of whether funds spend prior to Obergefell should be “clawed back” because Pidgeon never sought such relief in the injunction, and the injunction did not provide for it (17). Held that Obergefell did not necessarily entitle same-sex couples to the same benefits as heterosexual couples (20). Rejected amicus briefs asking the court to decide the issue there because there had not been briefing and full fact-finding (20). Held that it was unclear whether the mayor acted ultra vires or if that claim was still active post-Obergefell (22).

Morath v. The Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition (2016) 

In In re C.J.C Justice Lehrmann wrote a concurrence. Expanded on how she believed a court should determine when the fit-parent presumption has been overcome, and remarked that the majority appropriately did not discuss the issue in its opinion (2). Noted that the Troxel court did not define “the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context” (3).  The court has not examined how a non-parent whose standing in based on the parent-like role they played to the child relates to the fit-parent presumption since Troxel (5). “As such, while the fit-parent presumption is a pivotal part of the best-interest analysis even in the absence of a specific statutory standard, it is not absolute” (6) due to other state supreme courts’ post-Troxel analyses that courts may give requisite parental deference while still considering the child’s well-being through relationships of parental figures (6). Activist elements: argued courts may overrule the presumption in favor of fit parents’ decision making post-Troxel if a non-parental figure has standing to sue and the parent’s decision would harm the child (6-7). Signed Bland’s majority opinion.

In In the Interest of H.S Justice Lehrmann wrote the majority opinion. Held that grandparents who cared for a child for eight months had standing to bring a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (1-2). Case turned on what "actual care and control" meant (8). Court sided with the precedent of Jasek which defined it as de facto day-to-day care, rather than In re: K.K.C. which said there was a legal representation requirement (8-9). Held that the Jasek construction was consistent with the idea of in loco parentis and that the law did not specify that legal representation was a requirement (10). Held that exclusive care was not a requirement because it was not included in the statute (11). Argued that the dissent conflates actual control and legal control (12). Argued dissent placed too much focus on the parents' conduct (12). Held that "actual care and control" means that 1) the non-parent lives with the child 2) non-parent cares for child's physical and psychological needs 3) non-parent makes authoritative decisions in the child's life (14). Held that the supposed temporary nature of the child staying with the grandparents did not change the facts because the parents chose not to assume care of her (16). Held that the "actual care and control" requirement puts the case outside the precedent of Troxel (18). Good elements: Said that words of a statute were used or not used for a reason (7). Concerning elements: Dissent argued that "actual control" cannot mean simply day to day care for the child because it would not be distinct from normal care-- it must mean the authority to make important decisions (11-12).

Justice Debra Lehrmann (R) is a member of the Texas Supreme Court. She was appointed by Governor Rick Perry (R) in June 2010.

Judge Voter Guide gave Justice Lehrmann 4/5 stars.