Jeffrey Boyd

Agree

No Answer

The government shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

Strongly Agree

Strongly Agree

I am a Christian who believes the Bible is God's inspired word for mankind.

I must decline to answer

During my 16 years in private practice, I maintained a commitment to always have at least one active pro bono case, referred to me by Volunteer Legal Services of Central Texas, on my docket. I also served on the board of VLSCT for many years, including as its president. Although I am not permitted to take on pro-bono cases as a judge, I have actively supported the Court’s numerous access-to-justice efforts.

2012 Republican Primary, 2012 General Election, 2014 Republican Primary, 2014 General Election, 2016 Republican Primary, 2016 General Election, 2018 Republican Primary, 2018 General Election

Conservative

My voting record

Law school performance, judicial clerkship, sixteen years of private practice in both trial and appellate courts, three years as head of civil litigation for the state of Texas, two years as general counsel and chief of staff for the Texas Governor, and seven years as Supreme Court justice.

Civil litigation and appeals; government litigation

No

My consistently demonstrated and broadly recognized commitment to fairly applying the law without regard to personal, policy, or political preferences sets me apart from my opponents. (See www.justicejeffboyd.org/supporters/)

For more information visit justicejeffboyd.org

Strongly Disagree

No Answer

I cant select 1 that “best” reflects my philosophy

It depends on what "legislative history" the question refers to. If a statute's language is ambiguous, courts may properly consider such historical considerations as when the statute was enacted relative to other enactments that relate to the same subject matter, and statutorily-expressed purposes related to the historical circumstances. It is rarely, if ever, appropriate to consider purposes or understandings expressed by individual legislators during the legislative process.

As I explained in a recent opinion: “Stare decisis is a sound policy because it promotes certainty and finality. . . . [But if] a prior decision is wrong, our duty to uphold the law compels us to correct the decision unless it has provided the governing rule for ‘so long,’ and citizens have relied on it so extensively, that ‘greater injustice would be done to individuals, and more injury result to society by a reversal of such decision, though erroneous, than to follow and observe it.’ But when ‘adherence to a judicially-created rule of law no longer furthers’ the interests of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy, ‘and “the general interest will suffer less by such departure, than from a strict adherence,” we should not hesitate to depart from a prior holding.’” City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 792–93 (Tex. 2018) (Boyd, J., dissenting) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 215 (Tex. 2001), and P.J. Willis & Bro. v. Owen, 43 Tex. 41, 48 (1875)).

I generally disagree with the analysis that led to the Supreme Court’s recognition of constitutionally protected yet unspecified and unexpressed “penumbral" rights. Because that approach now serves as well-settled law, however, I believe the Court’s analysis must focus on our society's historical practices and traditions to evaluate whether any particular “right” falls within a very narrow category or those qualifying as “fundamental” to individual liberties. This analysis cannot be merely theoretical or conducted in a vacuum.