Background

From his official judicial website: The Honorable Daniel (Dan) McCaffery (D) was elected to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, assuming office in 2020. “[a]ppointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the Court of Judicial Discipline 2020[.]” Prior, he was a “Judge [for the] First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 2014-2019[.]” 

Judge McCaffery graduated from Temple University School of Law, J.D. 

Judicial Philosophy

• From his campaign website, judgemccaffery.com: “I have always worked to make our society more fair, inclusive, and accepting. Pennsylvanians deserve a justice who will always protect, obey, and defend the constitution. I believe I am that person. Over the next several months, I hope to earn your trust, your support, and your vote.”

Controversial Issues

• Celebrated “Pride.” See Facebook posts from June 04, 2023 and from June 10, 2023. 
• Was endorsed by “Ricky’s Pride PAC.” See Facebook post from May 10, 2023.
• Celebrated Juneteenth. See Facebook post from June 19, 2023. 
• Guest spoke at the PA Machinists Union State Council convention. See Facebook post from June 6, 2023. 
• Advocates for “women’s reproductive rights and LGBTQ+ equality.” See Facebook post from May 17, 2023 where Judge McCaffery posted:
• “THANK YOU Pennsylvania Democrats for your overwhelming support. From day one, I’ve said that I’m running to become a Supreme Court Justice with the courage and conviction to protect, defend, and obey our constitution and the rights it provides. Voting rights, worker rights, women’s reproductive rights and LGBTQ+ equality, just to name a few. I will not let you down, but will reward the faith you’ve instilled in me. Join me and together we’ll win these critical judicial elections in November. Let’s GO!

Notable Case

• Joined Panella's majority in Commonwealth v. Lopez (2021) in which the Court “conclude[d] that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing. Although the court had the discretion to consider that motion at sentencing, it was not required to do so by Rule 706 because Appellant had not yet been threatened with incarceration as a result of a default. Should that occur, Appellant will be entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing pursuant to Rule 706 at that time.”[12] The court found that “[w]hen the sections of Rule 706 are read sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of statutory construction direct, it becomes clear that Section C only requires a trial court to determine a defendant's ability to pay at a hearing that occurs prior to incarceration, as referenced in Sections A and B.” [5]  The court found support from Commonwealth v. Ciptak, 441 Pa.Super. 534, 657 A.2d 1296 (1995) which “reject[ed]  the defendant's claim that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(c), the predecessor to [page number omitted]  Rule 706,  required the sentencing court to determine his ability to pay prior to imposing costs at sentencing[.]”[5-6] Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court had the opportunity to explicitly repudiate the interpretation of Rule 1407 by our Court in Ciptak when renumbering Rule 1407 as Rule 706 and it did not do so. Instead, it left the Rule materially unchanged without any reference to the issue raised in Ciptak. Our Supreme Court, in fact, recently indicated its agreement with Ciptak’s interpretation[.]” [7] Additionally, this interpretation “most closely aligns with the case that is cited by the Comment to Rule 706 as a general reference point for the Rule. In that case, Commonwealth ex. rel. Benedict v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973), our Supreme Court held that a defendant has the constitutional right to an opportunity to show that he cannot afford the fine or costs that have been imposed on him prior to being incarcerated for failure to pay the fine or costs.”[9]  Issue1: Did “the court err[] by denying [appellant’s] Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing because Section C of Rule 706 obliges a sentencing court to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing court costs on a defendant at sentencing.” [4] Appellant argues that “. . . Section C ... unambiguously requires that a court consider a defendant's ability to pay when it imposes costs.”[4]
• Dissents in Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (2021), finding that “Section 1738(c) requires a new stacking waiver whenever the stacked amount of UIM coverage changes — regardless of whether the change is an increase or decrease in the amount of stacked coverage. This interpretation complies with our stated policy of construing the statute ‘liberally in favor of the insured’ so as to ‘afford[ ] the injured claimant the greatest possible coverage.’ See Jones, 40 A.3d at 127. Thus, I would conclude the Frankses were entitled to stacked UIM coverage in the amount of $200,000, and I would reverse the declaratory '' Justice McCaffery found “the Majority's focus [ ] too narrow. [And] [f]urther, [the Majority’s]  myopic interpretation undermines the stated purpose of the MVFRL which is to afford coverage to insureds.” Justice McCaffery found “[i]n determining whether a new stacking waiver is required, what is critical is whether there is a change in the potential amount of stacked coverage.” McCaffery cites Sackett where “the Supreme Court concluded a new waiver of the increased stacked coverage was required.” And cites “Barnard, [where] the Court held that a new waiver was required when the insured increased their UIM coverage on vehicles they already possessed, noting the insurer ‘was required to offer [the insured] the opportunity to waive stacking of the new, aggregate amount of UIM coverage at that time.’”  Justice McCaffery further disagreed with the Majority that Shipp was “inapplicable” finding their interpretation “too restricted.” Justice McCaffery noted that “[t]he Shipp Court could have narrowed its holding by stating a new stacking waiver is required only when an insured's coverage increases.”
• Concurred and Dissented in Goodwin v. Goodwin (2019) holding, "I would reverse the trial court's finding that Son's life insurance proceeds were a 'gift,' and thus excluded from the marital estate, within the meaning of Section 3501 of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code." [12] Justice McCaffery stated, the issue "may be resolved by applying the plain meaning of Section 3501 of the Divorce Code and Section 6108(a) of the PEC. The plain language of Section 3501 and Section 6108(a) is clear. As our statutes resolve this issue, I would not, as the Majority does, consider how our sister states have resolved similar claims. Any exception or accommodation in the statute must come from our legislature, and not by this Court's selective modification of how the statute should apply in certain circumstances." [15] McCaffery "would begin review by examining the statutory language of Section 3501, as well as Section 6108(a) of the PEC Code." [13] 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a)(3),(b)) states, "All real or personal property acquired by either party during the marriage is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common or tenancy by the entirety. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in Subsection (a)." [12] Thus," [a]s the Son died while the Goodwin's were married, his life insurance and IRA proceeds were presumed to be 'marital property' pursuant to Section 3501(b), and to establish otherwise, Wife bore the burden of showing the proceeds were acquired by a method set forth in Subsection (a)." [14] "Section 3501(a) excludes the following from marital property: '[p]roperty acquired by gift, ... bequest, devise or descent or property acquired in exchange for such property.'" [14] Further, "Section 6108(a) of the PEC provides: 'The designation of beneficiaries of life insurance ... shall not be considered testamentary and shall not be subject to any law governing the transfer of property by will.'" [14] McCaffery "agree[d] with the trial court that Son's life insurance proceeds were not testamentary bequests, devises, or descents" thus were not a gift. [14] Issue 1: "Husband asserts that under Section 6108(a) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (PEC Code), the trial court properly found Son's life insurance and IRA proceeds were not a 'bequest, devise, or descent' pursuant to Subsection 3501(a)(3)." [13] Holding 2: Justice McCaffery agreed with the Majority that "[t]he trial court clearly concluded the debts were marital in nature, notwithstanding Wife's decision to pay them 'with her separate money.'" [15] Issue 2: "Did the trial court commit reversible error when it failed to designate and apply a percentage to the equitable distribution scheme in its [o]rder, and then failed to make a clear distribution scheme in its [o]pinion?" [4] Holding 3: Justice McCaffery agreed with the Majority that" 'the distribution as a whole in light of the court's overall application of the 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a) factors' reveals no abuse of discretion under Section 3502." [12] Agreeing that the "[h]usband's issue [w]as 'less a claim the distribution scheme was unclear and more a claim Husband disagree[d] with the treatment of the marital debt." [15] The Majority stated, "we have long held we will not reweigh the relevant statutory factors on appeal, as that is not our role as an appellate court." [12] Issue 3: "Did the trial court commit [a] reversible error, abuse its discretion, and fashion an equitable distribution award that was manifestly unreasonable by failing to consider all of the relevant factors in 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3502, by adding words to factors to change their meaning, and by not properly applying the factors?" [4]
• Concurred in Commonwealth v. Purnell (2019)